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This thesis focuses on the coverage of the National Socialist movement by 
the American and British press in the period from 1922 to 1933.  Two major 
newspapers from both the United States and Great Britain were reviewed, as were 
several magazines and periodicals from those years.  The nature of the coverage, 
as well as its accuracy, was the primary concern of this work.  For the most part, 
the Anglo-American press emphasized the most visible political activities of the 
National Socialists and especially the prominent role of Adolf Hitler. American 
and British journalists addressed the violent, aggressive nature of the movement 
much more so than its inherent anti-Semitism and racist goals.  Though a handful 
of journalists recognized that the party’s hatred of the Jews was seminal to 
Nazism, this view was never addressed frequently or prominently.  The Anglo-
American press consistently underestimated the ability of the party to implement 
their goals.  Instead, the party was considered a temporary outlet for German 
economic woes in both the early 1920s and early 1930s.  In reality, following the 
failure of an attempted Nazi coup in 1923, the party reorganized and expanded its 
potential base of support, setting the stage for a more enthusiastic support than 
was perceived by the foreign press.  Overall, the American and British press was 
able to accurately assess the nature of the National Socialist movement before it 
took over Germany, but in an imbalanced way that did not take its aggressive 
aspirations seriously.  Though there was alarm when Hitler was made Chancellor 
iv
in 1933, American and British journalists honestly believed that his power would 
be limited.  
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On May 29, 1922, the British press first took notice of a small south 
German political movement that would bring unprecedented suffering on the 
world, the National Socialist German Workers Party (Nationalsozialistische 
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, shortened to Nazi party or NSDAP).1  Advocating an 
aggressive and racist ideology based on the pseudo-scientific beliefs of its leader, 
Adolf Hitler, the Nazi Party would eventually lead Germany into a series of wars 
against many of its neighbors and other countries abroad.  The horrors World War 
II unleashed were unmatched in human history, and included millions of victims 
of Nazi racist murder, most notably the Jews.  The National Socialists represented 
the worst aspects of humanity, and it cost millions of lives to defeat them.  
England, the Soviet Union, and the United States spent years trying to eliminate 
the threat of a Nazi-dominated world, going to war with Germany, Britain in 
1939, Russia and America in 1941.  By 1939, it was clear to the world that the 
Nazis represented a grave threat to world security, as they had intimidated other 
European powers into making concessions to Germany while at the same time 
terrorizing parts of their own population.  
When the Nazis came to power in 1933, many abroad had hoped that the 
responsibility of leading a country would tame the movement, forcing it to leave 
behind some of its more radical policies.  As the decade progressed, it was clear 
                                                
1 “Imperial and Foreign News Items,” The Times 29 May 1922, 9g.
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that power only incited Hitler and his followers and did not restrain them. Yet the 
Western powers of Britain and France did nothing to stop German transgressions, 
while the United States did not fully engage Germany until Hitler declared war on 
America.  
Given these responses, the question arises of how well the former allies 
and their citizens knew and understood the true intentions of the Nazi party before 
1933 - specifically, if it was possible to know that Hitler’s intentions were never 
at any point a limited scheme of returning Germany to its pre-war status, but 
rather a plan to build an ethnically German empire throughout much of Europe.  
Hitler’s memoir Mein Kampf, or “My Struggle,” published in 1924, enumerated 
many of the ideological, racial, and foreign policies the Nazis would endorse, but 
it was not available in even an abridged English version until October 1933, 
almost nine months after Hitler became German chancellor.2  
This thesis intends to answer the question about the availability of 
information concerning the Nazis in the West by examining English and 
American press coverage from the point when the Nazis were first mentioned in 
the press of these countries, May 1922, until Hitler was named chancellor in 
January 1933.  The accuracy and nature of the information available in the 
Western press during those years is important to determine, especially because a 
significant source of knowledge of the Nazi party for American and British 
citizens came from what they read in newspapers and magazines.
                                                
2 James J. Barnes and Patience M. Barnes, Hitler’s Mein Kampf in Britain and America: A 
Publishing History, 1930-1939 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 6-7, 73.
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After the First World War, the United States, Great Britain, and Germany 
followed very different paths.  To Americans, the war had been a great mistake, 
and for many years following its conclusion, American citizens wanted little or 
nothing to do with the problems of the European continent.  This isolationist 
attitude lasted into the 1930s, when the effects of the Great Depression caused 
many Americans to focus on their problems.3  Official interaction between the 
United States and Germany from the end of the war until 1933 was mainly in the 
form of negotiations on reparations and loans made by the U.S. government and 
private firms to both the Allied nations and Germany.4  Great Britain was faced 
by a variety of internal and external difficulties in the 1920s, though it was an 
unquestioned leader of the European community.  An economic downturn began 
at the war’s end that would not be alleviated fully until World War II.  Continuing 
economic troubles plagued England, and the British had to take a leading role in 
trying to sort out post-war European financial agreements in order to help 
stabilize their own economy.5  
Even though Great Britain experienced some serious problems in the 
1920s and early 1930s, however, it did not have to deal with the multifaceted 
social, political, and economic upheavals that shook Germany after the war and 
contributed to the rise of National Socialism.  Following the war and resulting 
political revolution in the country, a republic was set up in Germany in the city of 
Weimar in 1919, replacing the German empire that had led the country to war in 
                                                
3 David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-
1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 385-388.
4 Ibid, 71-73.
5 Felix Gilbert and David Clay Large, The End of the European Era: 1890 to the Present (New 
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002), 196-201.
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1914.  The new Weimar government faced severe problems from the outset, 
including political strife that saw several of its important leaders assassinated.  
There were serious attempts from both the political left and right to take over the 
country.  The Weimar republic also had to deal with the repercussions of the 
Treaty of Versailles, which faced bitter opposition from almost all Germans.6  The 
same year that the republic was founded, a former Bavarian army corporal by the 
name of Adolf Hitler joined a fledgling nationalist party in Munich known as the 
German Workers Party (Deutsche Arbeiterpartei).  At the time, the party was only 
one of numerous nationalist conservative parties in the city where many of the 
ideas that would be incorporated into the Nazi party were circulating.7  Over the 
next three years Hitler assumed almost total control of the group, slowly building 
the organization into an influential force in Munich politics.8  It was in 1922 that 
the Western press first took notice of this charismatic demagogue and his band of 
followers, and the importance of its coverage of the National Socialist movement 
thereafter should not be underestimated.
The press can play a powerful role in determining public opinion, which in 
turn may help shape the policy of a country’s government.  The Nazis themselves 
knew how crucial foreign press coverage of their movement would be, and they 
worked to cultivate favorable opinions among American, and especially British, 
journalists.9 Historian Deborah Lipstadt emphasized the importance of the press 
                                                
6 Ibid, 186-190.
7 Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris (New York: W.W. London and Company, 2000), 126-
127, 134-136; 
8 Milan Hauner, Hitler: A Chronology of his Life and Time (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 
18-33.
9 Frank McDonough, “The Times, Norman Ebbut and the Nazis, 1927-37,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 27 (1992): 408-409, 412-419.
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in her groundbreaking work examining American press coverage of Nazi anti-
Semitism and the Holocaust from 1933 to1945.   Referring to the concept of the 
press as “a looking glass to history,” she wrote: “The press does far more than 
passively hold up that looking glass; it positions the glass, and the way it does that 
serves to shape the events themselves.  The mirror, as the medium, becomes part 
of the message.”10  Though she was referring to the level of knowledge the 
American press related concerning the Holocaust, her words also apply to the 
coverage of the National Socialist movement from 1922 to 1933 by American and 
British journalists.  The information available to American and British 
policymakers on the National Socialists was important when considering the 
foreign policy of those countries during the 1930s, when they had to interact with 
a government led by that party.  The press can in fact shape what the people think 
about, and in what way they think about it.11  It is therefore important to 
determine how the press characterized the Nazi movement before it came to 
power in Germany.12
This thesis will focus mainly, but not exclusively, on two newspapers each 
from the United States and Great Britain.  The two American papers are the New 
York Times and Washington Post.  Both began covering the National Socialist 
movement in the early 1920s and dedicated a large amount of attention to the 
party’s evolution.  The New York Times utilized a sizable group of correspondents 
in Germany to cover the Nazis, while the Washington Post relied more heavily on 
                                                
10 Deborah Lipstadt, Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust, 1933-
1945 (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 9-10.
11 Ibid, 3.
12 Within this thesis, the term Western press refers to the specific sources chosen from the United 
States and Great Britain.
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reports from the Associated Press.  Such articles were nonetheless important, as 
they represented information that many smaller American newspapers had access 
to.  
The Times of London and the Manchester Guardian Weekly are the two 
newspapers from Great Britain that will be analyzed.  The Times provided 
detailed information from on site correspondents as did the New York Times.  The 
Manchester Guardian Weekly was a collection of the most important articles from 
the daily publication of the Guardian, combined into one release.  It provided 
another English viewpoint on the unfolding events in Germany.13  
In addition to the newspapers, a variety of magazines from the 1920s and 
early 1930s were consulted to provide a more complete view of the National 
Socialists in the eyes of the Anglo-American press.  Of such publications, Time
magazine was the most important because of its weekly sections dealing with 
foreign affairs, often focusing on Germany and the Nazis.  The Nation provided 
several important features concerning the Nationalist Socialists.  In 1932, 
Collier’s, Scribner’s, and The Atlantic Monthly all contributed important articles 
as the Nazis began their attempts to win power through several German elections.
There were a myriad of reasons that allowed the National Socialists to 
come to power in Germany.  Historians have focused on a combination of 
economic, social, and political factors which played a significant role in the 
                                                
13 For histories of these newspapers during the 1920s and 1930s see Meyer Berger, The Story of 
the New York Times: 1851-1951 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951); Chalmers M. Roberts, 
The Washington Post: The First 100 Years (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977); The 
History of The Times: The 150th Anniversary and Beyond, 1912-1948, Vol. 4 (London: Office of 
the Times, 1952); David Ayerst, The Manchester Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1971).
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development of a political atmosphere that allowed a large segment of the 
German people to accept a radical and violent Nazi platform.14   The American 
and British press put many of these issues on display in their coverage of the 
National Socialist movement from 1922 to 1933.  In those years, it provided 
crucial information about Nazi intentions should the party ever come to power, 
indeed the only extensive information that was available about Hitler and his early 
movement to many citizens of the United States and Great Britain.  What 
information the press provided readers, and the way in which it was presented, 
should be considered an important basis for examining the Western response to 
the Nazis following their takeover of Germany.
                                                
14 Peter D. Stachura, “Introduction: Weimar, National Socialism and Historians,” The Nazi 
Machtergreifung, Peter D. Stachura ed. (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), 1-11.
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CHAPTER TWO
FIRST IMPRESSIONS: MAY 1922 TO OCTOBER 1923
The British and American Press had little reason to devote much coverage 
to the relatively small and insignificant National Socialist German Workers Party 
before 1922.  Anti-democratic agitation in Bavaria was rampant as reactionaries, 
supporters of a strong nationalist and conservative policy, poured into the state.  
Bavaria served as an open venue to vent against and foment for the destruction of 
the republican Weimar regime in Berlin, and the Nazis were only one radical 
group among many.  In 1922, however, events would lead to limited recognition 
of the young Nazi movement and its fanatically energetic leader, Adolf Hitler.  
Benito Mussolini led his Fascist party forces to power in the Italian government in 
October, something some press agencies saw as a possibility with Hitler and his 
followers.  Also, the German economy began experiencing serious problems by 
the end of the year, exacerbated by the invasion of the Ruhr by French forces in 
early 1923, whose aim was making sure German reparation obligations were met. 
 In this environment, Hitler was able to garner significant coverage 
abroad.  His tireless recruitment of party followers in Bavaria led some to believe 
that he could call upon a virtual army of armed and fervent troops ready to march 
on Berlin and impose the return of a monarchy or dictatorship.  Though almost a 
decade away from gaining control of Germany, the Nazis were deemed a potential 
threat to the stability of Europe that might warrant closer coverage.  In these first 
months of the NSDAP’s international presence, the fundamental characteristics of 
10
Nazism were on display for all to see.  An inherent violent and xenophobic party 
nature was plainly visible in the reports of American and British journalists, as 
was the core belief of the Nazis, their vehement hatred of the Jews.  In this period, 
Hitler and his charismatic leadership would be a central focus of many journalists, 
as some writers even helped in the construction of the myth that was already 
being built around an emerging Führer.  Reports made it clear that the Nazis 
would work ruthlessly to see their goals realized, and they are early indicators of 
what would happen once they seized power in the 1930s.
The first report on the Nazis from either American or British press 
agencies appeared in May 1922.  The Times of London reported in a short article 
on a group, “moddeled(sic) apparently on the lines of the Fascisti,” which went by 
the name of National Socialists.  The article observed that the group would 
consider it an outrage for the German Federal President Friedrich Ebert to pay a 
visit to Munich, the capital of Bavaria, where many anti-Weimar and anti-
democratic conservatives cared little for the leader of what was seen as a Socialist 
Republic.15  Though lacking in details, the article represented accurately the 
party’s activities at the time, mainly agitating in order to gain public exposure.  
After Hitler’s consolidation of his control over the movement in July 1921 at the 
expense of other early party leaders, the small group of Nazis followed a course 
of rabble rousing meant to generate publicity.  
A major source of discontent that Hitler tapped was the tension between 
Bavaria and the federal or Weimar government in Berlin.  This conflict resulted 
mainly from reactionary and monarchist forces in Bavaria that despised the Reich 
                                                
15 “Imperial and Foreign News Items,” The Times, 29 May 1922, 9g.
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government and that opposed following orders from Berlin.  This was evident in 
Bavarian Prime Minister Gustav von Kahr’s decision not to implement emergency 
decrees that Ebert ordered in August 1921, during a period of political unrest.  In 
this atmosphere, Hitler saw the possibilities of building support and gaining 
followers by railing against the federal government. The Nazis made their 
presence felt by disrupting meetings of competing groups of ideological 
opponents.  These circumstances were combined with faltering German economic 
conditions that saw a large upswing in inflation through 1922 that became 
increasinlgy worse in the following year.16  Though the Nazis gained in notoriety 
because of their own actions, the international spotlight focused upon the NSDAP 
as never before following the success of Benito Mussolini and his Italian Fascists.
Through much of the summer of 1922, Hitler spent his time speaking and 
agitating throughout Bavaria and Austria, attempting to garner new supporters 
and extend the reach of the party.  Though speaking in front of large crowds that 
at times reached 70,000 or more, as he did on August 16 in front of members from 
various south German nationalist groups, the press in the U.S. and England paid 
little heed to the movement.17  Only a few vague references from these months 
exist, and even they did not single out the Nazis specifically.  The 
“Hakenkreuzler,” wearers of the hooked cross or swastika, were mentioned in an 
article describing them as one reactionary and violent group among many that 
despised the Bolsheviks and the rule of the Jews.  Though not illuminating the 
                                                
16 Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris (New York: W. W. London and Company, 2000), 163-
165, 175.
17 Milan Hauner, Hitler: A Chronology of his Life and Time (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 
35.
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specific nature of the party, the article left the impression that the wearers of the 
swastika were a brutal group from the dark ages who espoused massacres and 
pogroms.18  
The National Socialists, and Hitler especially, would only gain a distinct 
place among the multitude of nationalist organizations in Bavaria because of 
events in Italy.  On October 27, 1922 Mussolini and his fascists came to power by 
threatening large-scale marches on Rome.  Mussolini used the threat of violence 
against the government and unwillingness of the Italian Army to protect the King 
to force him to grant a dominant position in a new government to the party, and 
the position of Prime Minister to its leader.19  Western writers would now pay 
much more attention to the long-winded but charismatic Hitler, whom they saw as 
another possible Mussolini, focusing on the brute force of his political tirades that 
might sweep him into power in the way it had for Mussolini in Italy.   
Nationalist forces in Bavaria gained inspiration and confidence from 
Mussolini’s successes in Italy.  The Nazis introduced banners into the party’s 
armed formations, known as the Sturmabteilung or SA, in imitation of the Italian 
Fascists.  The Nazi inspiration for a march on Berlin was found in the March on 
Rome, despite the fact that it had never actually taken place.20  Almost 
immediately, the Nazis cast themselves in the Fascists’ footsteps, with NSDAP 
member Herman Esser proclaiming Hitler to be the German Mussolini.21  The 
                                                
18 “What is at Stake in Germany,” The Nation, September 13, 1922, 241-242.
19 Gilbert, 208-210.
20 Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic (New York: Routledge, 2004), 50; Hans Mommsen, The 
Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy (Chapel Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 
162. 
21 Kershaw, Hitler, 180.
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press made this connection almost immediately.  Some reports on the eve of 
Mussolini’s takeover already described the Nazis as fascist emulators, who, in 
later articles, were intent on spreading Italian methods throughout Bavaria and 
then Germany.22  
American newspapers focused closely on Hitler, referring to him as the 
Bavarian Mussolini, mistakenly believing this title had belonged to him for some 
time.  The Washington Post even devoted an editorial to the Nazis because of the 
threat of the spread of fascism.  The editors believed that the Bavarian fascists 
were copying the Italians down to the smallest detail, only replacing Italian 
symbols with German ones.  While not drawing very much distinction between 
Mussolini and Hitler, the editors of the Washington Post pointed out the violent 
nature of the Nazi leader, claiming he was leading his party and Bavaria straight 
into a civil war instead of being a uniting force the way Mussolini had supposedly 
been.23  Some observers saw the comparisons to Mussolini as unfair to the Italian, 
as did one writer for the Manchester Guardian Weekly, who noted that Hitler was 
a muddle brained Bohemian, “devoid of solid convictions and incapable of a 
definite line of actions.”24  In the coming year, the rest of the world would 
discover such thoughts sadly untrue.  Nevertheless, the success of the Italian 
fascists spurred inquiry into the nature of the National Socialist Party, as well into 
its aims.
                                                
22 “German Fascisti,” The Times. 18 October 1922, pg. 11c; “Trouble Brewing in Bavaria,” 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, 17 November 1922, 388.
23 Cyril Brown, “New Popular Idol Rises in Bavaria,” New York Times 21 November 1922, 18;  
“Bavarian ‘Fascisti,’” Washington Post 22 November 1922, 6.
24 “Bavarian Fascists: The German Mussolini,” Manchester Guardian Weekly 9 February 1923, 
108.
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As would always be the case with the Nazis, categorizing what the party 
stood against was far easier than what the party stood for.  American journalist 
Cyril Brown wrote in November 1922 that the programs outlined by Hitler and 
the NSDAP “consist chiefly of half a dozen negative ideas clothed in generalities.  
He is ‘against the Jews, communists, Bolshevism, Marxian Socialism, separatists, 
the high cost of living, existing conditions, the weak Berlin government and the 
Versailles treaty.”  There were hints of the racial ideology that would become 
dominant later, seen in a report concerning Nazi recruiting drives in Berlin, where 
it was made clear that only racially pure Teutons were allowed to apply.25  
One interesting press conjecture that emerged concerning the party was 
the claim that it was supportive of the monarchist movement to put a member of 
the former Hohenzollern or Wittelsbach ruling families on the throne of Germany.  
Other writers discerned that the Nazis had no interest in recreating a German 
monarchy, pointing out that no such demand could be found in the Nazis’ 
platform.26  The Nazi party and Hitler envisioned the creation of a völkisch, or 
essentially racial nationalist, dictatorship for Germany, not the restoration of a 
monarch.  Hitler did not even see himself as the possible dictator in this period, 
but rather as a follower, drumming up support for the future leader.27  Besides 
political ideology, the question of Nazi violence and possible military capabilities 
would be a popular topic for foreign press agencies to discuss.
                                                
25 Cyril Brown, “New Popular Idol Rises in Bavaria,” New York Times 21 November 1922, 18;  
Cyril Brown, “Fascisti Movement Starts in Berlin,” New York Times 22 November 1922, 4.
26 Lincoln Eyre, “German Republic Opposed by Political and Military Organizations in Bavaria,” 
Washington Post 4 January 1923, 4;  Theodore von Sosnosky, “The New Pan-Germanism,” 
Quarterly Review 240 (1922): 308-322.
27 Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party: 1919-1933 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1969), 40;  Kershaw, Hitler, 169.
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Fears of masses of reactionary zealots flocking to Hitler’s banner were 
common among Western journalists.  Some level of trepidation existed about a 
renewed German military movement intended to exact revenge against internal 
enemies within Germany and quite possibly against the Western Allies. The Times 
made this clear in a report in early January 1923 concerning a massive gathering 
addressed by Hitler, where many called for action against those seen as 
responsible for Germany’s suffering.28  Many articles discussed the manpower 
that Hitler might have had under his control in case he called for a revolt against 
Berlin, gloomily reporting he could draw forth as many or more men to fight than 
the entire German army.  Sheer numbers of supporters and the implications were 
often discussed.  Some journalists mentioned 30,000 thousand members of the 
Nazi party in Munich, where Hitler supposedly rallied 180,000 to demonstrate in 
late January 1923, despite the opposition of the Munich government.  It was 
feared that the Nazis might draw upon more supporters than the Republic could 
muster between Reichswehr, or German army, troops and regular police forces.29  
These concerns were not necessarily unfounded, at least from a numerical 
standpoint.  Stipulations in the Versailles treaty limited the size of the German 
army to approximately 100,000 soldiers.30  The threat of several hundred 
thousand reactionary troops, many of whom had served in the war, was 
potentially a serious one.
                                                
28 “An Army of Revenge,” The Times 15 January 1923, 10d.
29 “Bavarian ‘Fascisti,’” Washington Post 22 November 1922, 6; “Herr Hittler’s(sic) ‘Storm 
Troops,’” The Times 30 January 1923, 10b; Lincoln Eyre, “Sees German Government Powerless 
in Face of Ills Political and Economic,” Washington Post 2 January 1923, 1.  
30 Kolb, 30.
16
  For the most part, however, the threat of a massive Hitler-led coup was 
overstated.  By November 1923, the Nazi party had a membership of 55,000, but 
many members had only joined because of the disastrous economic 
circumstances.  The Nazi semi-military formation, the SA, was relatively small.  
Military-style formations of other nationalist organizations were far larger than 
the forces the Nazis could muster.31  Despite this, the press expressed more 
concern about Nazi forces, probably because of Hitler’s leadership.  Time would 
prove such anxiety well founded.  An important aspect of National Socialism that 
would garner notice in both American and English news organs would be the 
violent nature of the party.
It is apparent from early press reports that Nazi attacks on enemies on both 
the left and right in Germany had made an impression on foreign journalists.  For 
the most part, wherever groups of Nazis were found, violence followed quickly.  
Storm troopers frequently met their enemies in the streets.  Reports mentioned the 
violence that accompanied political meetings and speeches.  The New York Times 
described a likely premeditated attack by Nazi members on a group of socialists 
in Munich.32  Hitler had designated the SA for just such a purpose when he 
created it in 1921.  He intended it to push around opponents and protect Nazi 
party officials from similar treatment by rival groups.  Historian Richard Evans 
pointed out that during this period “…Hitler and the Nazi Party felt no particular 
                                                
31 Orlow, 45; Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: The Penguin Press, 
2004),  183.
32 “Socialist Factions Battle in Munich,” New York Times 28 April 1923, 3.
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need to look respectable.  Violence seemed the obvious way to power.”33  Such 
violence, combined with the Party’s open scheming and planning of military 
campaigns, military drills, and subversive activities, made some feel uneasy about 
the future of Germany.34  
Another frequently reported aspect of National Socialism was its anti-
Semitism.  This characteristic was written about throughout the period, for the 
most part only fleetingly.  Western reporters at the time could have had little idea 
of the depth of hatred among Hitler and other leaders of the National Socialist 
Party for Jews, and of the horrific crimes to which such hate would lead.  
Nevertheless, Western journalists wrote disparagingly of the increased levels of 
anti-Semitic feelings that had emerged throughout Germany, including their 
especially virulent manifestation in Bavaria.  One writer described Munich as 
among the most tolerant cities toward Jewish citizens before the war, allowing 
Jews to serve as officers in the Bavarian Reichswehr, something not allowed in 
the northern state of Prussia.35  The Bavarian Reichswehr admitted a limited 
number of Jews as reserve officers, but using this as evidence of a more liberal 
atmosphere in Bavaria than in Prussia, where no Jewish officers were allowed, 
was misleading.  From 1907 to 1913, the army commissioned only three Jewish 
reserve officers per year.36
                                                
33 A.J. Nicholls, Weimar and the Rise of Hitler (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1968), 100;  Evans, 
189.
34 “Germany’s Internal Peril,” Manchester Guardian Weekly 19 January 1923, 46.
35 “Bavarian Fascists; The German Mussolini,” Manchester Guardian Weekly 9 February 1923, 
108.
36 Peter Pulzer, Jews and the German State: The Political History of a Minority, 1848-1933
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2003), 114-116.
18
 In the wake of a brief but violent period of Socialist control in Munich 
after the war, however, a wave of anti-Semitism broke out in the city, inflamed by 
the many Bavarians who blamed Germany’s loss of World War I on alleged 
traitors at home, including minorities such as Jews.37  By January 1923 the 
situation became bad enough that one writer noted, “It is dangerous for a Jew to 
show himself in the streets of Munich.”38  The wave of anti-Semitic feelings had 
gained strength during the war, when many Germans used Jews as scapegoats.  
When the Bolshevik revolution occurred in Russia, many pan-German groups 
pointed to it as proof of a Jewish conspiracy to create world revolution to allow 
Jews to take over the globe.39  This explained to some extent how the rising anti-
Semitic feelings were linked to the Socialist government in Munich.  Foreign 
journalists saw how the Jewish community was used as a scapegoat for all that 
was wrong in Munich and Germany.  When describing the reactionary movement 
in Munich, a journalist for the Manchester Guardian Weekly observed how anti-
Semitism could be used as a veritable war cry, when reduced into a simple 
formula that stated: “The world’s capital is Jewish; Marxism is Jewish; Marxism 
and Capitalism are responsible for the desperate straits the world is in.  Therefore 
                                                
37 In the first half of 1919, Socialist and subsequently Communist groups gained control of the 
government in Munich and Bavaria, incited by the assassination of Socialist leader Kurt Eisner.  
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‘Down with the Jews!’”40  Foreign journalists saw anti-Semitism everywhere in 
Munich at the time, and they reported that the Nazis were basically no different.  
In reality, Nazi anti-Semitism had a unique blend of preexisting anti-Semitic 
elements, which differentiated its Jew-hatred from other groups.
Hitler discussed his view of the Jews long before 1923, including them in 
his first political statement written in September 1919 for his military superiors in 
the German army, prior to leaving the army and joining the tiny political 
movement in Munich that eventually became the Nazi party.  In the statement he 
made it clear that he viewed the Jews as a race and not a religious movement, an 
idea he would maintain for the rest of his life.  While other German nationalists 
and anti-Semites might have wanted to use anti-Semitism to create popular 
support, Hitler wished for a rational and methodical anti-Semitic movement to 
remove the Jews from participation in society, but whose final aim “…must be the 
uncompromising removal of the Jews altogether.”41  
Hitler’s anti-Semitism had taken shape before World War I in Vienna, a 
city filled with virulent Jew-hatred and nationalism. The anti-Semitic politics of 
Vienna mayor Karl Lueger and the pan-German ideology of Georg von 
Schönerer, had great influence on Hitler.42  The racially based anti-Semitism of 
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Hitler and other early Nazi leaders would be the foundation of National Socialist 
ideology throughout the party’s existence.  At least one American news article 
noted this fact, recognizing that anti-Semitism was indeed the fundamental 
principle behind National Socialism.  This was because Hitler consistently linked 
questions of what he considered Germany’s Jewish problem with the problems of 
the state itself.43  Several articles would demonstrate how the Nazi hatred of the 
Jews was in a way unique and extremely dangerous because of its murderous 
intentions towards the entire Jewish community.
Reporters who attended early National Socialist meetings learned that the 
Nazis blamed the Jews for all German problems, much like other reactionary 
groups did in Munich.  Members of the audience told one journalist that the Jews 
were communists as well as war profiteers, though the reporter clarified to his 
audience in the United States that the principal war profiteers in Bavaria were 
actually Christians.44  The article drew a religious distinction with the Nazis’ 
anger, however, with no elaboration on their racial hatred.  The concept of race 
appeared rarely in articles, with the most prominent example quoting Hitler as 
stating, “The new banner, the swastika cross, is the symbol of the war we must 
wage against the race responsible for our downfall.”  This article did not point out 
that the Jews were the group to which Hitler was referring. 45  Most articles made 
only passing reference to Nazi anti-Semitism when it was mentioned at all, 
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observing that the party was known for attacking Jews or was rabidly anti-
Jewish.46  
The New York Times, on the other hand, published articles that made clear 
the attitude of the Nazis towards the Jews.  In March 1923, one described a Nazi 
resolution concerning the invasion of the Ruhr by the French, which proposed that 
all Jews in Germany should be held hostage and shot if the occupation was 
continued.  Another discussed possible financial support for the Nazis by Henry 
Ford, claiming that the professed anti-Semite Ford might have an incentive to 
support the movement since “…a part of the program of Herr Hitler…is the 
extermination of the Jews in Germany.”47  Though readers of the two short 
articles could not have known their horrific importance at the time, they implied 
that the Nazis possibly thought of using violent measures against Jews.  Even 
though the Nazi party displayed an aggressive and violent nature directed so 
viciously against the Jewish community, the American and British press discussed 
both it and the party in general little.  Just as the success of the Italian Fascists had 
been equated with the leadership of Mussolini, press coverage in the United States 
and England focused on the role of Hitler, whom the press focused on in great, if 
often inaccurate, detail.
Descriptions of Hitler in Western news articles during 1922 and 1923 
often tended to be dismissive or derogatory in nature, as for example, one that 
compared Hitler and Mussolini; it was less than impressed with the young 
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Austrian, writing that he was all show and no action.48  Some journalists 
attempted to discredit the threat that Hitler posed to German and European 
security by attacking his physical appearance.  A Times story emphasized his 
short height and undistinguished past, asserting that he had barely gotten by on 
speaking fees in Munich.49  Other journalists, however, were obviously impressed 
with Hitler’s abilities.  The characteristic of Hitler’s they focused on most was his 
oratorical skills.  Writing for the New York Times, Cyril Brown concluded: “He 
has the rare oratorical gift, at present unique in Germany, of spellbinding whole 
audiences regardless of politics or creed.”50  Other reporters who attended Nazi 
meetings tended to agree, noting that Hitler was seen as a savior or prophet 
among many in the audience.51  Such writers were witnessing the reverence for 
Hitler among his early supporters that would grow to almost religious proportions 
in the coming decades in the German population.  In early 1923, Hitler still 
claimed to be paving the way for a future leader who would direct Germany back 
to glory, but some in the NSDAP, including Hermann Göring, were already 
labeling Hitler as the destined Führer.52  Journalists recognized the importance 
that Hitler had in creating support for the party, as well as his growing leadership 
of the extreme conservative and nationalist community in Munich.  This would 
encourage them to examine Hitler’s background more closely in an attempt to 
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discern the Nazi leader’s motivation, but in doing so they would publish some of 
the myths that were already being spread about him.
Hitler’s background before World War I is still, in some ways, difficult to 
document many years after his death.  His youth in Austria and Vienna left few 
sources to trace his ideological and personal development, though contemporary 
historians have done an admirable job in reconstructing much of it.53  During 
1922 and 1923, it was nearly impossible for journalists to obtain accurate 
information on his early life.  Most of what they found came from rumors, the 
Nazis themselves, or even rivals of the National Socialists.  Hitler’s Austrian 
heritage was generally known, but how he had spent his youth there was up for 
debate.  Some sources called him a worker or locksmith, and nearly all portraits of 
Hitler mentioned his artistic pretensions in Vienna.54  In reality, however, Hitler 
lived off of others or in squalor, rarely attempting to better his circumstances 
while living in the Austrian capital.  Historian Ian Kershaw has written about 
Hitler in Vienna: “Systematic preparation and hard work were as foreign to the 
young Hitler as they would be to the later dictator.”55  Nevertheless, American 
and British reporters in Germany during 1922 and 1923 began illuminating for 
their audiences back home for the first time the origins of Hitler’s deranged and 
dangerous politics.
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A fascinating piece of information in several articles involved the 
circumstances in which Hitler decided to become a politician and leader of a 
political party.  The press accounts related the supposed visions Hitler 
experienced while convalescing in a hospital after being gassed and suffering 
injuries to his eyes and lungs on the Western Front during World War I.  The 
American journalist Ludwell Denny noted, “In the hospital [Hitler] was subject to 
ecstatic visions of victorious Germany, and in one of these seizures his eyesight 
was restored.”56  Probably the story was related to Denny and other journalists by 
Hitler’s followers or during one of his speeches. This was almost a year before 
Hitler would include a modified version of the supposed event in Mein Kampf, his 
autobiography, in which he wrote that it was this experience that created the 
hatred and resolve necessary for him to enter the political arena.57  In a way, 
journalists who reported on the alleged episode helped to spread an early legend 
about Hitler that would only grow. 
 In reality, Hitler’s decision to oppose those he saw as responsible for the 
defeat of Germany took shape in the months following the end of the war, during 
which he molded various animosities and extremist right wing political beliefs 
into his singular Weltanschauung or world view. It was not due to some quasi-
religious experience.58  Considering the picture that had been drawn of his 
leadership, however, it is of little surprise that the Western press was cautious of 
such a highly effective demagogue who could claim divine inspiration and 
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allegedly convert even communists and skeptical former German generals to the 
Nazi cause through his oratory.59  While Hitler had little use at the time for 
foreign journalists, they would document the growing unrest Hitler contributed to 
in Bavaria, as conflicts between the state and federal governments grew more 
heated in light of French action toward Germany in early 1923.
The decision by France to occupy the Ruhr, a heavily industrialized region 
of northwest Germany on January 9, 1923, appeared to be a golden opportunity 
for German nationalist and conservative forces.60  Not only could such forces 
foment anger towards France, but they could also focus the German people’s 
animosity on their own Weimar regime for inaction and for ever-increasing 
economic woes.  Using delays in the shipments of reparation goods as a pretext, 
France sent military forces into Germany in order to guarantee their delivery.  All 
the while, some French political elements pressed for the separation of the Ruhr 
from the rest of Germany, and hoped to accomplish this through occupation.  
The German government responded with a policy of passive resistance, 
whereby German workers in the occupied region refused to work for the French, 
seeking to thwart their aims.  The government financed what amounted to a 
general strike through the almost unlimited production of German currency.  This 
policy led to disastrous consequences, a hyperinflation of prices that threw the 
country’s economy into crisis.  The French were able to bypass the strike by 
bringing in foreign workers, thus making the policy of passive resistance a total 
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failure.  Consequently, the policy was abandoned in late 1923.61  The crisis 
environment was perfect for Hitler and the National Socialists to exploit for their 
purposes the widespread German hate for the occupiers.  A British news report 
described it well: “It is not likely that the German Fascists will ever again have an 
opportunity like the present.”62  
The outcry against the French occupation was almost universal throughout 
Germany, recreating to some the sense of unified will present in the nation at the 
beginning of World War I.63  Within days of the occupation, Hitler already made 
use of the event, attacking both the Republic and France in his characteristically 
racist way, reportedly stating in a quote that appeared on the front page of the 
New York Times: “We dishonored and disarmed ourselves and have become 
objects of contempt, a laughing-stock to the enemy and the world.  We have fallen 
to complete slavery.  France holds us lower than a negro state.”64  
Nazi street thugs (SA) attempted to attack hotels frequented by foreigners 
as well as the office for the Inter-Allied Commission in Munich.65  Rumors 
circulated that the Bavarian fascists would attempt a Putsch (coup) in light of 
recent events, reports that would be echoed through the remainder of the year.66  
The Bavarian government took such threats seriously, attempting to prevent the 
National Socialists from staging a series of rallies planned for the end of January.  
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Only upon guarantees from Hitler that a Putsch would not take place did the 
authorities allow the rallies to go forward, whereas in the rest of Germany there 
was an outright prohibition against the party even existing.67  Conflicts would 
only grow more common in the coming months as the Nazis attempted to garner 
as much attention as possible.
Hitler, emboldened enough by his successes in Munich and growing 
support throughout Bavaria because of the crisis, made threats against both the 
French occupiers and the Berlin government.  To the French Hitler stated in a 
press interview reported in the U.S.: “A people may be goaded to that degree of 
desperation that they become convinced all hope for them is gone.  Then they will 
choose gigantic ruins as their death monument, and, like Samson, pull down on all 
what may remain of the structure of civilization and culture.”  Perhaps presaging 
his sinister attitude in the Second World War, the statement made clear that Hitler 
would rather see death and devastation to spite the French than any kind of 
negotiation.  He also noted that should the policy of passive resistance fail, 
German political leadership would face serious consequences.68
 The idea of passive resistance was anathema to Hitler, who desired a 
more active and violent opposition to the French.  Attacking Berlin’s policy was 
also simply another way of assaulting the so-called November criminals, the 
leaders who had signed Germany’s surrender and formed the republic, which 
Hitler blamed for putting Germany in such a subordinate position in the first 
place.  These attacks enhanced the growth of the Nazi party in Bavaria, where 
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separatist sympathies were strong and hatred for the republican government in 
Berlin was equal to, and perhaps even greater than, the hatred for France.69    As 
the economic and political crisis became more serious, confrontation between the 
Nazis, Bavaria, and the federal government in Berlin would escalate.  Extreme 
nationalist and conservative forces became desperate to act under what was 
considered fortuitous circumstances for attempts to take control of Germany.
The political atmosphere in Bavaria and the rest of Germany was strained 
severely by the events of early 1923.  Conflicts between the Bavarian and Weimar
governments originated mainly because of the right wing sympathies of Bavarian 
leaders for the multitude of nationalist forces within its borders.  Bavaria had been 
intransigent about disbanding armed civilian defense formations that remained as 
vestiges of the Freikorps, paramilitary organizations of counter-revolutionaries 
used by the democratic Berlin government to stave off communist revolution after 
World War I.  The Freikorps had eventually played a role in the suppression of 
the Kapp Putsch of 1920.70  Bavaria had also consistently been a thorn in the side 
of Berlin’s republican leaders because of the presence of avowed monarchist and 
separatist leaders, such as Gustav von Kahr.  He had been elected minister 
president of Bavaria in 1920 and advocated the return of a monarchy. 
 Another point of contention with Berlin was the Bavarian government’s 
decision to ignore the implementation of the Law for the Protection of the 
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Republic that had been instituted following the assassination in 1922 of German-
Jewish Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau by nationalist sympathizers.  This law 
gave the states the right to ban dangerous organizations such as the Nazi party.  
While Prussia and other states carried out the law, Bavaria did not, referring to it 
as invalid.71  The Nazis would make the most of the conflict between Bavaria and 
the federal government, using the protection of the sympathetic state government 
in an attempt to create new sources of support and influence for the NSDAP.  
They would exacerbate the tensions between Munich and Berlin, especially since 
the Nazis came into conflict with the Bavarian leadership for being too 
provocative.
During 1923, the political leaders of Bavaria had a difficult time 
maneuvering between what they saw as two extreme dangers.  On the left they 
saw revolution, even from the moderate Social Democrats, the largest political 
party in Germany.  The threat from the right was just as serious, with extremists 
like the Nazis awaiting an opportunity to make a revolution of their own, even at 
the expense of sympathizers in Bavaria.72  Hitler stepped up his attacks against 
any and all possible enemies as his popularity and clout in the south German state 
grew steadily throughout the year.  
Foreign reporters saw the tensions within Germany firsthand.  An article 
in the Times discussed the crackdown on radicalism within Prussia by the 
Minister of the Interior in that state, Carl Severing.  He labeled Hitler as one of 
the most dangerous men in the country and blamed the laxity of the Bavarian
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government for allowing such a threat to Germany to exist at all.73  Hitler’s party 
was seen with such fear that the German Supreme Court in Leipzig declared it 
illegal, because of its avowed opposition to and press attacks upon the federal 
government.  Hitler was able to brush such pronouncements off, however, even 
when proceedings against him were undertaken in April 1923. 
 A New York Times writer noted accurately when describing the 
relationship between the Nazis and the Bavarian government: “The fact that Hitler 
himself has not been molested by the authorities, notwithstanding his expressed 
scorn of the Bavarian Government leads some of the German writers to hint that 
the Conservative Cabinet is merely using camouflage while secretly backing the 
so-called National Socialists…”74  The Times reported the response to the charges 
against Hitler and the Nazis in the official party organ, the Völkischer Beobachter, 
which stated that there was no question of Hitler appearing before the Leipzig 
“Cheka”, a comparison of the court to the brutal Soviet secret police.  Hitler’s 
newspaper called on Bavaria to take action against the charges.75  Thus, Nazi 
political opportunism was on display for readers in the United States and England, 
as Hitler attempted to force Bavaria and the federal government into conflict in 
order to strengthen his own position and incite a revolt against Berlin.
Some foreign journalists recognized that the actions of the Nazis were 
becoming more provocative as the months wore on.  Nazis and socialists 
skirmished on several occasions, especially near May Day.  Reporters believed 
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the police were only barely able to contain the rampant violence.  The socialists 
members of the Bavarian Landtag (Parliament) attempted to implement the 
ordinances against the Nazis like the rest of Germany had, but were blocked by 
other parties, something that apparently gave encouragement to the extreme 
rightist parties.76  One reason the foreign press became increasingly wary of Nazi 
aggressiveness was the apparent alliance between Hitler and the former World 
War I General, Erich Ludendorff.  The New York Times suspected that Ludendorff 
was running the Nazi party behind the scenes, using Hitler as a figurehead.77  
Ludendorff had been introduced to Hitler by one of Hitler’s young fanatical 
followers, Rudolf Hess.  The general would work closely with members of the 
extreme right in Munich, eventually becoming for a time a close collaborator of 
the Nazi leader.78   
A few journalists were aware of how Hitler used the former general’s 
reputation and connections to help the NSDAP while at the same time keeping 
Ludendorff from a leading position.  The Times quoted Hitler as saying about 
Ludendorff: “Excellency, a man who fled to Sweden for safety and who, as a 
Prussian, prefers to seek refuge in Bavaria can never be a leader of our national 
movement.  If, however, we should be in need of your organizing ability or your 
knowledge of tactics and strategy, we shall be glad to call upon you, but our 
leader you can never be.”79 Hitler used Ludendorff in much the same way he used 
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the Bavarian government - for the benefit of the party.  Many journalists saw the 
Nazis as pawns of such figures as von Kahr or Ludendorff, but in reality Hitler 
never planned to play a subordinate role to anyone. During September and 
October 1923, the fears of a revolt led by Hitler became justified as extremist 
nationalists of many different groups began agitating for action. 
On June 15, 1923, as the value of the mark decreased daily, the New York 
Times reported that in Germany the rumor was “Bolshevism in Germany before 
winter is over, if not sooner.”80  German economist and future head of the Reich’s 
federal bank, Hjalmar Schacht, noted that the threat of communist revolt was very 
real in several German states, such as Saxony and Thuringia, and many people 
were willing to listen as the fall of the mark’s value reached disastrous 
proportions – some 4.2 trillion marks to the American dollar by November.81  The 
president of the Weimar Republic, Ebert, was forced to introduce a new 
chancellor or prime minister in Berlin, Gustav Stresemann.  Stresemann moved to 
end passive resistance against the French, which was done on September 26.  The 
inflation, however, continued to mount.  
Hitler adjusted his tactics to the new chancellor by attacking the inflation 
and end of passive resistance.  The end of resistance in the Ruhr also did not stand 
well with Bavarian political leaders, leading them to declare a state of emergency 
and von Kahr the virtual dictator of Bavaria.82   Events that had unfolded during 
the previous year would come to a climax in this new political climate in Bavaria, 
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with Hitler realizing that time might be running out to maximize support for an 
uprising under his leadership.
These events were seen in various lights by the Western press.  Some 
papers wrote that the intention of von Kahr’s elevation to the post of general 
commissioner of Bavaria was to stave off an imminent Putsch by Hitler, which it 
did for a short while.  Others saw his appointment as a provocative move, noting 
that the Weimar president Ebert had sent troops to the Bavarian border in case 
von Kahr attempted an offensive against Berlin.83  Hitler wanted preparations for 
an armed march on the German capital, but the meetings planned for such were 
banned by von Kahr.  However, problems emerged over the control of the 
Bavarian Reichswehr, or army, when orders were sent from the federal 
government to suppress the Nazis’ newspaper, the Völkische Beobachter.  General 
Otto von Lossow, the commander of the Bavariam Reichswehr, did not carry out 
the orders, leading to his dismissal.  This too was ignored and his troops 
apparently remained loyal to him, not Germany.  This led immediately to the 
possibility of armed conflict between the two armed forces.84  
Journalists could see other problems developing within Bavaria as well, 
where unaffiliated nationalist organizations had to choose which leader to 
support, Hitler or von Kahr, a competition The Times believed had sapped Hitler’s 
support.  His position was strong enough that von Kahr would not attack Hitler 
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directly, but von Kahr also would not give Hitler his support, something important 
in the fall of 1923.85  The Nazis had played an important role in creating a 
situation that might lead to civil war, which Hitler would have had no problem 
with.  However, circumstances forced him into a corner in which he had to make 
a decision about carrying out an attempted coup.  Both the American and English 
press generally covered the ensuing German crisis and the Nazis’ role in it in a 
comparable way, as had been the case with most, but not all, aspects of National 
Socialism.  
Newspapers in the United States and England first recognized in 1922 the 
potential threat of National Socialism to German democracy, devoting more 
consistent and thorough, though not necessarily prominent, coverage beginning in 
the fall of the year.  Though mentioned in dozens of articles, during almost two 
years the Nazis were discussed in only seven stories on the front page of the 
Washington Post and twelve on the front page of the New York Times.  The 
Times’s front page was devoted to advertisements, but the paper mentioned the 
Nazis in the first column of the foreign news section only four times.  The 
Manchester Guardian Weekly included them in ten issues.  For the most part, the 
Nazis were perceived at first as a local threat that had little chance of being a 
political factor outside Bavaria, but as the months progressed and the situation in 
the state worsened, the Nazis were seen as a growing problem.  The Western press 
generally attempted to learn about the NSDAP and what its program was.  An 
exception was The Times, which concerned itself more with reporting the Nazis’ 
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political activities and their possible repercussions.  The treatment of nearly all 
aspects of the early National Socialists was generally similar within the press.  
Only the New York Times’ covered Nazi anti-Semitism thoroughly.   This was an 
outgrowth of the paper’s ownership, which was of German-Jewish descent.  The 
New York Times’s ownership had personal ties to Germany that made gaining 
information concerning the Jewish community easier, and took an activist role in 
publishing anti-Semitic stories when they emerged.86  Overall, such press 
coverage of the Nazis was fundamentally similar on both sides of the Atlantic, 
portraying the party as a serious, but most likely fleeting phenomenon.  The 
characterization of the Nazis that can be gleaned from news articles was often 
inaccurate in specifics, but was surprisingly precise concerning the core nature of 
the National Socialist movement.
Newspapers would not refer to the National Socialists as Nazis for many 
years, yet even in 1922 they had singled the movement out for special attention.  
Even though the Nazis appeared to be simply one reactionary monarchist party 
among many, or a pale imitation of the Italian Fascists, the impression from the 
Western press articles makes it clear that the Nazis differed from both.  Hitler was 
seen as a crude Austrian who did not have the courage to see through the violence 
of his rhetoric, yet some British and American journalists were clearly in awe of 
the charismatic appeal he wielded in inciting the hatred and anger of many 
Germans.  His leadership gave the Nazi party a prominent role in Munich.  To an 
extent, foreign journalists were witnesses to, and participants in, his nascent cult 
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at the time.  In general, they represented the NSDAP as incipiently violent and 
aggressive, as were many of the other nationalist groups in Munich.  It was 
likewise clear that the Nazis targeted certain groups as the source of Germany’s 
problems, including especially the Jews.  As several journalists made clear, 
however, Nazi animosity for the Jews went beyond simple stereotypical hatred, 
reflecting the pseudo-scientific racism of the party’s leadership that professed a 
willingness to contemplate and advocate mass violence.  
Alongside anti-Semitism, an important characteristic illustrated in this 
period by journalists was the party’s ability to take advantage of crisis.  As the 
political and economic situation in Germany deteriorated, the Nazis were able to 
expand their base of support, making them a threat not only to the Bavarian 
leadership, but the Weimar Republic as a whole.  Later the Nazis would use this 
experience to make another national emergency work to their utmost advantage 
during the early 1930s.  In the months following October 1922, the party 
leadership exhibited another important characteristic to American and British 
reporters - namely its limitless ambition and drive for power and notoriety.  The 
attempt by the Nazis to take over Germany by force, which became known as the 
Beer Hall Putsch, and the results of that endeavor, would be avidly covered by a 
Western press that during the previous year had become frightened by the 
prospects of renewed European conflict originating in southern Germany. 
CHAPTER THREE
REVOLT AND DECLINE: NOVEMBER 1923 TO DECEMBER 1924
For much of 1923, American and British journalists expected that the 
Nazis would lead a Putsch against the Weimar government.  The economy 
continued to decline and relations between Bavaria and Berlin had almost been 
severed. Circumstances seemed perfect to incite a rebellion among the thousands 
of conservative nationalists in Bavaria, and it was not likely that the opportunity 
would last long. The new government of German chancellor Gustav Stresemann 
worked quickly to stabilize the economy and come to some kind of agreement 
with France to remove occupation troops from the Ruhr.  In November 1923, 
Hitler decided he had to act or risk losing his supporters, which included not only 
Nazis but also other nationalist groups in Munich allied with the party.  Along 
with former German General Erich Ludendorff, he led the Nazis and other 
nationalist followers in an attempted coup meant to sweep the movement into 
power, in a manner similar to Mussolini.  Western journalists considered this 
event the possible outbreak of a new armed conflict in Europe.
Before the Putsch was fully underway, however, it was almost 
immediately snuffed out by Bavarian political leaders.  In the eyes of British and 
American writers, Hitler turned from a menace to a laughingstock in a matter of 
hours.  They believed his failed coup attempt discredited the Nazis and made their 
leader politically powerless.  Reporters dutifully related the subsequent trial of the 
rebellious leaders, with low expectations of justice for crimes of treason.  It was 
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well known that justice was impossible given the sympathetic Bavarian climate to 
the rightist cause.  British and American writers who described the Beer Hall 
Putsch, its resultant trial, and the lax sentence imposed on Hitler and others 
demonstrated crucial characteristics of National Socialism and German public 
opinion for western audiences.  While some accused leaders of the coup 
attempted to blame others, Hitler squarely accepted the consequences of his plans.  
The Nazis may have been opportunistic politically, but their long term goals and 
convictions to gain power and wield it unmercifully were unwavering.  Though 
the party was decimated after this period and many thought the National Socialist 
movement would fade away, the Nazis were firmly committed to seeing their 
perverse political ideology come to fruition.  
The political situation in Bavaria was tense during the first week of 
November 1923.  Writers believed that Hitler was preparing for something, as he 
stepped up his polemics against the Bavarian dictator von Kahr, which Western 
journalists included in several dispatches.  Hitler was highly critical of the 
Bavarian regime, describing it as on the verge of collapse after only five weeks of 
existence.  Moreover, he voiced his treasonous intentions loudly, stating to an 
assembled group of followers that he would see through his beliefs “…even if he 
were alone and forsaken.  The question would only be solved when the red, white, 
and black and the Swastika flags waved over Berlin.”  This was followed by the 
statement that “…we [the nationalist forces loyal to Hitler] would march…” on 
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the German capital city.87  Hitler had used such language before, but it was clear 
the circumstances made his threats real.
As the economic situation in Bavaria worsened, observers knew 
nationalist supporters were ready and willing, and in some cases impatient, to 
participate in an uprising. A writer for The Times drew attention to the economic 
troubles in Germany. The reporter wrote that a train ride he had taken that day at a 
cost of 2.7 billion marks had cost only 1.2 billion marks the previous day.  Von 
Kahr, who was made the virtual dictator of Bavaria in September, had trouble 
keeping control of the various rightist groups in Bavaria for this reason, allowing 
Hitler to step into a leading role.88  Rumors reportedly set the date of the revolt for 
November 7, and nationalist groups allegedly readied themselves throughout 
Germany at the command of Hitler and other nationalist leaders.  Fears of a 
Putsch were so strong that the French government told Berlin that a revolution 
creating a nationalist military dictatorship in Germany would not be tolerated.89  
This stance by the French government was interesting.  The French were willing 
to risk invading Germany to stop a possible victory by Hitler and other rightists in 
1923, but would not be willing to take such a strong stance when the Nazis 
consolidated control in 1933.  French government officials had little to worry 
about at this time though.  Hitler indeed led an attempted revolt against Berlin, but 
a combination of a lack of foresight and the betrayal of supposed allies made it a 
short-lived uprising.
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The plans for carrying out this coup were almost nonexistent, representing 
Hitler’s belief that he had to obey the desires of followers in Munich quickly or 
risk losing their support.  Several of his closest allies made it clear that if no 
action was taken, their supporters might decide to desert the united rightist 
movement.90  Hitler also believed that he had to move quickly because von Kahr 
could lead his own monarchist coup against Berlin, costing Hitler a chance at 
power.91  Von Kahr had taken steps to limit Hitler’s capabilities after becoming 
dictator, and threatened to resist any violent steps that Hitler initiated.  On 
November 6, Hitler and other leaders hastily created plans to take over the 
Bavarian government, hoping to gain control of the Bavarian army and police for 
use in the march on Berlin.  The original plans called for action to go forward on 
November 11, but Hitler worried that von Kahr might declare Bavarian 
independence beforehand and return a Wittelsbach, the former monarchs of 
Bavaria, to the throne.  
This eventuality would rob Hitler of the opportunity to form his national 
government.  The takeover was then scheduled for the evening of November 8, 
when Hitler and other nationalist leaders had been invited to hear von Kahr speak
at the Bürgerbräukeller, one of Munich’s largest and most famous beer halls.  
Knowing that the Bavarian dictator could announce plans harmful to Hitler’s own, 
the Nazis resolved to begin the rebellion while von Kahr was speaking.92  The 
Nazis launched their planned coup, described by historian Peter Fritzsche as “an 
amateurish production that rested on a stunning exaggeration of Hitler’s sway 
                                                




over other people’s troops…,” resulting in disaster for the NSDAP.93  The 
American and British press had fretted about the possibility of a coup in Munich 
headed by Hitler.  They believed he might perhaps be able to enlist the tens of 
thousands he had spoken in front of to fight. When Hitler needed these followers 
the most, however, he was unable to find them because of the actions of his 
supposed allies.
Hitler launched the Beer Hall Putsch with approximately 4,000 viable SA 
and other troops.  They outnumbered police and army units within Munich, but 
government reserves were close to the city in substantial strength.  Since accounts 
of possible Nazi-led uprisings had circulated several times before, few had any 
inclination that the Nazis would actually do anything on November 8.  Many 
simply feared that the atmosphere was perfect for some group to take advantage.  
Even von Kahr was confident that Ludendorff and Hitler would not take the 
initiative and that they would consult him beforehand if they did.  He was wrong 
in this assumption.  Hitler arrived at the Bürgerbräukeller slightly past 8 p.m. 
while von Kahr was speaking.  Hitler and a group of S.A. troops used gunfire to 
quiet a raucous and drunken crowd before forcing their way to the stage to declare 
the formation of a new national government.94  
The first details of the Putsch reached foreign newspapers on November 9, 
a day behind the unfolding drama in Munich.  Early reports were pessimistic 
about the repercussions of Hitler and Ludendorff’s actions.  It was feared that a 
civil war would break out in Germany.   Several selections from the New York 
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Times expressed this possibility.  The articles related that General Hans von 
Seeckt, the national army commander, would likely send units to march against 
the Hitlerites, while federal President Ebert was calling on the German people to 
resist the traitors.95  The Putsch was front page news in the United States, and was 
a prominent story in the foreign section of The Times.  It, along with the 
Washington Post, described the revolt as if Ludendorff was the driving force 
behind it, and that he would emerge as the leader of a new government were it 
successful.96  With the chaos and rapidity of events in Bavaria, one would expect 
that the press would not have all the facts concerning the unfolding situation.  
Surprisingly though, the presence of reporters in Munich allowed them to see first 
hand what was transpiring in some cases, and how it ignominiously ended for 
Hitler and his troops.
American and British audiences received relatively accurate information 
regarding the failure of Hitler and Ludendorff to execute their attempted coup.  
This was in part because of lax security in the Bürgerbräukeller, which allowed 
foreign correspondents in attendance to sneak out through the kitchens and relay 
descriptions of the situation.97  They wrote that Hitler stormed into a nationalist 
meeting while von Kahr was speaking, took the stage and declared a new 
government for Germany.  Accounts differed on the leaders of this new 
government, some naming Hitler, others Ludendorff.  The most accurate account 
of what took place was in an official press release from the German government 
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stating that Hitler and Ludendorff had only overthrown the Bavaria government.  
The release added that the two had arrested the Bavarian Prime Minister von 
Knilling, and pronounced Ludendorff the head of the German army and Hitler the 
leader of the new government. Von Kahr and Lossow were also given important 
positions according to articles reprinting the official statement from Berlin.98  
Early communiqués had them willingly joining Hitler’s crusade, as they had been 
sympathetic to the nationalist cause for some time.  In later articles, the story 
emerged that Hitler had forced the two men into service at gunpoint.99  The 
second story proved the more accurate.  
Hitler stormed into the Bürgerbräukeller on the evening of the 8th, firing 
gunshots into the ceiling to intimidate von Kahr and others in attendance.  He 
quickly cordoned off von Kahr, Lossow, and one other Bavarian leader, Colonel 
Hans von Seißer, the head of the Munich police.  Hitler asked for their support, 
and they all agreed to join him, allowing Hitler to speed off to see to arrangement 
in other parts of the city. Ludendorff was left in charge of the beer hall, and the 
general allowed the three Bavarian officials to leave, believing they would be true 
to their agreement with Hitler.100  This proved a serious blunder on his part.  
Hitler and Ludendorff had badly misjudged the willingness of other reactionary 
leaders in Munich to engage in a civil war with the rest of Germany.  Fear and 
foreboding had been apparent in Western press reports that appeared on 
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November 9.  On November 10, the American and British press breathed a sigh of 
relief as the takeover attempt fell quickly apart because of the decisive actions of 
von Kahr and Lossow.
Readers were greeted by a very different set of headlines concerning 
Hitler’s Putsch on November 10 than those of the previous day.  Merely hours 
after beginning their uprising, Hitler and Ludendorff’s revolt had been brought to 
an end.  The New York Times alone included eleven separate articles related to the 
Putsch in its various daily editions.  These chronicled the coup’s transformation 
into a humiliating failure.  The details as to how events developed were unclear in 
some articles, but it was well known that Lossow and von Kahr had reneged on 
their agreement with Hitler.  After leaving the beer hall they had allegedly 
arranged to use army and police forces to put down the revolt.  At first it was 
believed that Hitler and Ludendorff had been captured by these forces during an 
assault against a Munich office where they were entrenched.101  In the subsequent 
days it was clear that events had taken a different course.  
Upon learning of von Kahr’s betrayal on the morning of the 9th, Hitler 
decided to lead a large group of followers into the city to force von Kahr’s 
surrender.  Those Hitler gathered walked straight into the fortified forces Lossow 
and von Kahr assembled, resulting in a short exchange of gunfire.  One writer, 
describing the actions of Hitler’s followers under fire, wrote that they fled at the 
first sounds of fighting.  The result was Ludendorff’s capture while Hitler 
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escaped.102  This account came closest to the actual events.  As soon as the 
Bavarian leadership left the Bürgerbräukeller, it began preparing to thwart 
Hitler’s plans.  It amassed an overwhelming force in order to prevent fighting if 
possible.  The Putsch leadership found out about this as its plans began to go 
awry.  An expected outpouring of support from troops in Bavaria and the rest of 
Germany never materialized.  
Never lacking confidence, Hitler and Ludendorff believed they could 
march on the government buildings in Munich and force von Kahr and Lossow 
into submission.  They had hoped the presence of the legendary general would 
prevent their enemies from firing upon them.  They were once again incorrect in 
their suppositions, as the Putschists were attacked, resulting in the deaths of 
sixteen men.103  Hitler had predicted this betrayal from von Kahr.  In an article
that appeared after the uprising, Hitler told an Italian correspondent before the 
Putsch that von Kahr “…always falls down at the last moment.”104  Hitler never 
forgot this betrayal.  During the purge of the Nazi party in June 1934 known as 
the Night of Long Knives, after he had seized power in Germany, Hitler had von 
Kahr dragged from his Munich home and murdered by Nazi assassins.105    British 
and American journalists might not have provided every detail of what took place 
during the coup, but their accounts provided accurately the results of the event –
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namely that the nationalist rightist movement in Munich had been dealt a 
crippling blow.
In the months following the attempted overthrow, more specific details 
emerged concerning the events in Munich.  One of the most accurate, if not 
objective, accounts appeared in March 1924 in the American periodical Living 
Age.   That publication reprinted a story from the Berlin daily newspaper 
Vorwärts written by a supporter of Hitler’s who took part in the Putsch.  The
article detailed the failed attempts by the Putchists to obtain weapons and 
maintain control of positions in Munich.  It also illustrated the failed march on the 
Munich government offices. It was sympathetic to Hitler and antagonistic towards 
those seen as betraying the nationalist cause, mainly von Kahr.  This adoration of 
Hitler was evident in the author’s heroic description of the end of the coup.  He 
claimed to have seen a wounded Hitler bravely carry a dying child to his get away 
car before fleeing to safety.  The article revealed some of the more horrifying 
aspects of Nazi intentions for the country when the party believed it held political 
control.  
The author of the Living Age article recalled walking into the 
Bürgerbräukeller in the early morning of the 9th, to be greeted by what he 
considered a humorous image.  He wrote:  “Who was there?  Fifty-eight Jews, 
mostly in their underwear and socks, just as they had been dragged out of bed.”  
One of the Jewish prisoners asked to have word sent to his wife that he was alive. 
The author “…laughed in his face and said, as I left, that I couldn’t do it, for so 
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far as I knew our people would begin to shoot them in a few minutes.”106  The 
Jews mentioned in this piece had been brought to the Bürgerbräukeller forcibly, 
and were added to another group of Jews unlucky enough to be in attendance 
when Hitler sprang his coup.  Nazi thugs were ordered into the city to terrorize 
and round up any Jewish residents that they found, though they were only able to 
bring back several dozen people.  Many were beaten and terrorized for the few 
hours they were held prisoner, and threatened by SA men with execution.  Nazi 
leader Hermann Göring overheard these threats and told the SA troops that “We 
do not have the right or authority to execute – yet.”107  Other major press 
publications did not include this episode in their releases.  By March 1924, when 
the Living Age article was released, most Western journalists no longer considered 
the Nazis a serious political threat.  
It was clear to American and British audiences that the risk of a new 
conflict emerging out of the Munich coup was no longer a possibility.  One New 
York Times article observed that the French government called off meetings 
intended to draw up a response to the Putsch because its intervention was no 
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longer necessary.108  American and British editors displayed a new overall 
opinion of Hitler and Ludendorff in opinion pieces on November 10.  The leaders 
were referred to as lunatics, especially the more famous Ludendorff.  His sanity 
was questioned, with one newspaper adding this failure to the long list of his prior 
miscalculations. 
 Hitler was treated even more disparagingly.  Called a house decorator and 
a demagogue by one editor, he was ridiculed for his political naivety and inability 
to gauge the attitudes of his co-conspirators accurately.  Questions were raised 
about what the two men’s failure meant for Germany.  Some were of the opinion 
that Germany was in a state of civil war, while others thought this was a positive 
thing for the stability of the country.  Most of these journalists saw the failure of 
the Hitlerites as an opportunity for the Western Allies to work together to make 
future Putsch attempts impossible.  What was apparent from these editorials was 
that writers in England and the United States considered Hitler and his followers 
failures, who were now political nonentities in Germany.109  Though Hitler was 
still at large and rumors of his raising new troops in Bavaria circulated widely, it 
was clear that he would not be able to achieve any of his goals.  Despite this, 
Hitler and the Nazis continued to be semi-popular subjects for writers, especially 
in the wake of a farce trial of the Putsch leaders for the crime of high treason.
Worries over the possibility of Hitler leading a renewed assault against 
Munich quickly dissipated, though rumors of a renewed National Socialist 
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movement in Bavaria lingered.110 Demonstrations against von Kahr were rampant 
in the city, as remaining Nazi sympathizers attempted to stir up support in the 
following days, and the press believed Hitler had fled to the Isar Valley or 
Rosenheim outside Munich. Finally, however, government forces captured him in 
the house of one of his followers, Ernst Hanfstaengel, in the small village of 
Uffing south of Munich.111  Hitler was slightly wounded in the fighting, and he 
had fled with no intention of raising new troops.  Rather, he had gone to 
Hanfstaengel’s to hide and to compose a political will, which placed the NSDAP 
leadership in the hands of fellow Nazi Alfred Rosenberg.112  Now that Hitler had 
been captured, articles concerning Hitler and the Nazi party appeared less 
frequently.  Most of the articles published concerning the Nazis were devoted to 
assessing the ramifications of the Putsch for all involved.  
It was widely believed that Hitler and other leaders would not face stiff 
penalties for their actions.  While awaiting trial, Hitler was interned at Landsberg 
fortress outside of Munich, known as a very comfortable prison.  The only real 
restriction placed on Hitler and other co-conspirators was that they were 
forbidden to leave the grounds, though the public was assured that Hitler’s guards 
had been specially chosen to resist his magnetic personality.  He and other leaders 
of the Putsch were to go to trial early in 1924, and they would probably not face 
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the death penalty.113  Several selections in the British and American press 
demonstrated a lack of concern about what punishment Hitler would receive, 
however, because they believed his movement was dead.114  This should have 
been the case. If he had been tried in other parts of Germany, he might have very 
well been executed.  Unfortunately, the Bavarian judicial system would prosecute 
a “…melodramatic trial that gave [Hitler] unparalleled publicity,” and 
transformed him from a Bavarian celebrity to a well-known figure throughout 
Germany.115
The trial of the coup’s leadership was not pursued immediately by 
Bavarian officials.  Western reporters knew that the reason for this was the 
reticence of leaders such as von Kahr and Lossow to be linked to Hitler’s 
movement in testimony that would emerge throughout the proceedings.  The 
official argument for delaying the trial was that there were fears of another 
Putsch, but it was obvious that the Bavarian leadership did not want its own 
treasonous activities displayed for the rest of the Germany.116  While awaiting 
trial, Hitler lived comfortably in Landsberg fortress.  Initially disheartened by the 
course of events, he went on a hunger strike upon hearing of his indictment on 
charges of treason.  Pleas from several of his followers imprisoned with him, as 
well as from the Nazi party founder Anton Drexler, convinced him to end his 
hunger strike.  Several different groups sprang up in Bavaria to take the place of 
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the National Socialist movement, which was now banned by the state 
government, and Hitler had no role in administering any of them.  
Hitler was content to be fawned over by a multitude of visitors and well 
wishers that came to visit him before his trial.  He had recovered from his injuries 
sufficiently to be declared fit for trial in January 1924.117  Articles from The Times
and the New York Times, both of whose reporters covered the trial closely, noted 
that it was to begin on February 18, though it was postponed to the 26th.  The 
atmosphere in Munich was uneasy as the trial date approached, as many citizens 
saw Ludendorff and Hitler as heroes according to Western reports.  An article 
explained that at least 80 percent of the people wanted von Kahr brought up on
treason charges and Hitler released.118  The Bavarian government declared that it 
would try the case, instead of handing the prisoners over to the federal 
government.  By having the trial in Bavaria, instead of at the German Supreme 
Court in Leipzig where it normally would take place, the Bavarian leadership 
hoped to limit the amount of information revealed.  Even though there was 
residual support for the leaders charged with treason, the Bavarian government 
had little fear of a new uprising, so it was desirable to have a quick and painless 
trial with only minimal sentences.119  The defendants would not allow von Kahr 
and Lossow to escape suspicion though.  Hitler especially used the trial as a 
platform to attack these men and shape his actions as only national devotion.
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In pre-trial interrogations, Hitler let the Bavarian prosecutor’s office know 
his intentions for the trial, and how he would use it to his full advantage.  He 
provided no official statement about what had taken place during the Putsch.  He 
told his interrogator, though, that he would expose the treason of von Kahr and 
Lossow, stating that he would find the right words to use once he spoke in court.  
One fact that unsettled the Bavarian government was Hitler’s knowledge of the 
Bavarian army’s involvement in the training of paramilitary forces for a march on 
Berlin.120  
Though not privy to all the details of von Kahr’s involvement with Hitler, 
the Western press knew the trial would likely paint him in a very unfavorable 
light with the federal government.  Both he and Lossow resigned from their 
respective positions in the Bavarian government and army only days before the 
trial began because of mounting suspicion of their role in the Bavarian rightist 
movement.121  This trial became a political lighting rod throughout Germany, and 
it was noted that rightwing forces throughout the country demanded that the trial 
be a “mere formality” while left wing supporters wanted harsh punishments for 
those involved.122  This trial should have been an opportunity to demonstrate the 
consequences of violent, subversive action against the state in a forceful manner.  
Because of the people involved and the sympathetic nature of Bavaria to the 
national conservative cause, though, there was no way that a trial convicting the 
criminals with a maximum sentence was possible.
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As the trial opened, American and British journalists realized that it would 
provide anything but the justice desired by German leftists.  One writer observed 
that since the two lead defendants were almost worshiped in Bavaria, a just 
verdict would be impossible.123  Indeed, two Western reporters portrayed the 
atmosphere of the court room as friendly to the defendants.  Ludendorff was 
allowed to commute to the trial freely each day from his home in Bavaria, while 
the other defendants would be kept in the Munich army school.124  Ludendorff’s 
very presence at the proceedings turned it into a national event, something the 
German press referred to as the trial of the age.  The case could not be prosecuted 
in a normal courtroom, as the number of audience members, gathered from all 
over the world, could not possibly fit.  Subsequently, the trial was relocated to a 
lecture hall in the Munich Infantry School.  The defendants would not face a jury, 
but rather a tribunal traditionally sympathetic to the radical nationalist cause.125  
This was the setting in which Hitler and Ludendorff stood trial for treason.
One the first day of the proceedings, Western reporters wrote that 
Ludendorff was cheered as he entered the courtroom, and even the judges referred 
to him as Excellency throughout the trial.  Hitler was called by the president of 
the court to give his testimony after the indictment against the accused was read.  
The indictment labeled Hitler as the main instigator of the revolt instead of 
Ludendorff, as many reporters had assumed.  Hitler used the opportunity to testify 
at length, speaking for four hours that day.  He was sure not to address the issue 
                                                
123 “Story of the Hitler Plot,” Manchester Guardian Weekly 29 February 1924, 172.
124 “Ludendorff Cool as Trial Begins,” New York Times 27 February 1924, 19;  “German Treason 
Trial: Ludendorff, Hitler, and von Kahr,” Manchester Guardian Weekly 29 February 1924, 172;  
“Ludendorff Trial; Sequel to Bavarian ‘Putsch,’” The Times 26 February 1924, 12g.
125 Flood, 573-575.
54
of his leadership of the coup.  Rather, he focused the discussion on his supposed 
role in saving Germany from the internal criminals that had allegedly produced its 
defeat in the First World War.  This included the vision that he supposedly 
received while in the hospital in 1918, an account of which reporters had relayed 
earlier in 1923.  The court president told Hitler to stay on the topic of the events 
of November 8 and 9, but within minutes Hitler was speaking as if he were back 
in a Munich beer hall, letting loose one of his usual tirades.126  Unfortunately, few 
other details were provided by the press about Hitler’s statements this first day.  
One American correspondent wrote that Hitler and Ludendorff both 
attacked the Jews and the Bavarian leadership, especially von Kahr, in their 
opening speeches.  Little else was clarified other than how absolutely ludicrous 
much of it sounded to him.127  This was not surprising considering Hitler’s 
message was not intended for foreigners.  On that first day, his speech was 
carefully crafted to appeal to the German people.  He discussed the outcome of 
the World War and how Germany was stabbed in the back, a popular myth that 
Germany had lost the war because of betrayal at home.  Marxism and the evils 
France had perpetrated on Germany also assumed a prominent role in his speech, 
in an attempt to justify the use of violence during the Putsch.  Hitler eventually 
came to his main argument, an indictment of von Kahr and Lossow.  He argued 
they were no different than him in planning to overthrow the government in 
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Berlin, and in this point he was correct.128  The question of the Bavarian 
leadership’s culpability with Hitler’s schemes would become a major issue in the 
trial.  This helped advance Hitler’s goal making his own actions appear as heroic, 
and not seditious, while making von Kahr and Lossow look like the true 
traitors.129
As the trial progressed, few American and British reporters focused on the 
information revealed about the intentions of the conspiracy’s leadership had they 
been successful.  The Manchester Guardian Weekly differed in this regard.  It 
made a point to divulge the plans for many summary executions laid out by Hitler 
and others.  The paper also noted what would likely have resulted had Hitler and 
Ludendorff been successful in Bavaria - specifically civil war and untold further 
suffering for the citizens of Germany.130  Unfortunately other Western reporters 
had a difficult time focusing on such facts.  Instead, they emphasized the carnival-
like atmosphere that emerged in the court as von Kahr and Lossow became 
progressively more involved.  One American journalist was entertained by the 
trial.  He observed that the trial had produced “several thrills,” including a 
challenge to a duel made by a German Army officer to Lossow on Ludendorff’s 
behalf.131  
The Times and the New York Times followed the trial on almost a day by 
day basis, but both papers concerned themselves mostly with the arguments and 
accusations that flew back and forth between the defendants, von Kahr, and 
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Lossow.  The atmosphere of the court was poor compared to a proper trial, so 
much so that the chief prosecutor quit at one point because the defense had been 
allowed to enter large amounts of irrelevant evidence and testimony, holding the 
trial up.  Lossow and Hitler came close to a physical confrontation when Lossow 
charged Hitler with being treasonous for breaking an agreement with von Kahr 
not to begin any uprising.  He also belittled Hitler’s position within the extreme 
right, labeling him as a tool for others and nothing more.132  The trial, a little over 
two weeks into the proceedings, had become little more than a farce.  Hitler used 
what remained to his full advantage, claiming responsibility for the uprising and 
becoming a heroic figure to the extreme nationalist conservative movement 
throughout Germany.
As the trial ended in late March 1924, reporters knew Hitler had tried to 
implicate others for the crime of treason, but he was not trying to disavow 
anything he had done.  Ludendorff attempted to downplay his role in the Putsch, 
maintaining he had nothing to do with its planning.  He claimed he had joined 
Hitler only upon hearing that the revolution had begun, and that he had no 
intention of creating a permanent government.  He insisted he was paving the way 
for the return of a monarch.  One reporter for the New York Times relayed the 
effect this had on Hitler: “Ludendorff’s reluctance to shoulder any portion of 
responsibility only seemed to inspire Hitler to reach out for the lion’s share of the 
blame.”  Hitler told the court his intentions were to cast down the government in 
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Berlin and create a new, permanent system for Germany.133  He wanted the 
citizens of Germany to know he was willing to eradicate what he considered a 
weak and ineffective government.
Only one article discussed Hitler’s closing statements, in which he 
declared that treason was only a crime when it failed.  His defense argued that he 
had carried out the Putsch with only the best intentions for Germany.134  Hitler’s 
closing speech contained some important elements that were not included in 
Western press reports though.  He elaborated on his intention to have neither a 
monarchy nor a republic in control of Germany, as well as his plans to free 
Germany from its alleged stock-exchange slavery and to reintroduce compulsory 
military service.  He stated that in the future, November 9 would be a holiday in a 
new Germany when the army was on his side.135  Sadly, there would one day be a 
holiday on November 9, in celebration of the farcical coup attempt.  Hitler used 
the failed takeover for propaganda purposes for the rest of his career, attributing 
greater significance to the events than they deserved.136  He had little to fear by 
making such bold pronouncements during the trial since he and the rest of those in 
attendance knew he was going to receive only a minimal punishment.
The sentences for those involved in the Beer Hall Putsch were handed 
down on April 1, 1924.  Considering what they entailed it was not surprising they 
were seen as an excellent April Fool’s joke, and many Munich residents 
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reportedly had a good laugh over them.137  The verdicts were carried on the front 
page of the New York Times, but less prominently in other sources.  It was noted 
that Ludendorff had been completely acquitted for his involvement, while Hitler 
received five year’s imprisonment.  The court ruled, however, that Hitler would 
not be expected to serve the full sentence, and that he would be released in six 
months time.  Many supporters of Hitler were ecstatic with this 
pronouncement.138  The sentences stood in stark contrast to the ones handed down 
against Bavarian communists and socialists in previous years, who received far 
harsher punishments for less serious offenses.139  
The prosecution had asked for Hitler to be sentenced to eight years in 
prison, but even this was too harsh in the judges’ opinion.140  Many Germans were 
surprised at the lax nature of the sentence, considering the Putsch resulted in the 
deaths of four policemen, the theft of 14.6 billion Marks, and the kidnapping of 
several important figures in Munich, including prominent government officials.  
Also ignored was the fact that Hitler was on probation on a conviction of 
breaching the peace in 1922.  He served his short sentence at Landsberg fortress, 
making his time in prison similar to an extended vacation.  His jailors were 
generous to and sympathetic toward him, some even greeting him with ‘Heil 
Hitler.’141  The trial ended extensive coverage of National Socialism for the 
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American and British press, since it considered the event Hitler’s last act on the 
German political stage.
Coverage devoted to the National Socialist movement for the remainder of 
the year dealt with the leadership of the extreme right in Bavaria and the new 
directions it would follow.  After the trial, any articles mentioning the extreme 
right in Bavaria or Hitler were no longer featured prominently.  Most American 
and British reports discussed the various parties attempting to replace the Nazis, 
who were now banned by the Bavarian government.  It appeared that there was 
much disagreement within the extreme right, and that recreating a united front 
would be impossible.142  Ludendorff’s possible ascension to the leadership of the 
National Socialists was mentioned.  Apparently Hitler had lost favor with some of 
his supporters, necessitating his replacement by Ludendorff.  Another article 
claimed that Ludendorff took over the movement because Hitler had temporarily 
retreated from politics to write his memoir, and that he expected to resume his 
leadership role once he was released from prison.143  Little of this information was 
actually accurate.  Hitler had ceded leadership of the NSDAP to Alfred 
Rosenberg, a devout Nazi and editor of the party’s newspaper.  What the writers 
referred to was a coalition of conservative and nationalist parties that Ludendorff 
attempted to orchestrate in early- to mid- 1924, which caused disagreement 
between many NSDAP branches.  
Hitler made it known that he wanted nothing to do with politics while in 
Landsberg.  He had little access to what was going on with various leaders both 
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inside and outside the Nazi party, who were constantly bickering over tactics and 
policies.144  Besides, as one article had mentioned, Hitler was working on a book, 
and the New York Times devoted a short article to it.  Hitler had announced his 
intention to write a book during an interview at Landsberg.  During the interview 
he emphasized his belief that an ultra-nationalist, völkische dictator was the only 
salvation for Germany.145  He dedicated himself to writing during his 
imprisonment, completing the first volume of what he wished to title Four and a 
Half Years of Struggle Against Lies, Stupidity, and Cowardice.  Max Amann, who 
would become the press magnate of the Third Reich, suggested shortening the 
title to Mein Kampf, or “My Struggle”, for publication.146  Hitler purposely 
removed himself from the spotlight as the NSDAP foundered, using his book as 
an excuse not to deal with the bickering of his followers.  As the year came to a 
close, all that was left of any importance for the press to report was Hitler’s 
release from prison.
By the end of 1924, Hitler and the Nazi party were considered mere 
curiosities and pariahs of the extreme nationalist cause.  The New York Times
even included a repudiation of the Bavarian fascists from Mussolini himself in 
one edition.  When asked about what he thought of the link drawn between his 
movement and the German fascists, Mussolini reportedly replied: “I know – I 
know that Hitler, Wulle and Ludendorff crew.  One of them, I forgot who, even 
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came here and asked me to receive him.  I refused, of course, to have anything to 
do with them.  Is it possible to be misunderstood like that?”147  
Because of the perceived unimportance of a shunned political figure, 
Hitler’s parole was treated as a mere formality in American and British reports.  
Only one newspaper mentioned the refusal on the part of the Bavarian 
government to free Hitler in October when his term was due to end.  This was 
because of his alleged involvement or contact with a new extremist 
organization.148  He was not released until December, when various articles 
simply stated that he was set free along with several other Putsch leaders.  No real 
mention of Hitler’s future plans was made for the most part, except that he was 
expected to remain in Bavaria.149  
One article was more descriptive of Hitler and his intentions upon release 
than others.  This was an article carried deep within the December 21st issue of 
the New York Times that labeled Hitler as a “much sadder and wiser man” than 
when he stood trial for treason, and that it was expected he would return to 
Austria in retirement.  The headline to this article summarily stated he had been 
tamed by prison.150  Unfortunately, the reporter’s words were not borne out.  
Hitler had used his time in prison to crystallize his hateful ideology even further.  
He decided to follow a new path to power in Germany, a path only he could 
dictate to the party as its unquestioned leader.
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The impressions gleaned from American and British press reports from 
November 1923 to December 1924 vary slightly.  Most believed that the National 
Socialist movement was finished, and that if there was any lingering threat in 
Bavaria, it came from the destabilizing influence of a large group of newly 
formed, yet heterogeneous, right wing parties.  Only the New York Times printed a 
story dealing with the long term impact of events upon Hitler, believing it had 
broken his spirit.  Other British and American press sources concluded that Hitler 
was happy at having gotten off so easily for crimes that he would likely have been 
executed for elsewhere.  Articles dealing with the NSDAP’s intentions for 
Germany and its ideology became scarce following the failed Putsch.  Instead, 
reporters turned their attention to the antics that took place in the courtroom 
where Hitler, Ludendorff, and other leaders were tried.  
The Manchester Guardian Weekly was the only source focusing even 
cursory attention on plans the Nazis would have put into effect had the coup 
succeeded.  This was unfortunate, because the speeches and interviews that Hitler 
and other Nazis made available demonstrated they were committed as ever to 
their racial, hate-based ideological goals.  A lone article from Living Age
demonstrated how quickly the Nazis turned on the Jews once they believed they 
held power, but this was a reprinted story from Germany.  After their failure, 
coverage of National Socialism became less emphatic as well.  The NSDAP had 
been on the front page, or at least featured in prominent columns, several times 
throughout 1922 and 1923.  Only a few instances of the trial coverage were 
deemed important enough to be accorded that position.  It would be over five 
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years before the press would consider the National Socialists important enough to 
warrant renewed serious consideration.  Despite less informative material on the 
party ideology and program than was available the previous year, the months 
from November 1923 to December 1924 helped provide a fuller picture of 
National Socialist politics in action.
Even though coverage of the National Socialist party focused on specific 
events from November 1923 to December 1924, reporters in the United States and 
Great Britain provided readers in England and the United States with important 
information.  The Beer Hall Putsch demonstrated that the Nazis were willing to 
use violence to achieve their aims, and that they would use it ruthlessly. Almost as 
soon as the uprising was under way, the Nazis sent troops in search of those 
considered dangerous to Germany, most notably the Jews.  Though the article 
from Living Age was the only one to relate the kidnap and treatment of Jewish 
hostages, it was nevertheless indicative of the racist priorities of the Nazis, who 
threatened their Jewish hostages with execution as soon as they were sure of their 
takeover.  The American and British press did not carry much substantive 
information from the trial of Hitler and the other coup leaders either, but they 
demonstrated that Hitler believed in the goals he had pursued in the Putsch
wholeheartedly.  While Ludendorff tried to play down his role in the uprising, 
Hitler brazenly told the court he accepted full responsibility for his crimes, and 
that he had been ready to die for them.  He made such a firm statement because he 
knew the court would sentence him to a light punishment, but there was no reason 
to believe that Hitler fabricated his beliefs.  The Putsch and the resultant trial 
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demonstrated Nazi intentions of not simply gaining power, but instituting a new 
social order based upon their malevolent political ideology.  
CHAPTER FOUR
YEARS OF OBSCURITY: JANUARY 1925 TO AUGUST 1930
After Hitler’s release from prison at the end of 1924, journalists in the 
United States and England believed that there was little need to provide extensive 
coverage of the National Socialist movement.  With the NSDAP outlawed by 
most of Germany already, the Putsch forced even Bavaria to ban the party for a 
short time.  For much of the five and a half years following 1924, the Western 
press devoted little attention to the Nazis except for a few scattered reports.  
While the Nazis might have been considered powerless by outsiders, these years 
proved crucial to the formation of a more resilient and politically oriented party.  
Hitler consolidated the movement under his leadership alone, and he worked to 
remove or subordinate any possible rivals.  Following his release from Landsberg 
prison, he cultivated the concept that was the basis of this consolidation – namely 
that he was the ultimate authority, and that the power structure of National 
Socialism emanated from him downwards.  
These years were also important for the party’s growth outside of south 
Germany, with hundreds of new branches founded throughout Germany to lay the 
foundation for explosive growth later on.  In addition, the movement shifted its 
political strategy within Germany, publicly renouncing violence as a means to 
power and embracing a democratic path to control.  In reality, violence would 
always be integral to National Socialism, but Hitler intended to gain control of the 
country through the ballot box and not through another revolution.  The party 
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instead used violent street confrontations with its enemies to gain publicity, 
mainly with the German public.  This strategy created attention in the foreign 
press as well, and many of the articles that appeared between 1924 and late 1930 
related Nazi involvement in political altercations.  Just as the Nazis had fed off of 
the economic and political crisis in Germany during the early 1920s, they would 
wait for another period of turmoil to attempt to resurrect a stronger, more 
nationally-oriented movement.  When the economic crisis of the late 1920s began 
to sweep the globe, the Nazis benefited with surprisingly strong support in 
German elections.  By the middle of 1930, American and English correspondents 
who had paid little attention to the National Socialists for much of the previous 
five years realized that the Nazis were heading for a dramatic, and legal, electoral 
victory in Germany.
In the early months of 1925, Hitler began reorganizing the Nazi party.  His 
first step was to make the organization and its newspaper legal again in Bavaria.  
To do so, Hitler pleaded with the recently installed Bavarian Prime Minster, 
Heinrich Held, during a private meeting.  Hitler told Held that the NSDAP would 
no longer turn to violence to meet its aims, labeling the Putsch a serious mistake.  
Hitler promised the Nazis were firmly dedicated to supporting the state and its 
political system, as well as fending off Marxism.  The abrupt turnaround in 
Hitler’s policies made an impression on Held, and he agreed to lift the ban on the 
Nazi party, allowing the Nazis to again become a legal organization on February 
16.  Held took the same view as the New York Times correspondent who wrote in 
late 1924 that prison had tamed Hitler.  In reality, it had only changed his 
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methods, not the results he hoped to achieve in Germany.  Following his release 
from prison, Hitler fortified his position as the sole leader of the Nazis.  He 
openly stated this before many important völkish leaders on February 26.  Several, 
including Ludendorff, did not like the idea of ceding all leadership to Hitler, and 
were reluctant to do so.151 Hitler was not concerned though.  Even the legendary 
general was not allowed to contest Hitler’s leadership. 
Hitler’s attempt to reorganize the National Socialist movement under his 
firm control came as little surprise to one Western publication that kept track of 
the meeting between the Nazi leader and Held.  In February 1925, The Times
carried a story explaining that Ludendorff and several other leaders had ended any 
pretensions of party control, and had resigned the leadership of their temporary 
nationalist organizations created when the Bavarian government banned National 
Socialism. The resignations were not viewed as shocking for several reasons.  The 
British journalist believed that the nationalist leadership desired to reunite the 
splinter rightist movements as they had been before the Putsch.  Ludendorff’s 
resignation was linked to his recent unpopular attacks on the Catholic Church and 
clergy.  Whatever the reason for their submission, Hitler’s consolidation of the 
party under his control was seen as the primary result.152
Once the NSDAP could operate openly again, Hitler wasted little time in 
reaffirming his support of the core National Socialist goals.  Towards the end of 
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February, he returned to the Bürgerbräukeller to speak in front of 3,000 
supporters.  The Times journalist covering the speech wrote that Hitler told the
audience he was combining all of the small National Socialist parties that had 
split off following the failed coup into a united movement once again, with 
several former leaders rushing to accept him as leader.  He also took the 
opportunity to denounce Marxism and the Jews.  His speech that night proved 
detrimental to the party, however, as the Bavarian government forbade him to 
speak for some time afterwards.  The authorities justifiably feared his ability to 
spur his followers to action.153  While information concerning a reunited Nazi 
party was indeed important for Western audiences, they did not understand the 
importance of Hitler’s message.
The speech in the Bürgerbräukeller went beyond the reunion of the small 
nationalist conservative parties.  In the speech, Hitler told his followers of his 
desire to bear the entire weight of leadership for the National Socialist movement 
upon his shoulders.  In what historian Ian Kershaw described as “pure theatre,” 
various rival leaders went onto the stage where Hitler was speaking and swore 
allegiance to him.  The Times correspondent noted this, but did not address the 
almost religious manner in which it took place.  From this point forward it was 
believed that Hitler would act as the glue to the entire Nazi cause, which was 
composed of disparate nationalist and conservative elements of the extreme right.  
Members of the NSDAP who had been unable to hold it together in Hitler’s 
absence began to perceive the leader as the one factor that could hold the 
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movement united.  For this reason, the adulation demonstrated by the party 
leaders following Hitler’s speech began to revere him as a destined leader or 
führer even before the idea had solidified in his own mind.  In the leadership’s 
opinion, he could transcend differences among the party’s membership, and lead 
it to glory.  One of the few remaining obstacles for Hitler was Ludendorff, who 
was still popular with some south German extremists.  Hitler had a plan to 
discredit Ludendorff though, evidence of which appeared in Western 
publications.154  
In March 1925, reports emerged that Hitler was supporting Ludendorff in 
that year’s upcoming presidential elections.   A New York Times article observed 
that Hitler was backing the general over another candidate who had garnered most
of the rightist support in Germany.155  Hitler had worked to convince Ludendorff 
to run for president, knowing that in all likelihood he would lose miserably.  
Ludendorff was indeed humiliated in the elections that March, and Hitler knew 
that the general’s image had been tarnished among the German ultra-nationalist 
movement.156  Hitler’s plan worked, though Ludendeorff attempted to play down 
his defeat.  His subsequent break with the south German nationalists was reported 
on the front page of the Washington Post in May 1925, which explained that he 
had tired of politics on such a small scale considering his former army colleague, 
General Paul von Hindenburg, had been elected the new German President.157  
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Hitler’s attempts to consolidate the party under his control were well on their way, 
though the Western press showed little interest. 
For the remainder of 1925, little of real substance was reported about 
National Socialism.  Several articles linked Hitler and the outbreak of anti-Semitic 
uprisings in Vienna.  The riots included attacks on Jewish businesses and citizens.  
The perpetrators of the hate crimes, which took place in mid and late 1925, 
dressed in the attire of Hitler’s troops, wearing swastikas and the Nazi uniform.  It 
was never proven that Hitler had anything to do with organizing the attacks as he 
was still in Germany.158  The Washington Post informed its readers that Hitler had 
been deprived of his Austrian citizenship, carrying a short article on the subject on 
the front page.  The article also mentioned that Bavaria had denied an application 
for German citizenship on Hitler’s behalf, and that he would reapply at the 
national level.159  
Hitler actually requested an end to his Austrian citizenship in April 1925.  
He based the application on his service in the Bavarian army during World War I, 
and the Austrian government was happy to oblige.  Thereafter, both Austria and 
Hitler no longer feared deportation, which would return the troublemaker to his 
homeland.  Attempts to gain him citizenship status in Germany remained futile, 
and for several years he continued to live in Germany without any national 
affiliation.160  Little else of Hitler’s movements and actions were included in the 
American and British press in 1925, though one other prominent Nazi, Joseph 
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Goebbels, made his first appearance in the Western media near the end of the 
year.
A New York Times article printed in November 1925 discussed an 
outbreak of violence in Berlin which involved the Nazis.  The riots began because 
of political speeches comparing Vladimir Lenin, the former leader of the 
Bolshevik party and head of the early Soviet Union, and Hitler.  The article 
mentioned that the speaker who made the comparisons was a Dr. Goebbels, who 
reportedly asserted that “...Lenin was the greatest man, second only to Hitler, and 
that the difference between communism and the Hitler faith was very slight…”  
This apparently precipitated a fight, though the participants were not described.161  
The article was the first mention of Joseph Goebbels to appear in the 
western press, and the nature of Goebbels’s words demonstrated a major problem 
for Hitler in consolidating control of the NSDAP in northern Germany.  Born in 
the Rhineland  in October 1897, Goebbels was an intelligent student and a gifted 
orator early in life, and he obtained his Ph.D in German literature in the early 
1920s.  He became one of the most powerful figures in the Third Reich, despite a 
club foot that he claimed was a result of a childhood accident, heading the 
ministry of propaganda and controlling almost every aspect of the German media.  
In late 1925, however, Goebbels was part of the northern German National 
Socialist movement, which was expanding because of the leadership of Gregor 
Strasser, a talented Nazi leader Hitler had sent to facilitate the party’s growth 
outside Bavaria.  The north German Nazis viewed the southern branch of the 
party somewhat suspiciously, since it emphasized the socialist aspect of the 
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movement more so than Hitler.  That branch hoped to appeal to supports of the 
Socialist and Communist parties by emphasizing its support for the proletariat.  
Many member in the northern branches of the party were from proletarian 
backgrounds, but Hitler would be unwilling to following a leftist path for the 
party.  Goebbels helped make the expansion of the party possible with his talent 
for incendiary and effective propagandizing.  In 1925, he was still not devoted to 
Hitler’s brand of National Socialism despite being an ardent anti-Semite, and he 
advocated a stronger socialist direction for the movement.162  
Though it would be odd for a south German party member, Lenin 
fascinated Goebbels, and he compared Lenin to Hitler in several speeches and 
publications in 1925.  The information reported in the article from the New York 
Times demonstrated Goebbels’s adoration of Lenin and a growing admiration of 
Hitler.  Goebbels used Lenin’s name to help garner support from working class 
sections of the north German population, and German communists understandably 
attempted to break up such propaganda whenever possible.  
The issue of the northern Nazi party’s belief in a more leftist course for the 
movement was resolved at a meeting with Hitler at Bamberg, in Bavaria, in 
February 1926.  At the meeting, Hitler upbraided Strasser, who had also become 
combative with Hitler, and Goebbels’s position.  Afterwards Goebbels decided to 
follow Hitler’s directions faithfully.  Over the next few months, he transformed 
himself into one of Hitler’s most sycophantic followers, accepting that Hitler 
represented the only path to Germany’s nationalist renewal.  Hitler recognized 
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Goebbels’s talents, as well as his emerging slavish devotion, and he knew he 
could use Goebbels to help solidify control in north Germany by removing one of 
Strasser’s most able supporters.  Hitler made Goebbels the head of the Berlin 
branch of the Nazi party, allowing Hitler to have confidence in his control of the 
party in the German capital.163  The American and British press did not convey 
any information at all concerning such squabbles within the Nazi party, and the 
only information concerning Goebbels before 1929 came from the short New York 
Times communiqué, which did little to elaborate on his importance.  Yet by early 
1926, Hitler had solidified his leadership of the party in north Germany, subduing 
another possible competitor in Strasser and acquiring the devotion of Goebbels, 
who in the years that followed helped cast Hitler in an almost religious mold.
Hitler extended his effective control over the entire National Socialist 
movement in 1926, but for American and British journalists, such events went 
completely unnoticed.  Western press coverage of Hitler and the Nazi party 
reached its lowest level from 1926 to 1928.  Only a handful of articles mentioned 
the movement.  Reports from 1926 had little of substance concerning Nazi 
machinations, for the most part mentioning Hitler’s name fleetingly in relation to 
some other personality, such as Ludendorff.  For example, a New York Times 
article related that Alfred Hugenberg, a wealthy German industrial magnate and 
an extreme conservative in his own right, was seeking to combine his political 
movement with the National Socialists.164  Hugenberg was a leading member of 
the German National People’s party, and he eventually would move the 
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organization in an even more extreme direction than its traditionally ultra-
conservative stance.  Later in the 1920s and early 1930s, Hitler would work 
closely with Hugenberg.165  Other semi-important articles from 1926 mentioned a 
speech in which Hitler espoused his belief in conflict between nations instead of 
reconciliation, and another relating an outbreak of violence between Nazis and 
Socialists in Berlin.166  Even this scant coverage in 1926 continued to demonstrate 
the Nazi belief in conflict and violence, despite Hitler’s public disavowal of such 
activity.
Despite the meager coverage offered in American and British press 
sources, Hitler and the Nazis were working feverishly to organize the party and 
develop its constituency.  In July 1926, Hitler declared the creation of the Hitler-
Jugend, or Hitler Youth organization.  This was a part of Hitler’s plans to enable 
the NSDAP to infiltrate as many aspects of German society as possible.  Over the 
next few years, the Nazis initiated a wide range of social and professional 
organizations, including associations for women, students, teachers, and lawyers.  
The groups were meant to broaden the attractiveness of National Socialism to as 
many disparate groups as possible.167  The Nazis also began looking to new 
groups for electoral support.  For some time the party had attempted to build a 
base of support among the urban working class, but recruitment efforts were not 
very successful in the mid 1920s.  During the late 1920s, the NSDAP began to 
make inroads with rural protestant population in northern agricultural parts of 
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Germany, finding there a much more willing base of support.   By 1929 the shift 
to the new constituency began to bear fruit, and Nazi membership roles increased 
significantly.168  Another important development was Hitler’s commitment to 
combat Marxism more aggressively than ever.  To this end, he ordered the 
reorganization of the SA.  He expressed his wish to increase radically the size of 
the Nazi para-military formation from hundreds of members to hundreds of 
thousands.  This would allow the National Socialist movement to, in Hitler’s 
words, become “…masters of the streets…”169  
The Nazis had long been involved in vicious street fighting with its 
opponents in Munich, but the new party policy led to violent confrontations 
throughout Germany.  Hitler wanted the expansion of violence and bloodshed to 
combat the German communists and any other political opponents.  According to 
historian Richard Bessel, the Nazis sought to demonstrate that they were 
“…prepared to abandon respectable bourgeois behaviour(sic) in the struggle 
against the ‘reds’ and ‘would never quit the field.’”170  The violence of the SA 
was never meant to be a means to an end, however.  Hitler had no intention of 
trying to seize power again violently, no matter how large the SA grew.  One of 
the SA’s main roles was to generate publicity and notoriety within Germany, 
demonstrating that there was an organization willing to confront the elements in 
Germany the Nazis blamed for every conceivable problem, including Jews, Poles, 
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and various other political groups besides the communists.171  Even these 
developments went without much notice in the Western press during 1926.
But eventually, articles from the American and British press began to take 
limited notice of emerging German political violence.  During 1927 and 1928, 
reports appeared discussing the outbreak of fighting between fascist and 
communist forces.  Accounts of the violence rarely included much detailed 
information other than the fact that they were ferocious.172  Communists were not 
the only target of Nazi aggression.  Anyone who voiced opposition to their 
program was a target. At one Nazi meeting, a Lutheran minister was nearly beaten 
to death after voicing his opposition to one of the National Socialist speakers.  
The Berlin police responded by banning the Nazis from operating within the city 
for a short time.173  Prussian authorities were much more active in trying to curb 
the excesses of Nazi street troops than their counterparts in Bavaria had been in 
the early 1920s.  In August 1927, the authorities stopped a trainload of Nazis 
returning from a party meeting in Nuremberg, arresting 435 of them.  The 
incarcerated men were all eventually released, but at least the police attempted to 
prevent some of the public violence from taking place.174  The trouble seen in the 
various reports only escalated in the following years, as the economic woes of the 
Great Depression helped both the communists and the Nazis find new members.
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Little was reported about Hitler’s actions during 1927 and 1928.  He had 
been under a ban keeping him from making public speeches throughout most of 
Germany, which probably accounts for why little was written about him.  It did 
make news in 1927 when he spoke in Berlin on May Day, supposedly for a 
counter-demonstration to the regular socialist and communist activities on the 
worker’s holiday.  It was not a very successful show of force, however, as Hitler 
was limited to speaking privately to a select group of Prussians.175  While 
hundreds of thousands of his opponents marched in Berlin, Hitler spoke in front 
of only 5,000 people.176  The ban on Hitler speaking in Prussia would not be lifted 
until September 1928, when the government and most others in Germany thought 
the NSDAP was completely finished following small gains by the National 
Socialists in that year’s Reichstag election.177  It did not take long, however, for 
him to help create trouble.  In October 1928, a street fight between communists 
and Nazis broke out at one of his first public speeches in Prussia.178  On 
November 16, he gave his first major speech in Berlin in front of 10,000 
supporters at the Sportpalast, a major Berlin arena, where he commented on the 
degenerative influence of Jazz music.179  The following year proved to be a 
slightly more active one for the party, as the Western press slowly began to 
recognize that while the Nazi party might be suffering for support, it had not 
disappeared or deviated from its core belief, the hatred of the Jews.
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During 1929, the New York Times noted the anti-Semitic activities of the 
Nazis.  First, the paper mentioned that the Prussian Diet was considering 
sanctioning several of its National Socialist members, and revoking the immunity 
from prosecution that they enjoyed.  Several members had lent their names as 
publishers of National Socialist publications which produced large amounts of 
libelous, anti-Semitic material.  The publications remained immune from 
prosecution, however, because of the association with a legislature member.  The 
article specifically mentioned a deputy accused of such maneuvers.180  It referred 
to Robert Ley, the future leader of the German Labor Front during the Third 
Reich.  Ley was fined in September 1929 after being found guilty of insulting 
Jewish religious leaders in a Nazi newspaper.  Ley was not the only Nazi 
sanctioned for such publications.  Two others in Nuremberg reportedly were 
sentenced to jail terms for printing stories about Jewish ritual murders.181  The 
New York Times included several more articles in 1929 describing Nazi hostility 
toward German Jews, including the desecration of Jewish cemeteries in the small 
town of Hermeskeil.182  Such reports demonstrated that the Nazi hatred of the 
Jews had not withered in the years since the Putsch, but had remained as vicious 
as ever.
American and British correspondents also took notice of the Nazis’ vocal 
protest against the Young Plan.  It was the first time in several years that Hitler 
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and his movement were recognized for their stance on a major German political 
issue.  The Young Plan was an agreement between Germany and the Western 
Allies of World War I concerning German reparations payments, replacing the 
prior arrangement of the Dawes plan.  It called for reparations payments to be 
extended well into the 1980s but significantly lowered the amount Germany was 
expected to pay in the initial years of the agreement.  Foreign supervision was to 
be withdrawn, and the Allies agreed to remove all remaining troops in the 
Rhineland five years ahead of schedule.  The Young Plan was attacked viciously 
by right wing elements in Germany, who argued that it was simply another 
agreement enslaving Germany to decades of repayments.  The opposition to the 
plan was led by Alfred Hugenberg, head of the German National People’s party.  
Hugenberg enlisted the aid of other extreme nationalist groups in Germany, 
including the Nazis.  National Socialist participation provided Hitler with a new 
outlet to reach a large audience with his program.183  He used the party’s 
resources to agitate for a referendum condemning the passage of Young Plan, a 
referendum that barely succeeded and had no important impact.  Nevertheless, the 
party’s opposition to the Young Plan exposed it to a larger German audience than 
ever before.  The publicity gained the NSDAP new respect among nationalist and 
rightwing supporters, who began to drift away from the older groups into the 
seemingly more vibrant Nazi party.184  Western press coverage of the Nazis’ 
involvement on the issue was limited, but it was recognition of the renewed 
importance of the National Socialists within German politics.
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Western press reports of Nazi involvement in the agitation against the 
Young Plan portrayed the party as secondary to Hugenberg and his nationalist 
party.  Nevertheless, Nazi demonstrators were important in attempts to pass the 
national referendum preventing Germany from ratifying the Young Plan.  An 
article from The Times covered Nazi efforts in the cause, relating the propaganda 
speeches of two party members in Cologne.  The speakers repeated a series of 
rumors and lies about the terms of the agreement, including a fabrication that 
German men and women would be forced into slave labor in Siberia should 
German default on reparation payments.185  Other articles dealt with the downfall 
of Hugenberg and Hitler’s schemes, mainly because of the open opposition of the 
German president von Hindenburg.  He took issue with a part of the referendum 
that would subject those signing any international agreement, including the 
Young Plan, to criminal prosecution.  He perceived this as a personal attack, and 
his opposition dealt a serious blow to the referendum, since he was a revered 
military figure to German rightwing elements.186  
A New York Times opinion piece justifiably believed that von 
Hindenburg’s opposition had harmed Hugenberg and his party, but it made no 
mention of the effects the entire referendum had on the Nazis.187  The lack of 
support for the referendum was reported on October 23, 1929, and an American 
journalist covering the story believed that this “…has left Dr. Hugenberg, Adolf 
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Hitler and their clique of agitators in a state of withering isolation.”188  For the 
remainder of the year, articles from the New York Times proved this was the case 
for the DNVP and Hugenberg, but not for the Nazis.  The referendum against the 
Young Plan succeeded, passing by the narrow margin of 8,000 votes, although 
there was apparent voter fraud in several areas.  There was no possibility of the 
referendum against the Young Plan ever succeeding, though, since neither the 
Reichstag nor the 41 million votes necessary to pass a plebiscite would 
materialize.189  The Nationalist party suffered because of its failure to mobilize 
support, but the Nazis benefited.  In November municipal elections in Berlin, the 
Nazis increased their share of the votes, mainly at the expense of the nationalists.  
Hitler also did well personally, moving into a large apartment in Munich.  This 
led reporters to believe he was well supplied by wealthy German supporters of his 
movement.190  The Nazis were riding a new wave of support that would carry 
them firmly to renewed importance on the German political scene as well as with 
the international press.
The years from 1924 to 1929 had seemingly been a stable period within 
Germany, but serious problems had developed during the period that would help 
serve the Nazis as a springboard to power.  A major characteristic of those years 
was the demonstrated willingness of the German people to support anti-
Republican elements.  Nowhere was this more visible than with the election of 
former General Paul von Hindenburg in 1925.  His firm dislike of representative 
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government helped to undermine the effectiveness of democratic processes in 
Germany and demonstrated the willingness of many voters to support nationalist, 
anti-democratic movements and leaders.  Another major problem facing the 
Weimar Republic was the advent of a severe new economic crisis.  
Early in 1929, economic difficulties began emerging in the agricultural 
sectors of the German economy; such problems would eventually spread into 
other parts of the country as the Great Depression began to engulf the world.191  
The first widespread economic problems in agricultural areas arose during the 
winter of 1929, coinciding with Hitler’s re-emergence as a prominent political 
figure.  During the depression unemployment increased significantly and national 
output collapsed.192  As the 1930s began, circumstances in Germany were perfect 
for a surge of support for the Nazi party.  Voters who had demonstrated a dislike 
for the Weimar regime with the election of Hindenburg found a new party to 
support in the Nazis, who staunchly supported Germany’s rebirth as a great world 
power.  The economic crisis of the Great Depression also provided the Nazis with 
new supporters, when the situation became so grave for many that they were 
willing to listen to the National Socialist’s extreme policies.
During early 1930, German economic disruptions began to affect more 
and more people.  Unemployment rose sharply, climbing above 2,000,000, a 
figure that did not include many whose unemployment benefits had already 
expired.193  American and British journalists recognized that the National 
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Socialists were gaining in popularity in an environment of such economic and 
political instability, and that they would likely benefit at the ballot box.  This 
electoral support materialized quickly in state elections throughout Germany.  The 
New York Times noted that the Nazi party won a large enough share of the 
electorate in the states of Mecklenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia to be included in 
coalition governments.  In Thuringia, the party garnered its first cabinet position.  
Wilhelm Frick, a long time party member, was made the Minister of the 
Interior.194  Frick had taken part in the Putsch in 1923 and, like Hitler, was 
imprisoned for a short time.  Following the Nazi takeover of Germany in 1933, he 
assumed control in Berlin of the Ministry of the Interior, the same position he 
held in Thuringia.195  
Frick’s placement was part of a plan by Hitler to assume the most 
important political posts in Germany.  Hitler went to Thuringia to plead the case 
of the Nazis for inclusion in a coalition with the German People’s Party, and he 
was able to secure the position for Frick.  He knew that the Nazis were gaining a 
new wave of support, and he wanted to be able to exploit the opportunity.  The 
Ministry of the Interior controlled the police and civil services at both the state 
and federal level, and he believed that Nazi control of these branches of 
government would facilitate the National Socialist rise to power.196  Frick’s 
attempts to influence the Thuringian police and educational system on the Nazis’ 
behalf created many problems for the NSDAP with the federal government, but it 
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was undeniable that Nazi influence was expanding rapidly throughout the 
country.
Frick’s activities in Thuringia demonstrated Nazi government policy, and 
what would likely result should the party come to power at the national level.  The 
British press reported in March 1930 that the Thuringian government and the 
federal government were in conflict over Frick’s policies concerning the police.  
Apparently Frick had ordered all possible police recruits to be questioned about 
their political loyalties.  Any applicants who disagreed with Nazi policies were 
rejected.  Upon discovering this, the federal Minister of the Interior, former 
Prussian official Carl Severing, ended national subsidies to Thuringia for police 
forces.  The police was not the only area of Thuringian policy that Frick tampered 
with.  The Manchester Guardian Weekly reported that he had introduced a bill in 
the Thuringian state legislature “…making it illegal (under ferocious penalties) 
for any German to marry Jews or coloured(sic) people or in any way to pollute 
Teutonic civilization.”197  
The end of funds from Berlin caused an outcry against Frick within 
Thuringia, but he remained in office despite the economic problems he had 
brought to the state.198  The British reports concerning Frick’s attempted 
conversion of Thuringian police and civil services into loyal outlets of the Nazi 
party was an important lesson for Western audiences.  It demonstrated that Hitler 
was telling the truth about wanting to come to power in Germany through the 
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electoral system.  It was also true, however, that the Nazis desired to use the 
positions gained through elections to tear down Weimar democracy from the 
inside.
While the Nazis gained new sources of popular support during the 
economic crisis, the German government began experiencing difficulties on how 
to help alleviate the suffering of the German people.  The collapse of the 
American stock market in the fall of 1929 caused the withdrawal of loans made to 
Germany, which in turn produced bankruptcies and exacerbated the 
unemployment situation.  The government deadlocked over the issue of funding 
unemployment benefits because of the tight financial situation, and this resulted in 
the removal of the regime of then chancellor Herman Müller.  His government 
was replaced by one headed by Heinrich Brüning.199  
Brüning, a leader of the Catholic Centre party,  ran the government 
through the presidential decrees of von Hindenburg, deciding not to rely on any 
legislative coalition or backing for his decisions.  He employed the emergency 
power granted to the president in Article 48 of the Weimar constitution.  Von 
Hindenburg had no problem ruling in this manner, since he disliked a legislative 
system filled with many leftist parties that he despised.  The German legislature 
was firmly against Brüning’s attempt to bypass its authority, and it voted to 
rescind his ability to rule through presidential decree.  Rather than backing down, 
Brüning dissolved the Reichstag on July 18, 1930, setting the stage for a new 
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series of elections in September.200  The Manchester Guardian Weekly explained 
to its readers the expected outcome of the elections:  “The election campaign is 
dreaded by all except the National Socialists (who stand to score very heavily) 
and the communists (who at least do not stand to lose).”201  American and British 
journalists understood that the dissolution of the Reichstag paved the way for 
meaningful Nazi involvement in the German federal government.
Hitler knew the opportunity to expand the NSDAP’s position had come.  
In late July, he organized the propaganda and party machine he had been building, 
and began campaigning for the National Socialists.202  In the weeks before the 
September elections, the Western press relayed the fears of some in Germany 
about what results the elections would return.  The New York Times observed that 
various middle class parties were hoping to form coalitions among themselves to 
help stave off the expected movement of voters to both the extreme right and 
left.203  The gains were predicted even though it was well known that both the 
Nazis and the communists desired to create a dictatorial system in place of a 
democratic one.204
 The Western press observed that the Nazis had established a large 
foundation among German youth as well as among the middle classes.  Referred 
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to as the most effective campaigners of the election by far, the Nazis planned to 
hold in excess of 34,000 campaign meetings in the weeks before the elections.  
Projections concerning how many seats the Nazis would gain varied, but all were 
substantial.  One correspondent predicted the Nazis would win close to 60 seats in 
the Reichstag.  Another thought that the Nazis and communists would probably 
obtain around 100 seats between them.205  Even that result would increase 
dramatically the prestige and power of the Nazi movement.206  Hitler hoped that 
such estimates would prove accurate; he thought 60 seats were a marked victory 
considering the party had won only twelve in 1928.207  Both Hitler and the 
Western press’s estimates of Nazi gains were inaccurate.  Even the Nazis were 
shocked when, in September 1930, they received enough votes to become the 
second largest political party in the German legislature.
From 1925 through the first months of 1930, the British and American 
press devoted little space in their publications to the National Socialists, which 
was understandable.  The NSDAP lost a significant number of followers after the 
fiasco of the Putsch, and appeared banished from the German political 
mainstream.  For this reason, the Western press included only cursory references 
to the Nazis in their publications, not realizing that some party activities were 
harbingers of a reconstituted National Socialist movement.  The reports from 
1925 through 1928 mentioned Hitler’s troubles with Ludendorff and the northern 
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wing of the movement.  It was unimportant to Western audiences that Hitler was 
consolidating the party under his sole leadership, mobilizing it to spread 
throughout the country and finding new venues to disseminate its program.  
The Western press had given Hitler what he desired in late 1929, though, 
by prominently including his name with Hugenberg and other protestors of the 
Young Plan.  Though reported in a secondary light, the National Socialists were 
the only beneficiaries of the failed attempt to prevent the signing of the treaty.  
American and British writers were not concerned at the time with the growing 
support for the Nazis, but early in 1930 this attitude changed.  Wilhelm Frick’s 
placement in the government of Thuringia demonstrated what a Nazi government 
would look like, but the press did not make the connection at the time. Frick’s use 
of government power to influence the police in favor of the National Socialist 
cause should have raised alarms about the how Nazi legality was going to work.  
Rather, what the British and American press noted was how quickly the federal 
government was moving to stop Frick’s excesses.  The confidence in the federal 
government had to wane, however, when the Weimar Republic collapsed under 
the strain of the Great Depression.  Only two newspapers, the New York Times 
and the Manchester Guardian Weekly, dedicated much coverage to the Nazi’s 
success in exploiting these circumstances, but even they were not concerned the 
NSDAP would have influence in the government, believing it would win around 
60 Reichstag seats.  This lack of concern would continue into the following year.
Though limited in scope, the Western press provided its readers valuable 
information concerning the National Socialists in the years from 1925 to 1930.  
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The Nazis consolidated the party during this period, preparing themselves to 
move forward and become a successful political movement.  Hitler disposed of 
any possible opposition to his sole leadership of the NSDAP, laying the way for 
his role as Führer, not only of the party but for the millions of Germans he hoped 
to rally to his cause.  He shifted the emphasis of the party away from violent 
takeover to attaining power through parliamentary means, though he in no way 
abandoned the use of the SA in confronting the party’s opponents.  One constant 
theme present in Western press reports was the omnipresent violence surrounding 
the party and its activities.  The press did not mention the various social and 
professional organizations that the Nazis founded to further their interests among 
new segments of the population, but they did take notice in the late 1920s of the 
growing support for the movement within the German middle classes.  Not 




THE END OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC: SEPTEMBER 1930 TO 
DECEMBER 1931
Elections in September 1930 made the NSDAP second only to the Social 
Democrats in representation in the Reichstag.  The months following the Nazi 
victory foreshadowed what a Nazi-controlled Germany might resemble, and the 
Western press provided in-depth coverage of the movement and its activities.  
American and British journalists supplied their readers with a wealth of material 
about the nature and intentions of the Nazi party and the dangers its electoral 
victory created for the world.  Western correspondents and editors attempted to 
play down the threat of the Nazis, though, believing that the NSDAP was a 
fleeting expression of German discontent.  Some thought that taking part in the 
government would restrain the Nazis, or that other responsible German factions 
would keep them from power.  
Though the National Socialists were effectively kept from having a say in 
the government in 1931, the party’s breakthrough only spurred on Nazi excesses, 
at times causing Hitler and others to more brazenly flaunt their violent and racist 
intentions while attempting to maintain an appearance of respectability.  Hitler 
openly announced his goal to punish ruthlessly those Germans responsible for the 
Versailles treaty. He also espoused his belief in using war to free Germany from 
what he considered enslavement imposed by the agreement.  The National 
Socialist antipathy toward Jews also showed no sign of abating, and several 
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examples of Nazi hatred and violence toward the Jewish community appeared in 
Western press articles.  American and British journalists saw the Nazis as a 
barbaric reflection of Germany’s problems; the writers hoped fervently that good 
sense would take root among German voters.  They were sorely disappointed as 
Nazi electoral victories continued to mount throughout the country. Fears grew 
that the Nazis could gain some kind of control over the German government.  
As the September Reichstag elections approached, the Western press was 
relatively muted in its coverage of the political situation in Germany.  British 
newspapers described problems with Hitler’s control of the SA and whether he 
maintained its loyalty.  The Times reported that Hitler had maintained domination 
of the Storm Troopers by assuming the position of supreme commander of the 
group and by increasing their pay.  The Manchester Guardian Weekly attacked 
Hitler as an empty-headed demagogue, and stated that he had lost control of the 
movement, but this was not the case.208  Hitler had experienced problems with the 
SA leadership over the issue of the group’s representation in the party’s Reichstag
delegation.  This dispute led to the resignation of the SA commander and some 
violence by the SA branch in Berlin, but Hitler maintained control.209  Other 
reports elaborated on pre-election violence, including a series of brawls between 
the National Socialists and communists.  Time magazine discussed several rumors 
circulating in Germany concerning President von Hindenburg’s support for the 
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Nazis, which the magazine asserted had no factual basis.210  The relative silence 
of the British and American press ended abruptly following the Reichstag election 
of September 14, 1930.
The Nazis had expected that they would gain handsomely during the 
election, but even their projections fell far short of estimates.  A few months prior, 
Goebbels had estimated the party would win forty seats.  He noted that all were 
stunned when the returns showed the Nazis had won 107 seats, increasing their 
share of the vote from 2.6% in 1928 to 18.3%.  This made the Nazis the second 
largest Reichstag party, smaller only than the Social Democrats.211  In the United 
States, the victory of the National Socialists was considered a severe blow to 
German republicanism, and details of the elections were prominent front-page 
stories.  The New York Times asserted that the NSDAP had received a 
groundswell of support from the middle class as well as from workers who were 
not affiliated with the socialists or communists.  The electoral breakthrough 
compelled the paper to reintroduce Hitler to its audience, calling his fiery oratory 
an important factor in creating support among young Germans.  A description of 
the party’s platform was also included, elaborating on many of its extreme 
qualities, including the objective of excluding the Jews from German society.212  
While a large portion of the Nazi support came from the German middle classes, 
the actual makeup of the party’s electoral support was diverse.  The party had 
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been able to appeal to a wide variety of Germans from an assortment of social, 
political, and religious backgrounds.213
A Washington Post editorial on September 16 made several observations 
about the election that became common among the Western press.  This included 
the belief that the German vote was simply a protest against economic conditions, 
and not actual support for the party.  Another idea in the opinion piece was the 
argument that the strong support for the Nazis and communists, who had also 
gained heavily, was temporary and would eventually fade.  The editorial 
expressed the conviction that the moderate and responsible parties of Germany 
would not allow the Nazis any chance at participation in the government, making 
fears of the imminent collapse of the Weimar Republic groundless.  Once again 
referring to Hitler as the German Mussolini, the Washington Post asserted that he 
had been able to play on the anxieties and economic distress of German voters, 
intimating that once those problems ended, so would the Nazis’ support .214  Other 
media mirrored the rejection of a real threat posed by the National Socialists.  
Writing for the American weekly magazine Outlook and Independent, H.L. 
Binsse argued that most in Germany would never go for the foolishness of a the 
Nazi movement, which was in his opinion nothing more than a German version of 
the Ku Klux Klan.215  This rejection of the immediate threat of the Nazi electoral 
breakthrough became common on both sides of the Atlantic.
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In Great Britain the press treated the National Socialist victory in a 
similarly incredulous manner.  A Times article dealing with the election observed 
that a dozen reasons could explain the success of the Nazis, but the main factor 
had to be the economic crisis and the delay by other political parties in dealing 
with it.  The paper noted that the Germans had to have voted with very little 
reflection about the implications considering the Nazis were a negative and 
violent movement.  The Times and the Manchester Guardian Weekly addressed 
the possible coalitions now that the Nazis were the second largest party, and 
neither newspaper, unlike their American counterparts, discounted the possibility 
of Nazi participation.216  Just like the American newspapers, the Times published 
several articles devoted to reacquainting its audience with the Nazis and their 
leader.  Most of the information regarding Hitler came directly from Mein Kampf, 
which meant the newspaper was printing several fabrications created by Hitler.  
This included his claim to have been a founding member of the NSDAP and its 
seventh member, which were both lies.217  The British and American press 
publicized the international reaction to the German elections, obviously out of 
fear that the success of both the Nazis and communists might lead to new 
European tension.
It was clear that France considered the outcome of the German elections a 
potential threat.  Reports described the mood in France as uneasy.  The French 
believed the vote demonstrated German unwillingness to cooperate with 
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international arrangements.   A Times article explained that France would watch 
the situation closely.  The paper produced a veiled warning that the success of the 
German right might necessitate a French response.218  Austria was reportedly also 
upset by the victory of the Nazis because of fears that it might spur internal 
fascists to attempt a takeover of their own.  Italy was apparently not expecting the 
sweeping victory of Hitler’s party.  The Italian government released a statement 
that the elections were evidence of fascist theories that parliamentary 
governments did not work.  The German foreign minister, Julius Curtius, was 
dispatched to the League of Nations where he declared that despite the elections, 
the moderate path of the German government would not be abandoned.219  
Though the American press tried to reassure its readers that the Nazis would not 
come to power, it was clear that a political upheaval had taken place in the 
European and international political arena.
The Western press attempted to sort out what the German government 
would look like in the wake of the elections.  An early article in the Times
indicated the Nazis wanted control of the national ministries of interior and 
defense, probably basing this assertion on the experience with Wilhelm Frick in 
Thuringia.  The Times noted that this would be tantamount to handing the country 
over to the National Socialists.220  It appeared, though, that the Nazis would be 
given no opportunity to have a say in a coalition government.  Members of a 
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coalition of the German middle class parties stated that they would not seek any 
cooperation with the Nazis.  The possibility existed for a limited coalition 
between the Center party and the socialists, or of bypassing legislative 
government altogether with Brüning continuing to rule by presidential decree.221  
Whichever path the government eventually took, the press reported, the Nazis 
would have no influence on government policy, at least for the time being.
The question of Nazi intentions for Germany was a popular topic for the 
Western press to discuss.  Nazi anti-Semitism was only hinted at within the 
British press, but in the New York Times the issue received considerable attention.  
Journalist Guido Enderis reported that the Nazis represented the largest anti-
Jewish legislative group in over fifty years within Europe.  He observed that the 
NSDAP had been playing down this aspect of its program in its mass appeals, but 
Enderis singled out a chilling warning from the Nazis to German Jews found 
within the party newspaper: “The day will yet come when you Jews will have 
nothing to laugh at, and then may God have mercy on you.”222  
The Washington Post included a dispatch from the Associated Press that 
contained another portent of Nazi intentions towards the Jews, this time from 
Joseph Goebbels: “I have been told the Jews think the only means to get rid of us 
is to pick off our leaders one by one.  If a single leader thus falls, we shall answer 
with a pogrom.”223  The statement foreshadowed Goebbels’ actions in 1938, when 
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he orchestrated the brutal Kristallnacht pogrom at Hitler’s request.224  Even 
though the Nazis limited their open attacks against Jews somewhat, as Enderis 
mentioned, Goebbels’s statement demonstrated the long-term violent intentions of 
the Nazis towards the Jewish community had not diminished in the least.
Another opportunity to gauge the intentions of the Nazis for the country 
came towards the close of September 1930, during the trial of three junior 
Reichswehr officers.  These officers were charged for their attempts to increase 
participation between the army and the Nazis.  The army leadership wanted to end 
such subversion, and it had three of the most prominent officers in the movement 
who had collaborated with the National Socialists brought to trial.  Hitler was 
called to testify by Hans Frank, a Nazi lawyer who defended one of the 
officers.225  Just as he had done during the Putsch trial of 1923, Hitler used the 
opportunity to publicize the movement and its policies.  The press covered his 
testimony closely.  It reacted harshly when Hitler’s words intimated a murderous 
agenda should the party ever come to power.  When questioned about Nazi 
intentions for Germany, Hitler reiterated his stance that the Nazis would only seek 
power through legal and not violent means.  His statements, however, caused a 
vigorous reaction in the Western press.  Hitler asserted bluntly that once the Nazis 
were in power, they would rip up the Versailles treaty and other international 
                                                




agreements and set up tribunals in order to sentence and to execute summarily the 
so-called November criminals.226  
There was nothing but condemnation in the British and American press for 
Hitler’s testimony.  Now newspapers discarded the earlier opinion that having the 
weight of responsibility on their shoulders might moderate the Nazis.  A New 
York Times editorial called Hitler’s remarks childish, noting, dubiously it would 
seem, that Hitler’s plans had none of the constructive elements that Lenin and 
Mussolini had espoused when they came to power.  The article called for the 
responsible German political parties to keep the Nazis from power.  The Times
referred to the Nazis as dangerous romantics, whom the moderate German parties 
should justifiably shy away from.  Hitler’s remarks would, in The Times’s view, 
only bring about ridicule and irritation rather than any positive result.  The 
newspaper questioned the common sense of German voters who would endanger 
international good will by supporting such an incendiary group.  Washington Post
editors reflected the view shared by several other press outlets that Hitler had 
become emboldened by the Nazi electoral victories, and was displaying his true 
feelings concerning Nazi policy.227  While the Western press disapproved of 
Hitler’s position, many Germans reacted positively.  They focused on Hitler’s 
promise not to stage a violent attempt to take over the government, allaying fears 
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of a possible civil war.228  Just as he had done over six years earlier, Hitler had 
used the judicial spotlight afforded him to help increase the political reputation of 
the Nazis among the German people.
During the first weeks of the Nazi re-emergence on the German and 
international political scene, the position of The Times concerning the National 
Socialists merited special consideration.  In his chronology of the life of Hitler, 
historian Milan Hauner argued that the origins of the policy of appeasement that 
The Times would follow late in the 1930s could be found in articles from 
September and October 1930.229  Later in the decade, the newspaper advocated 
concessions in order to appease Hitler and Germany.  These included handing 
over the Sudeten territories in Czechoslovakia to Germany in order to stave off 
hostilities.230  For the most part, however, Hauner’s assertion that early vestiges of 
appeasement could be found in articles dating from late 1930 had little support.  
Before 1933, The Times encouraged its Berlin correspondent, Norman Ebbut, to 
make his reports on the Nazis more sensational in order to compete with other 
papers in London.  The editors at the The Times also often shortened many of the 
articles that he sent to England, but Ebbut’s reports on the Nazis were not singled 
out for this treatment.  Beginning in 1934, The Times took a conciliatory, 
appeasing stance towards Germany, and intentionally began shortening Ebbut’s 
articles that were critical of the Nazis.  Before 1934, however, Ebbut was mostly 
unhindered in his reporting on the Nazis, and he covered the movement 
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objectively despite viewing them as a grave threat, especially towards Germany’s 
Jews.231  The position of The Times’ articles from late 1930 was not 
condemnatory towards the Nazis on a day-by-day basis, but neither were they 
sympathetic or conciliatory toward their cause.
Articles in The Times describing the Nazi electoral victory labeled the 
party as a destructive force lacking any constructive policies.  Despite such an 
opinion, the paper believed at first that it might be possible for the NSDAP to 
grow into a positive and more moderate group in time.232  Following Hitler’s 
speech at the officers’ trial, however, The Times discarded even this viewpoint, 
rightly asserting that the Nazis should not have any role in the German 
government.233  Another of Hauner’s arguments was that The Times began 
portraying the Nazis as the frontline in the defense of Europe against 
communism.234  This idea was addressed in several Times articles, but did not 
originate with the newspaper.  The notion came from the Nazis themselves.  In an 
interview with Hitler carried on October 4, he asserted that the Nazis were the 
best hope for keeping Bolshevism from coming to Great Britain.  Hitler was 
conciliatory towards Britain, attempting to ingratiate his movement with the 
English people.235  The periodical Literary Digest related another blatant 
fabrication intended for the British that also originated with the Nazis.  The 
publication reprinted several lines from the London Evening Standard, asserting 
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that Hitler had played a prominent role in ousting the Bolshevik style government 
that took over Munich shortly after the end of World War I.236  
The idea that the Nazis could serve as protection from Bolshevism running 
rampant throughout Europe was not limited to English newspapers.  In a 
Commonweal article reprinted in the Washington Post, journalist George Shuster 
called the Nazis a possible blessing for its opposition to communism.237  
Throughout the early 1930s, the Nazis attempted to sway the foreign press in their 
favor, granting inside information to those correspondents who presented 
favorable viewpoints of the party.  Ebbut was not considered a friendly journalist 
by the Nazis, and they worked to have him replaced as the The Times’ Berlin 
representative.238  This supports the argument that while The Times was not 
explicitly hostile towards the National Socialist movement, neither was it taking a 
position of appeasement in the early 1930s.
Another opportunity for the Western press to denigrate the Nazis and warn 
of the danger they represented came with the opening of the first Reichstag
session in which their now numerous representatives took part. In order to 
demonstrate their militant devotion to the Nazi cause, the party’s representatives 
marched into the legislature in formation wearing party uniforms.  The party’s 
brownshirts were forbidden in Berlin, but the immunity granted to representatives 
allowed the National Socialists to don the party’s attire.  This elicited laughs from 
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other politicians as well as derisive comments from the press about the apparent 
lack of experience many of the Nazis exhibited.239  
Accompanying the opening of the Reichstag, however, was a series of 
riots and attacks, proving that the Nazis were not content just to sit in the 
parliament.  In the Berlin business district, several Jewish storefronts were 
smashed by supporters of the National Socialists as well by some Storm Troopers.  
Hitler did not support the attacks, quickly labeling them out of line with NSDAP 
policy.  He stated that the movement did not advocate violent anti-Semitism and 
denied his party had anything to do with the riots, claiming that the communists 
had to have played a role in provoking it.240  Hitler was obviouly attempting to 
play down the violent aspect of the party to help maintain its public image.  He 
wanted to pin the blame on Marxist influences, but the fact that so many Nazis 
and their supporters attacked Jewish property without orders proved that violent 
anti-Semitism was the core of Nazi policy.
Despite Nazi successes in the September elections, they were nonetheless 
left out of the government and played no role whatsoever in shaping German 
policy.  Brüning had been able to convince the Social Democratic Party, the 
largest Reichstag party, to join a coalition of the Center party and other middle 
class parties to create a majority in the legislature.  The coalition had many 
internal differences, and the parties united mainly in order to protect the country, 
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not out of shared political goals.241  Many middle class politicians were wary of 
the Socialists and their semi-Marxist platform.  The New York Times reported that 
some members of the group of bourgeois parties were thinking it a good idea to 
give the Nazis some responsibility in order to remove the “poison” from the 
movement, believing the Nazis would be strong defenders against leftist 
policies.242  This move towards cooperation with the Nazis by middle class 
political parties only grew over time.
Nevertheless, for the remainder of the year the Nazis were left with little 
else to do but protest in the Reichstag and oppose every action taken by Brüning.  
In the last months of 1930, they also went on a cultural crusade against the film 
version of Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front.  The Nazis 
saw the film as pacifist and slanderous towards German soldiers.  Goebbels led 
the charge against the film in Berlin where he had assumed control of that city’s 
branch as well as control over the party’s propaganda efforts.  He made several 
speeches against the film, presumably using his appointment in the Nazi 
Reichstag delegation to agitate against it.  The Nazis took drastic means to keep 
filmgoers from seeing the movie, including allegedly letting mice and snakes 
loose in theatres.243  A Manchester Guardian Weekly editorial declared the 
German nationalist opposition to the film deplorable, stating that it feared the 
film’s message would undermine the German myth of the glorious war 
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experience.244  Eventually the film was banned in Germany, though not for its 
depiction of war, but because the government felt the controversy generated by 
the film might worsen the already strained political circumstances, and that it was 
best to keep the country as stable as possible.245  This episode presaged the strict 
Nazi control of the media.
Through the end of the year, Hitler attempted to popularize the party’s 
policies and stump for support, making a series of speeches throughout the 
country.  He gave one such speech to students at Berlin University, among whom 
in attendance was a young Albert Speer, who would later become an important 
member of the Nazi party and government.246  In the speech, Hitler gave an 
indication of his vision for the German people.  He extolled the students to spurn 
the idea of internationalism and the vice of democracy and instead accept the 
holiness of the fatherland that the students should serve unquestionably.  He told 
the students, “Respect the authority of a person of genius and of ability and 
submit to the next highest in authority. Do away with the insanity of pacifism and 
with the idea that anybody else will help you.”247  The speech emphasized the 
Nazi concept of unquestioned subordination to one’s superiors, as well as the 
acceptance of violence and war. 
 During the fall of 1930, several important developments within the 
NSDAP took place in these months that escaped the notice of the press.  This 
included the separation of the Schutszstaffel or SS from the SA in November 
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1930.248  Only one article had mentioned the SS by 1930.  The Times explained 
that the group was the black shirted Nazi defense squads who supplied Hitler’s 
bodyguards.249  Led by Hitler devotee Heinrich Himmler, the SS would become 
the vanguard of the Nazi movement, eventually displacing the SA.250  
In early 1931, the Western press expressed the hope that the Nazi party 
was beginning to decline.  A tough stance by the federal government toward the 
National Socialists had supposedly weakened the party, and many argued that 
Nazi electoral support would subsequently falter.  There was little hope of a 
political partnership, as Center party officials continued to resist consideration of 
any kind of alliance with the Nazis that might bring the party into a governing 
coalition.  The New York Times relayed the opinion of some German newspapers 
that Hitler’s movement had reached a high water mark, demonstrated by a 
decrease in its support in some district elections in Pomerania.251  
The most serious piece of evidence that Western journalists claimed 
suggesting that the Nazis were weakening came in February 1931.  On February 
10, the National Socialist delegation in the Reichstag began a boycott of the 
legislature, refusing to attend.  The Nazis left the Reichstag because of new 
parliamentary rules meant to speed up proceedings and cut down on the 
interference by any single delegation.  Some reporters referred to it as a retreat in 
the face of a government standing firmly behind Brüning.  The Times reported 
that the view of many other politicians was that the Nazis had not been effective 
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at all, and they chose to leave to end any further embarrassment in the legislature.  
The New York Times claimed that the actions of the Nazis had provided the 
German population evidence of their “schoolboy” platform:  “The sober second 
thought of the nation is now against the Fascists.”252  A series of events in April 
further strengthened the belief that the National Socialists were weakening.
On April 1, the political momentum of the NSDAP suffered a major 
setback.  The Thuringian Interior Minister, Nazi member Wilhelm Frick, was 
forced to resign his post.  The German People’s Party, with whom the Nazis had 
helped formed a government in Thuringia, forced Frick out.253  Western 
journalists wrote that Frick had been ousted because he had proven difficult to 
work with and that he had worked solely for the benefit of the National Socialists.  
Apparently, Frick and other Nazis had even made attacks on the People’s Party, 
with whom they were aligned.254  A New York Times editorial concerning Frick 
and Thuringia was titled optimistically “Hitler’s Ebb Tide.” Despite the title, the 
paper was skeptical that the event marked the beginning of the end for the Nazis.  
The editors emphasized that stabilization or retrogression might be better 
descriptions of what was happening to the National Socialists.  The paper asserted 
that the Germans seemed to be coming to their senses, because as civilized 
people, they could not have gone on supporting the anti-Semitic campaigning of 
the Nazis.  Such anti-Semitism was referred to as “…the utterance of unhappy and 
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illiterate peasant masses seeking an outlet, or the resource of unpopular dynasties 
and regimes looking for a scapegoat…”255  Besides the removal of Frick from his 
ministerial position, a revolt by a section of the Berlin SA provided even more 
evidence of possible Nazi decline.
Many SA leaders were at odds with Hitler over his policy of coming to 
power through legal channels.  The issue was partially responsible for the 
problems Hitler had with the SA in late 1930.  The leader of the SA in Eastern 
Germany, Walter Stennes, advocated publicly in the Nazis’ Berlin newspaper, 
Der Angriff, the violent takeover of the government.  Hitler had to reassure the 
public that his party had no such intentions, creating a tense relationship between 
the Berlin Storm Troopers and the party leadership.256  
Further problems stemmed from the actions taken by the President.  On 
March 28, 1931, von Hindenburg declared that he was going to begin ruling 
through presidential decree, cutting the Reichstag out of the electoral process as 
he had done in 1930.  He empowered the police to crack down on political 
violence and propaganda throughout Germany, limiting civil rights as allowed by 
Article 48 of the Weimar constitution.  The press interpreted this announcement 
as being directed at the Nazis, whose violent fights with the communists had 
begun to get out of hand.257  The press saw the President’s decree as a serious 
blow to the Nazis, and Hitler appeared to share this view.  In an article from the 
Völkischer Beobachter reprinted in The Times, Hitler announced that the 
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President’s actions were illegal and that the Nazi leader would attempt to overturn 
the decree in the Bavarian Supreme Court.  Hitler nevertheless ordered his 
followers to comply with the edict and not create unnecessary problems.258  
Hitler’s pronouncement did not sit well with some in the SA, who were already 
perturbed by the emergency powers granted to the police to limit their ability to 
confront their political opponents.
Hitler moved to depose troublemakers within the NSDAP who might 
disobey his commands and bring harsh retribution from the federal government.  
To this end, at a meeting of party officials in Weimar, he removed Stennes as 
leader of the East German SA.  Just after the decision had been made to dismiss 
Stennes, word was received that he and a loyal group of SA troops had taken over 
Nazi offices in Berlin.259  Stennes was upset with Hitler’s orders, and upon 
hearing of his dismissal he decided to take action against the party.  He arranged 
for the publication of an entire edition of Der Angriff filled with attacks on Hitler. 
Knowing that the revolt could turn into a public relations nightmare, Hitler 
reaffirmed publicly his commitment to peace and declared that he would remove 
the radical elements of the SA.  He demanded that all SA commanders personally 
pledge their loyalty to him and his leadership.260  The Berlin police assisted the 
Nazis in removing the SA rebels from the party offices and support for Stennes 
fell apart quickly.  Most of the SA leaders throughout the rest of the country 
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quickly signaled their support for Hitler, ending the crisis.261  Taken with Frick’s 
displacement, this uprising made some Western journalists believe the Nazis were 
falling apart.  An astute Berlin politician clarified the situation though.  A member 
of the Prussian political police told Time magazine that, despite such 
embarrassments, in his estimation the Nazis were only growing.262  This official’s 
statement was accurate, as the Nazis continued to accumulate electoral success at 
the state and local level.
While Western journalists wrote of the possible stagnation of the National 
Socialists, it was hard to dispute the success of the Nazis at the polls.  These 
triumphs eventually forced the Western press to acknowledge that, if anything, 
the Nazis were only gaining in support from most sectors of German society.  In 
January 1931, the New York Times hoped that a bad showing by the Nazis in 
Pomerania represented the party’s high water mark, but just two months later the 
paper reported large Nazi gains in Brunswick.  In that election, the Nazis polled 
17,000 more votes than they had the previous September, taking many votes from 
the German middle class parties.263  
After a setback in elections in Hesse in April, the Nazis had a major 
triumph in the state of Oldenburg.  The returns made the Nazis the largest party in 
the state legislature, the first time they had accomplished this at any level.  In the 
same election, the communists increased their share of the vote, demonstrating 
that German voters were flocking to the extreme political ideologies and away 
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from the center.264  A Manchester Guardian Weekly editorial admitted that the 
tough stance assumed by the federal government towards the Nazis had no effect 
whatsoever on the NSDAP’s popularity.  Referring to the election in Oldenburg, 
the editors wrote that the middle class parties had lost half the support they had 
enjoyed only eight months before during the Reichstag election.  Nazi policies 
seemed much more attractive to voters than the slow reforms endorsed by 
Brüning’s government.265  Nazi gains only accelerated following the Oldenburg 
elections.
It appeared by mid-1931 that the Nazis were heading for some type of 
influence in the government if their electoral support kept growing.  Hitler 
reached out to some of the middle class leaders to demonstrate that he held no 
animosity towards their constituencies, even if he cared little for a parliamentary 
system.  Throughout the summer, he toured Germany making contacts with 
industrial and financial leaders.266  He believed that Nazi control of the 
government was close at hand.  The September elections in Hamburg could only 
have reinforced the belief.  The Nazis obtained 43 of 160 seats, bringing them 
close to the size of the socialist party in the state.  This was a significant victory 
for the Nazi movement considering that urban Hamburg had traditionally voted 
for leftist parties.267  
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In November the Nazis reversed the losses they had experienced earlier in 
the year in Hesse.  In a new election they more than doubled their total vote from 
137,000 to 300,000.268  The New York Times maintained the belief that even with 
these gains the Nazis would never be able to field a majority in the national 
legislature.  Nevertheless, in an opinion piece following the Hesse elections, the 
paper espoused the attitude that the Allied governments had to meet the threat of 
any Hitler-led government head on.  The editorial made it clear that the 
aggressiveness of the Nazis should not cow the Western allies into concessions: 
“Not to be frightened by Hitler into surrender but not to be driven by him into 
coercive measures is the indicated course for the Allied Governments.”269  Even 
at this early state, the journalists of the New York Times could tell that Nazi 
blustering might intimidate other nations frightful of war to back down and give 
in to Hitler’s demands.
The success of the Nazis in their drive to gain control of the German 
government led many Western journalists to consider what would happen in 
Germany should the Nazis take over.  Not surprising given the disastrous 
worldwide economic circumstances, the press focused on the Nazi stance on 
reparations.  The Times argued that it might be wise to reevaluate the situation in 
Germany, to assess the extent to which reparations were harming the country.  
But the Nazis did not wish to study the situation.  In late November, Nazi officials 
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such as Frick proclaimed that the party would not recognize any international 
financial agreements entered into by the Brüning government.270  In an attempt to 
assuage fears of the international community, Hitler reportedly remarked that all 
of Germany’s private debts would be fulfilled, and that only the politically 
imposed obligations would have to be removed.  Hitler also sent one of his party 
leaders, Alfred Rosenberg, to England in an attempt to reassure the British 
government that the Nazis had nothing but legal, peaceful intentions when it came 
time for the Nazis to run Germany.271  Rosenberg’s mission was important to the 
Nazis in light of the possibly incriminating evidence found at the time in the 
German state of Hesse.
In late November 1931, Hessian government officials discovered a 
document belonging to the local Nazi leadership that supposedly exposed Hitler’s 
claims of peace and legality as fraudulent.  The document contained details of 
Nazi plans should an armed uprising occur.272  Western journalists recounted the 
contents of the documents, observing that they were plans of action should a 
communist coup overtake the country.  The plans called for the SA to overthrow 
the government by a counter-coup, and for any citizen disobeying orders from the 
Storm Troopers to be shot.  The document also provided that the newly 
established dictatorship would abolish wage labor, force all able-bodied Germans, 
excluding Jews, into labor divisions, and institute a rationing system for food.273  
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Hitler had no knowledge of the plans, which were known as the Boxheimer 
Documents , and they embarrassed the party at a time when legality was the 
proclaimed Nazi policy.274  Hitler publicly denounced the documents.  Once 
again, he ordered his followers to adhere to the party dictates and not involve 
themselves in unproductive violence when victory was seemingly so close at 
hand.275
Towards the end of 1931, some journalists began taking Hitler’s talk of a 
third empire, or Third Reich, seriously.  The first two empires were the Holy 
Roman Empire and the one formed by Otto von Bismarck in 1871 when Germany 
was unified under Kaiser Wilhelm I.  Hitler claimed that he would maintain a 
form of German democracy, which he described as the “choice of a leader to 
whom unlimited authority is given.”  New York Times journalist Harold Callender 
wrote that such a powerful leader could repair all of Germany’s ills through the 
imposition of order and discipline.  This included the removal of inconvenient 
treaties, recovering lost territory, suppressing usury, “weed[ing] out all who are 
not pure-bred Germans…, and possibly re-establish[ing] the old German religion 
in place of an imported one of Semitic origin.”276  The idea of a third empire led 
by a strong leader was not novel to the National Socialist movement.  It had 
existed for some time within ultra-nationalist circles within the country, as had the 
concept of a Germanic religion.277  Despite these radical pronouncements, Hitler 
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did not address any specific elements of the NSDAP platform.  In interviews with 
foreign journalists in December, he stressed the friendly intentions of the Nazis 
toward foreign nations, especially England, and the fact that the Nazis were 
purely a political and not militaristic movement.  He refused in the interview with 
Callender to discuss openly the topic of anti-Semitism in the Nazi movement. 
When asked about it, Callender noted that Hitler skirted the issue.  Hitler only 
replied that Germany was “cramped” with people and that the Germans could not 
even be the masters of themselves.278  Other members of the Nazi party gave a 
clearer picture of the violent, racist intentions of the movement.
While Hitler maintained a somewhat moderate tone towards France, 
Gregor Strasser was reputed as stating that any kind of international agreement 
with France was madness, and that a new war between Germany and France was 
a foregone conclusion.  He wanted Germany to seek out alliances with all of 
France’s enemies in preparation for the conflict.279  Strasser made even more 
incendiary comments at a meeting of National Socialist Pharmacists and Doctors 
held in Leipzig early in December.280  The New York Times report on the meeting 
was carried on the front page of the paper, and no other article from 1931 
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displayed the core, fundamental nature of the Nazi party in such a distinct 
manner.  Formed at the Nazi party gathering in Nuremberg in 1929, the Nazi 
Physicians’ League was founded to help promulgate the inclusion of racial 
science into the mainstream and to help Hitler’s party in all matters of health 
science and information.  It was an outgrowth of the Nazi attempt to create a host 
of professional and social organizations meant to broaden the overall appeal of the 
party.281  At the meeting, several statements were made that characterized what 
actions the Nazis would take once in power
According to the correspondent reporting on the meeting, Nazi officials 
asserted that racial purification would be the prime objective of the future Nazi 
regime.  The reporter described one attendee’s emphasis on the point:  “The 
Nordic race – ‘the finest flower on the tree of humanity,’ as one speaker described 
it – it was said, must be bred and secure unquestioned predominance according 
the ‘criteria of race hygiene and eugenics.’”  Three tiers of races were described, 
placing the Nordic on top.   Those placed on the second tier would be tolerated by 
the Nazis, but those on the bottom rung would be subjected to forced sterilization.  
After the cleansing of German society, the Nordic race would have every right to 
expand ruthlessly:  “If the ‘genuine’ Germans so restored to their pristine purity 
found their dwelling place too narrow for life’s needs…there would be nothing 
for them but conquer more room, sword in hand.”  Strasser gave a fiery speech in 
front of the assembled doctors, stating “…that when the ‘Nazi’ movement gained 
ascendancy it would restore to the German people their primitive vigor, would 
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bring the women back from the factories and offices to the kitchen, would abolish 
‘Jewish abstractions’ such as stock companies and trade unions and would 
liberate the people even against their will, from ‘slavery.’”282  The New York 
Times account presented a picture of the racially oriented social structure that the 
Nazis intended to create.  It also demonstrated the long term goal of waging war 
to increase the living space for what the Nazis considered the superior Nordic 
race. 
Following the elections of September 1930, the Nazis emerged as a 
powerful force within German politics, a position they maintained from that point 
on.  For the British and American journalists covering the situation in Germany, it 
appeared that the Nazis were simply the beneficiaries of the crushing economic 
problems afflicting the rest of the globe, and to some extent this was the case.  
The Western press was hopeful that German voters would come to their senses 
and realize that the Nazis represented only negative and violent possibilities.  
British and American writers were dismayed as support for the National Socialists 
held up in state and local elections throughout the year.  The fear of a German 
regime bent on violent repudiation of the agreements made in the Versailles also 
was a source of concern.  During the officers’ trial in Leipzig, Hitler explicitly 
outlined the road he would lead Germany down when the Nazis came to power.  
Though he shied away from violent proclamations to foreign correspondents 
afterwards, the Western press was perceptive enough to realize that this was an 
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act, and that the violent, racist speeches of his subordinates were more 
representative of what National Socialism stood for.
The American press did not display sympathy or approval of the Nazis, 
and it became especially vitriolic towards the movement after Hitler’s speech in 
Leipzig.  This was true of The Times as well, which displayed no conciliatory 
view toward the Nazis.  Just as it had early in the 1920s, the New York Times was 
the only newspaper visibly concerned with the National Socialists’ anti-Semitic 
and racist policies.  The paper illustrated the racist plans of party’s Physicians 
League, and often expressed the fears of the New York Jewish community about 
Hitler’s intentions toward German and European Jews.283  
Even though other media sources did not address Nazi racism so 
explicitly, all were opposed to the Nazis ever coming to power.   The Western 
press placed its hopes in the Weimar system, believing that the democratic 
government and parties would never allow the Nazis any say in the government.  
Most Western journalists believed democracy was somehow still functioning in 
Germany, even though that had not been true since mid-1930.  By the end of 
1931, democracy in Germany no longer operated effectively, as seen in the 
constant use the president made of Article 48, which marginalized the Reichstag.  
The only questioned that remained was what would follow.  From January 1932 
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to January 1933, the Nazis maintained their adherence to legislative decorum, 
while still engaging in violent assaults on their political enemies, and such a 
policy eventually gave them control of Germany.
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CHAPTER SIX
A LEAP INTO THE DARK: JANUARY 1932 TO JANUARY 1933
The Western press hoped that the officials of the Weimar Republic would 
be able to manage the National Socialists and the threat they posed despite 
continuing economic unrest.  Following the Reichstag election of September 
1930, fears of Nazi participation in the government became common, but the 
party had not gained any significant hold on power.  Though many American and 
British journalists knew that support for the Nazis had grown since the 1930 
election, they hoped that the movement would be contained in 1932 as it had been 
the previous sixteen months.  As the Great Depression continued to make life 
difficult around the world, the Western press focused on Germany’s political life 
as never before.  The press knew that Germany’s political troubles could have dire 
consequences if Hitler was allowed to bring his party to power.  
Nineteen thirty-two was dominated by a series of significant German 
elections, which the American and British press covered thoroughly.  Elections 
for the German presidency took place in March and April, and the Austrian-born 
Hitler became a nominee after obtaining German citizenship.  When he was 
defeated in the first presidential election and its subsequent runoff, the Western 
press believed this was a positive sign, claiming once again that Nazism was in 
decline.  The presidential election was followed by state elections in April and 
Reichstag elections at the end of July, which proved that the Nazis were not 
weakening.  The events of the year demonstrated that German democracy was 
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finished, as president von Hindenburg used his emergency executive powers in an 
attempt to alleviate the country’s problems by installing two new chancellors.  
The strategy did not work, however, and, in January 1933, the aging former field 
marshal was forced to consider the one candidate many thought could impose 
order and reestablish stability in Germany.  That month, Hindenburg appointed 
Hitler Chancellor of Germany and hopes of a moderate future for the German 
government were diminished. 
As the New Year began, Hitler appeared confident that by year’s end the 
Nazi party would be the dominant power in Germany.  In his New Year’s 
message to party members, he declared that 1932 would be the hardest time of 
struggle yet, but that the party would persevere through all hardships.  To ease 
such difficulties, he ordered the party faithful to adhere to the laws of the state 
scrupulously.284  His hopes were encouraged by the surge in Nazi membership 
that had taken place the previous year.  By the beginning of 1932, 5.7 million 
Germans were unemployed and the official membership of the NSDAP had 
grown to 806,300.285  Hitler knew that the path to power would not be easy, but as 
long as the German economic and political situation remained grim, the Nazis 
would have a chance at taking over the government.
The New York Times used the relative political inactivity during the first 
week of the New Year to present an analysis of the situation in Germany relating 
to the Nazis.  Correspondent Harold Callender wrote that the Nazis were the result 
of two factors that the world had yet to grasp – wounded national pride as a result 
                                                




of World War I and the terrible effects of the economic crisis.  The analysis was 
not groundbreaking, but Callender recognized how both problems were wrapped 
up in the issue of reparations stemming from the Treaty of Versailles.  He argued 
that the environment created by brooding for ten years over the defeat had helped 
create the Nazis, who appealed to a wide range of the German population as no 
other party did.  The article included statements by John Maynard Keynes, the 
prominent British economist, who argued that given what Germany had been 
through, it was not unusual that the country behaved as it did. Some in Britain 
began to think that reparations had created the severe worldwide crisis and should 
end, at least for an extended period, as outlined by an editorial in the Manchester 
Guardian Weekly.286  An opinion piece in the Washington Post opposed any end 
to reparations staunchly, though, arguing that some in Europe were using Hitler as
a bogeyman to help release them from debt to the United States.287  Such attitudes 
demonstrated a clear lack of cohesion and resolution on the part of the Allies 
concerning both the war debt situation and Germany.  By 1932, any economic 
concessions or aid to Germany would not have been enough to prevent the 
sequence of political events that took place considering how much had been done 
already to help relieve Germany’s debts.
American and British journalists did not have to wait long for the 
beginning of intense political turmoil in Germany.  It would characterize most of 
1932.  Plans had been underway since the fall of 1931 to find a way to keep 
German president Hindenburg in office, as his term was due to expire early in 
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March.  Von Hindenburg hoped that his supporters could find a way to extend his 
term without an election.  The plan they came up with called for the Reichstag to 
confirm von Hindenburg as president and extend his term by changing the 
constitution.  Any alteration in the constitution required the sanction of at least 
two-thirds of the body, and this meant that the Nazis and the Nationalist party 
would have to support the measure for it to succeed.288  On January 5, Hitler 
received a message from Wilhelm Groener, the minister of the interior and 
defense, requesting the National Socialist leader’s presence at an important 
meeting in Berlin.  Hitler was overjoyed, believing that he was now an 
indispensable figure in federal decision-making.  On January 6 and 7, he met with 
most of the government federal leadership, including Chancellor Heinrich 
Brüning, who attempted to gain his support on von Hindenburg’s behalf.289  The 
Western press learned shortly thereafter that the fate of von Hindenburg rested in 
the hands of the National Socialists.
The meeting between Brüning and Hitler was covered prominently in both 
Great Britain and the United States.  Journalists reported that Brüning had asked 
for Hitler’s cooperation in the Reichstag to prolong the term of von Hindenburg’s 
presidency.  Some saw the proposition as proof of the growing power of the 
National Socialists, while others believed Brüning was attempting to hamstring 
Hitler by forcing him to pass judgment on von Hindenburg.  Time magazine noted 
that choosing to support or oppose von Hindenburg held risks for Hitler.  If he 
opposed the plan, it would appear that he stood against a war hero.  If he 
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accepted, it would rob him of the opportunity to gain power through legal means, 
possibly in the upcoming presidential and Prussian elections.  Hitler was 
noncommittal, reserving any decision until he had spoken to other nationalist 
leaders.290  A New York Times editorial emphasized the possible risks to Hitler 
inherent in the plan, and it argued that Brüning was thinking only of the welfare 
of the country and not trying to stave off the NSDAP.  The paper contended that 
should the Nazis ever come to power, reparations and arms negotiations would 
become difficult to carry out.  The editorial expressed the opinion that Hitler 
desired power so badly, though, that he would moderate some of his radical 
positions.  To the New York Times, this made an agreement on the issue of von 
Hindenburg’s presidency more likely.291  Once again the Western Press 
demonstrated the stance that power and moderation went hand in hand.  Hitler 
was unwilling to compromise for the good of Germany, however, especially given 
the strong electoral position of the party.
He took several days to ponder the offer made by Brüning, but finally 
decided that the chancellor’s plan would give away too much power.  Hitler told 
the chancellor that his party would support the plan to extend the president’s term 
only if the president dissolved the Reichstag and the Prussian Diet, held new 
elections, and allowed those newly elected bodies to vote on the matter.  The 
chancellor refused and discussions ended.292  Once negotiations over the matter 
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closed, Hitler attempted to cast his party in a favorable light, and his version of 
the negotiations was disseminated in the first reports of the Brüning plan’s failure.  
The explanation given by the Nazis for opposing the plan was that, having 
considered the maneuver unconstitutional on the part of the chancellor, it would 
not violate the due process of presidential selection.293  Hitler used the failed 
negotiations to appear as though he cared about the German constitution and legal 
procedure.  
The Nazis’ rejection led to new appraisals of the strength of the party, and 
renewed hopes that the movement might be faltering.  It was well known that 
Hitler believed he could do well in the upcoming elections and that he wanted to 
keep out of any entangling political alliances.  There was optimism that his 
popularity had reached its limits, though, as the Nazis had made no headway
supposedly in recruiting voters from socialist and communist quarters.  A New 
York Times editorial placed the Nazis’ maximum possible support at around 35-40 
percent of the German electorate, which would keep them from obtaining a 
majority.  Articles from the Washington Post and the American publication 
Current History emphasized the view that Nazi electoral support had reached its 
absolute limits, and though new elections would increase the party’s 
representation at the national and state level, it would never obtain control.294  The 
Manchester Guardian Weekly reported that in Germany it had become 
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fashionable to proclaim that the Nazis had played out and that the fear inspired by 
Hitler’s movement was receding.  The article was tentative about proclaiming an 
early demise for the movement, however, having learned a lesson from doing so 
in early 1931.  The Guardian piece recognized that the fight in Germany between 
the republican forces and the Nazis was far from over, declaring that the fate of 
Western civilization might hinge on the outcome.295  Much attention would be 
focused on the upcoming campaign and election for the German presidency.
After refusing the request made by Brüning, the Nazis dealt with the 
question of what to do about the presidential election.  The party had not named a 
nominee, and Hitler was reportedly glum about the topic.296  For the rest of 
January, the Nazis remained quiet about the election, preferring to spar with 
Brüning over the legality of the presidential extension.297  The relative calm gave 
the Western press an opportunity to focus on some of the more obscure aspects of 
the party, which would get lost in the tumult of the upcoming elections.  The
Times reported one such piece of information, which involved the new marriage 
regulations placed on members of the Nazi protection squads, the SS.  The 
regulations required the bride and groom to provide ancestries and biographies for 
verification by the organization’s racial office.  The article reported that once the 
marriage applications were reviewed, “Permission [to marry] will be granted or 
refused ‘according to racial and hereditary considerations alone.’”298  
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Another account from January 1932 involved the death of a teenager who 
worked disseminating Nazi literature in Berlin.  While news of political murders 
involving the Nazis was not new, both the New York Times and The Times
reported on the young man’s murder at the hands of communist enemies.299  
Those publications emphasized the story probably because of his age, but they 
had no way of knowing that the Nazis would turn the death of this young Hitler 
Youth, Herbert Norkus, into a propaganda tool.  Both Hitler and Goebbels used 
Norkus as an example of sacrifice and devotion, and the young man’s story was 
turned into a major propaganda film in 1933.300  It was a small part of the 
propaganda machine unleashed upon Germany by the Nazis when Hitler decided 
to run for the office of president.
It was difficult for Hitler to decide to seek the presidency.  He knew his 
followers expected it of him, but he also understood that if von Hindenburg ran 
against him, he would stand no chance against the popular leader.301  Von 
Hindenburg announced his intentions to seek reelection on February 15, a move 
hailed by the New York Times as “a notable victory for the cause of peace and 
moderation in Germany and therefore in Europe as a whole.”302  His candidacy 
was seen as a great sacrifice by the president, who was eighty-four years old at the 
time, in order to serve his country during a time of great upheaval.  Most expected 
that von Hindenburg would die in office, causing the respect many Germans held 
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for him reportedly to grow.303  The threat of an extremist government of one form 
or another ran deep among Western journalists who were willing to support the 
election of a so-called “moderate” like von Hindenburg.  
Hitler had discussed the possibility of running for the presidency with 
Goebbels in early February, but he took several weeks to decide.  He was not a 
German citizen and thus unable to run for the office.304  The question of his 
citizenship had been a topic of the Western press since the mid-1920s, and it 
reported recent rumors that Wilhelm Frick had secretly given Hitler citizenship by 
appointing him as a Thuringian police official in the summer of 1930.  There was 
no truth to the story, however, as Hitler decided against such a course of action 
when Frick proposed it.305  Hitler did decide to use the same maneuver to gain 
citizenship though.  The state government of Brunswick was dominated by the 
National Socialists, and the party arranged for Hitler to be made an attaché for 
that state’s government delegation in Berlin.306  Once he had sworn to defend the 
Weimar constitution as a part of his naturalization, the way was clear for his 
presidential candidacy.
Goebbels announced Hitler’s candidacy several days before Hitler 
confirmed the decision officially.  Hitler ran as a Nazi candidate alone instead of 
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running as a so-called nationalist candidate, which had been a brief possibility.307  
During his official acceptance speech for the Nazi nomination, Hitler claimed that 
the hated Weimar system of November 9, 1918 was at stake.  He declared that the 
election would be the beginning of the destruction of the republic, which he 
associated with the surrender of Germany and the country’s problems thereafter.  
He laid down an ultimatum to the only other real candidate in the election, von 
Hindenburg: “Old man, you are too venerable in our eyes for those whom we 
want to destroy to hide behind you.  We are sorry, but you must step aside, for the 
others want a fight and we do too.”308  Hitler’s words were an accurate description 
of the two blocks that opposed each other in the upcoming election.  The 
supporters of moderation such as the Catholic Center party and the socialists 
stood behind von Hindenburg, while the extreme conservative nationalists 
supported Hitler almost exclusively.309  The campaign was short but intense for 
the country and the American and British correspondents reporting on it.
The reaction from the Western press toward Hitler’s candidacy ranged 
from incredulous to derisive.  Time magazine called the nomination risky, while 
the Washington Post took a much firmer tone just before the vote: “In allowing 
himself to be drawn into the presidential race Adolf Hitler made the greatest 
mistake of his career.  He will be hopelessly defeated, and the prestige of his party 
in the Reichstag will doubtless undergo a considerable shrinkage.”310  Some saw 
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the upcoming election as an indication of the path that German history was taking.  
American journalist W.H. Hale noted that 1932 marked both the ten-year 
anniversary of Hitler’s first widespread notice by the public as well as the 100th
anniversary of the death of the famous German poet, Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe.  Hale argued that a cult had developed around both men, calling the 
Germany that followed Goethe studious and conservative, while the Germany 
following Hitler was ruthless and fanatical.  Hale maintained that the future of 
Europe rested upon the struggle between what he called the Goethe- Brüning 
faction and the Hitlerists.311
Hitler’s candidacy sparked a wave of new recognition in the popular 
Western periodicals.  Generally articles sought to describe what the Nazis stood 
for and how they had come to enjoy such a high level of support.  Writing for 
Scribner’s Magazine, William C. White emphasized the religious fervor 
surrounding Hitler.  He recounted how a little girl hailed Hitler in the same 
fervent way as did SA troops, and how Hitler saluted the girl back with no sign of 
emotion.  Referring to Hitler as a self-proclaimed reformer, White noted that he 
possessed the most important characteristic required by zealous reformers – belief 
in his own infallibility.  The article observed that Hitler’s critics constantly 
attacked his lack of a concrete program, but White argued that he did not need 
one.  Much like other pseudo-religious figures, Hitler did not need to know the 
specific way to the alleged Promised Land, only that it existed.  White was 
skeptical about whether Hitler could maintain his control of the party, though, as 
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it was made up of such a diverse range of supporters.  White pointed that many in 
the wings of the movement, such as former army officers or industrialist 
supporters, were waiting to usurp power from Hitler should the Nazis succeed in 
taking control of Germany.312  White’s treatment of the National Socialists 
conveyed the depth of pious devotion surrounding Hitler, much of which was a 
product of Nazi propaganda but was skeptical about whether or not his charisma 
could keep the party and country unified under this leadership.
Also journalist Nicholas Fairweather attempted to explain Hitler and the 
National Socialist movement to his audience, writing a two-part piece in The 
Atlantic Monthly on the Nazis in March and April 1932.  Fairthweather relied on 
Mein Kampf for much of his information.  Hitler’s autobiography glorified his 
role in the creation and rise of the movement, and Fairweather faithfully 
recounted some of the myths that Hitler created about himself, including his 
fabricated claim to have started the National Socialist movement.313  Still, 
Fairweather’s explanation of the principles explained in the book had its benefits.  
He laid out some of the most fundamental and important ideological 
underpinnings of National Socialism more effectively than most journalists had 
been able to do.  He called Hitler’s most important policy his “violent racial 
nationalism which springs from his conviction that the Aryan stocks in general, 
and the Germans in particular, are a chosen people in whose victorious survival 
the divine purposes are bound up.”  But Fairweather placed Hitler’s hatred of 
Marxism ahead of his hatred of the Jews, likely because of party efforts during the 
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early 1930s to downplay its anti-Semitic aspects and emphasize its anti-
Bolshevism.314  The article presented the party’s intentions concerning France and 
German foreign policy once in power bluntly: “But when the time comes, when 
power at last returns to a Hitlerized Germany, then France must be crushed so that 
Germany may begin her conquest of land to the east.”315
Hitler himself attempted to explain to Westerners that a Nazi takeover of 
Germany would not portend such aggression.  In an interview for Collier’s 
magazine with T.R. Ybarra, who had covered the 1923 Putsch trial for the New 
York Times, he claimed that Americans had been deceived about the Nazis.  
Those who thought Nazi control would be detrimental to Germany and its foreign 
relations had been misled by meddlers intent on keeping Germany submissive.  
Hitler told Ybarra that he hoped the US would be able to extricate itself from such 
a spirit of hatred created by France.  In spite of Hitler’s claims, Ybarra attempted 
to explain what would happen inside Germany once the party took control.  He 
wrote that the Nazis “…will, by means of a ruthless house-cleaning, eliminate the 
ascendancy of elements in her population which, to Hitler’s way of thinking, are a 
liability.”  Ybarra did not point out that this referred almost certainly to German 
Jews and communists.  In summing up Hitler’s political prospects, Ybarra 
believed that the only way the Nazis could come to power would be if the party 
moderated its extreme policies.  Should the Nazis come to power in their current 
extremist form it would mean that either France had acquiesced to Hitler or that 
                                                
314 Ibid, 380-381.
315 Nicholas Fairweather, “Hitler and Hitlerism: Germany Under the Nazis,” The Atlantic 
Monthly, April 1932, 516. 
134
the Allies would have to act.316  Ybarra’s analysis was correct in this regard, as 
France and the other Allies did nothing once Hitler came to power in 1933.    
In February 1932, however, it appeared that Hitler had little hope in the 
presidential election against the venerable von Hindenburg, who was extremely 
popular.317  It was difficult for the Nazis to attack him outright, because von 
Hindenburg carried great of respect among the German right.  Just after Hitler 
announced his intention to run, Goebbels took the offensive in the Reichstag, 
where he was a member of the National Socialist delegation.  He intimated that 
von Hindenburg had ties to socialism.  Also, he declared that the Nazis would 
have nothing to do with the Brüning government since, in reference to Hitler, “the 
man of tomorrow is coming.”  His statement sparked a fist-fight within the 
legislature with Nazi rivals, resulting in Goebbels’s suspension from the body for 
the rest of that day’s session.318  Goebbels was not creating a total fabrication 
since von Hindenburg, much to his own displeasure, had to rely heavily on the 
support of the Social Democratic party for which he had little respect.319  The 
incident represented the characteristic struggle of the presidential campaign 
presented in the Western press.  Journalists found it incredulous when Hitler 
wrote a letter asking von Hindenburg for a chivalrous campaign without 
slanderous propaganda when the Nazis themselves employed such tactics 
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continually.320  Von Hindenburg’s camp had little to fear from Hitler’s 
propaganda machine, though, as the President was almost guaranteed re-election.  
Nonetheless, Hitler and his supporters were confident that the election, to 
be held on March 13, would bring the party to preeminence.  The party launched a 
vast propaganda campaign, and Hitler spoke in front of large crowds in twelve of 
the country’s largest cities.321  Though The Times noted that a surprising surge of 
support for Hitler was not out of the question since the party had sprung an 
electoral surprise once before, in September 1930, others were not so reticent.  
The Washington Post declared that German voters had a clear choice between von 
Hindenburg or the sure chaos the Nazi leader represented.   The paper believed 
that many in Germany would, in retrospect, look back in thanks to the day when 
Hitler decided to throw his hat into the presidential competition inasmuch as it 
would mark his party’s downfall.322  The Western press was relieved when the 
Post’s prediction for the election came to pass.
Because of a constitutional requirement, the first election on March 13 
was not decisive, but it did produce a victory for von Hindenburg.  He received in 
excess of 18 million votes in what was described as a relatively peaceful contest.  
However, the president failed to obtain an outright majority required by law, 
lacking only 170,000 votes.  A second election had to be held on April 10.  For 
the Nazis, the first election represented something of a disappointment, because 
Hitler did not receive the 13.5 million votes he boasted that he would accrue.  
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Instead, he received less than 12 million votes, which came as a surprise to some 
writers.323  The vote was received with approval in the United States and France.  
The American government was pleased that a Nazi platform of debt repudiation 
would not be allowed to come to the forefront in Germany.  The Italian press 
attempted to bend the results in Hitler’s favor, noting that more than half the 
country had voted against the president.324  Western press opinion was elated at 
the outcome, proclaiming German moderation had prevailed.
The American press seemed certain the von Hindenburg would win the 
run-off election, ensuring Germany’s safety from a radical Nazi government.  The 
Washington Post called the first election “…cause for felicitation, not only to 
Germany, but to the world.  It is one more gratifying proof that the forces of 
disintegration, repudiation and reaction…are not as strong as their boasts have 
made them seem.”  The paper assumed that Europe could go on with its efforts to 
solve various problems without fear of a German agitator initiating a new 
conflict.325  The New York Times believed the election proved that estimates of 
Hitler’s support had been exaggerated and that he had reached the full extent of 
his electoral strength.  It found von Hindenburg’s support astounding given the 
economic circumstances and noted about his election that “The traditional 
stability of the German character is shown in the survival of the democratic 
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Weimar Coalition after a dozen years in power.”326  Fear of the consequences of 
an extreme German  government was belied in such articles, which were 
supportive of the security that von Hindenburg represented.  He had been elected 
in 1925 as a staunch opponent of democratic government, and German 
nationalists had expected he would roll back the liberal policies of the Weimar 
Republic.327  Hope that he was a great champion of moderation and democracy 
was misplaced.  In Great Britain, examinations of the election were no less 
laudatory than those in the United States.
The Times called the election an indication that moderation and continuity 
was winning out over extremism and abrupt change.  An editorial piece 
discussing the election observed that voting patterns had shifted dramatically 
since 1925, however, with many of the nationalist supporters von Hindenburg had 
enjoyed that year swinging behind Hitler.  The newspaper was reticent to 
proclaim an end to all threats to German democracy, preferring to call it a good 
start in the battle for “orderly progress and normal evolution.”328  A Manchester 
Guardian Weekly editorial reflected the The Times’s stance.  The Guardian 
Weekly appeared confident that even if all the voters from other small nationalist 
parties supported Hitler, von Hindenburg would still be successful on the second 
ballot.  The vote in the initial election seemed to indicate that Hitler’s movement 
had hit a wall as far as the party’s growth was concerned, and that the party might 
have stalled.  Another article explained that many Germans were questioning 
whether or not the Nazis could ever come to power since a Nazi majority in the 
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Reichstag now appeared to be an impossibility.  Two years after the September 
1930 election that swept the Nazis to prominence, the party had gained the 
support of barely a third of the voting population.329  The struggle for stability in 
Germany was far from over, however, and the Nazis continued their intense 
campaigning efforts in further elections.
After the results of the first round of the presidential elections were 
announced, Hitler’s camp was disappointed that its leader had not won the victory 
as predicted.  The party was nevertheless ready to wage an even more aggressive 
campaign to make a better showing in the April run-off.330  The Nazis used a new 
tactic to spread Hitler’s message.  In order to cover the largest amount of a 
territory possible, Hitler rented an airplane to visit several major cities, delivering 
more than 46 speeches in an effort that gained international attention.331  An 
English journalist observing one of Hitler’s campaign stops wrote that the Nazis 
had little to learn about stagecraft, stating they had put on an impressive spectacle 
to win over their audience.  A further indicator of the curiosity surrounding the 
election was an American article that considered the electoral impact of a change 
in Hitler’s hairstyle.332  
Nazi opponents were also hard at work to discredit Hitler.  Chancellor 
Brüning declared publicly that if the Nazis ever came to power, the German mark 
would experience a disastrous fall because of a lack of international confidence.  
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Reports also appeared concerning Hitler’s father, Alois, revealing he had changed 
his name and claiming he had been a friend to Jews and disliked Prussians.333  
The report may have held some truth, in that Hitler’s father had changed his last 
name. He supported a political party that was loyal to the Austrian Emperor and 
admitted Jews to membership, although his specific views were never known.334  
It was an attempt to discredit Hitler with his radical followers just before the 
election.  The bid to weaken the Nazis was not successful, and while Hitler could 
not hope to defeat von Hindenburg, the Nazi propaganda machine helped increase 
his showing substantially.
The significance of the election was not lost on the Nazis.  The momentum 
that the election provided the NSDAP was important because of the state elections 
to be held in Prussia on April 24.335  In the second presidential election, von 
Hindenburg won an outright majority with over 19 million votes, entitling him to 
another seven-year term.  The Nazis had increased Hitler’s support to close to 
13.5 million, however, providing a surge of confidence going into the elections in 
the largest German state.336  Some of Germany’s neighbors observed the Nazi
gains with trepidation, but the Western press greeted the result much as it had the 
first election.337  The Manchester Guardian Weekly attempted to downplay the 
fact that von Hindenburg’s overall vote total increased less than was hoped, while 
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the Washington Post emphasized that Europe could look forward to a period of 
confidence in the stability of the German government.338  
The New York Times asserted that von Hindenburg’s re-election was 
evidence that the Germans wanted to maintain their republic.  The election did not 
dispel the threat of Hitler and his party in the paper’s opinion because there was 
still pervasive discontent n Germany.  A Times editorial considered the election 
an indication of Germany’s good sense, but it nonetheless raised fears about the 
upcoming elections in Germany’s largest state, Prussia.  Hitler’s total support had 
risen even more than von Hindenburg’s in absolute terms.  The paper noted, “Herr 
Adolf Hitler and the movement for which he stands are not crushed.  This issue is 
still open in German between the forces of continuity and of disruption, of 
moderation and violence,” and they would be tested in the upcoming vote.339  The 
struggle in Germany now moved to parliamentary elections, scheduled in late 
April for Prussia and several other German states.
Before the Prussian elections, Brüning and Groener decided to place a ban 
on the Nazi SA and SS formations.  Rumors had emerged that the SA, which had 
grown sharply to around 400,000 members, was preparing for an uprising that the 
Nazi leadership would be unable to control, creating apprehension of another Nazi 
Putsch.340  The Western press saw the ban as a courageous and important step on 
the part of the government considering the violence that the SA had perpetrated in 
previous months.  It was expected that Brüning’s decision might cause an intense 
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struggle, and to the British and American press it proved that the chancellor and 
his supporters were ready for such a fight.341  His decision, which appeared as the 
resolute action of a leader dealing with a dangerous political movement, had no 
effect upon Nazi support in the Prussian elections.  The ban also initiated a chain 
of events that ended with Hitler as the chancellor of Germany.
Though several German states held elections on April 24, none was more 
important than the one in Prussia. Comprising more than half of the country, the 
Prussian vote created almost as much scrutiny as the presidential campaign had.  
When the results were announced, Time magazine informed its audience that, 
despite Hitler’s setback in the presidential campaign, Germany had continued its 
march toward a fascist government.  The Nazis increased their representation in 
the Prussian Landtag from 6 to 162 members.  They were by far the largest party 
in the state parliament, yet could not count on a majority even with the support of 
the Nationalist party.  Only a coalition with the Center party would allow the 
Nazis control, and some sources saw this as a certainty.  Most assumed a political 
deadlock was likely to occur.342
Based on Hitler’s support for the presidency, the outcome of the election 
was not unexpected.  The New York Times acknowledged that the result was 
unpleasant, but would have been worse had the Nazis won a majority.  The Times 
called the election the third time Hitler had been kept from power during 1932.  
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Since the percentage support for the party was not significantly greater than in the 
presidential elections, the paper declared again that the Nazis might have reached 
their high-water mark.  The Nation believed that Hitler might be forced to temper 
his demands in order to cooperate with the Center Party and forge a coalition 
government in Prussia.343  These newspapers had a right to be somewhat 
optimistic, because support for the Nazis as a percentage of the population was 
close to topping out, at least during what remained of the Weimar Republic.344  
By the end of April, the political repercussions of the ban on the SA began 
to take its toll on the Brüning government.  When the prohibition of the Nazis’ 
para-military organization was put into place, one of Groener’s subordinates, 
General Kurt von Schleicher, voiced his opposition to the move. He was a protégé 
of several important military figures in the Weimar era, including Hans von 
Seeckt and Groener.  Von Schleicher played an important role as the army’s 
representative within the government.  He thought trying to break the Nazi 
movement outright was not productive.  He imagined it was possible to bring the 
Nazis into a governing coalition and exert control over Hitler.  Von Hindenburg 
shared this belief, and von Schleicher began using his contacts and personal 
influence to undermine the chancellor, Brüning.345  Evidence of von Hindenburg’s 
receptiveness to such overtones became apparent when the president demanded 
that all militant organizations be banned so that the decree against the SA did not 
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seem so one-sided.346  Von Schleicher met Hitler in late April and early May to 
determine if he could count on his support for a new government in exchange for 
lifting the ban on the SA and for holding new Reichstag elections.347   The 
Brüning government began to collapse shortly thereafter.
When the Reichstag reconvened on May 10, Groener came under attack 
for outlawing the SA, especially from the Nazis.  He had little support from 
conservative backers, and found no other choice but to resign his post as minister 
of defense.348  The Western press described the assault on the minister and 
explained that a staunch opponent of the Nazis had been ousted from his post.349  
Towards the end of May, a lack of confidence in Brüning’s abilities expressed by 
von Hindenburg caught American and British journalists off guard, and events led 
quickly to the chancellor’s resignation.  The only information available 
immediately was that von Hindenburg was upset with Brüning’s land 
redistribution policies in East Prussia.350  
Brüning’s plan to break up three large aristocratic estates gave the 
president an opportunity to act upon the suggestions of the highly conservative 
circle surrounding him.  It saw the chancellor’s cooperation with the socialists as 
leading the country down a Marxist path, and von Schleicher’s intrigues had 
weakened Brüning’s position immensely.  Another group of ministers had already 
been prepared to lead the country even before he was forced to give up his office.  
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On the recommendation of von Schleicher, von Hindenburg appointed Franz von 
Papen, a member of the Center party with an aristocratic background, as the new 
chancellor.  His cabinet was made up of conservative and nationalists who shared 
von Papen’s upper-class background.351
By early June it was clear that political intrigue had been the main 
component of Brüning’s downfall.  Time reported that several German generals 
had been planning the chancellor’s removal for months.352  The Manchester 
Guardian Weekly and the Washington Post considered the change in German 
chancellors unsettling.  Von Papen’s newly appointed cabinet in no way 
represented German voters.  It was made up of a group of men the papers 
expected to facilitate a Nazi takeover.353  The New York Times maintained the 
opinion that as long as von Hindenburg was in office there would be no problems. 
Though the members of the new government might harbor militarist interests, the 
paper assumed that they knew there was no way Germany could fight another 
war.  It hoped that a new nationalist government might be more effective in 
dealing with Hitler than Brüning’s moderate cabinet.354  That was the case as long 
as the government acquiesced to the Nazis on the issue of new elections.
Hitler said little while events that brought the new government to power 
unfolded.  The Western press had almost nothing to say about the Nazis or their 
leader while the government shift took place.  Aside from more violence, which 
included a Nazi-communist brawl in the Prussian Landtag, the most interesting 
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report dealing with the movement was one in which Hitler expressed his desired 
role for German women.  The New York Times covered a speech in which he 
declared “I am sorry, but I have no use for female politicians and female deputies.  
It is the job of men to take the future of the Reich upon their shoulders and to 
work and fight for the women in order to win their love.”  The Nazis’ chauvinist 
view of women had been used against them in previous political campaigns, but it 
was another fundamental point of the party’s platform.355  The party had little 
reason to attract attention with anything more insightful than this speech, having 
been informed that plans were underway to bring down Brüning.  Its only 
demands of the new government were that the Reichstag be dissolved, new 
elections held, and the ban on the SA lifted.  Von Papen announced the new 
election shortly after assuming office, and the Nazis publicized the decision as a 
great reward for the work and sacrifice of the NSDAP’s members.356  Hitler and 
other Nazi leaders believed the new Reichstag would give them an outright 
majority and control of Germany.
The Nazis carried out another extensive propaganda campaign, though 
funds for such exertions were becoming an issue.357  Violence characterized the 
effort more than before, especially once the ban on the SA was lifted in mid-June 
by the von Papen government. The decision met with opposition from several 
German states, mainly in the south.  By the end of June the violence had become 
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so intense that von Papen pleaded with Hitler to rein in his troops.358  Western 
editorials were pessimistic about a situation characterized by so much turmoil.  
The Times argued that von Papen had overestimated his ability to control the 
Nazis, and that he might be playing a role similar to that of Alexander Kerensky, 
a leader in the Russian government for a short time in 1917 after the fall of the 
Czar and before the Bolshevik takeover under Lenin.  The Washington Post 
doubted if there was any way to keep the country out of the hands of the National 
Socialists.  It believed that the elections would bring the Nazi “hot heads” into 
power.  The paper assumed that the von Papen regime was hoping that the 
election would produce a political deadlock, making its rule through presidential 
backing secure.359  
The New York Times predicted that the Nazis would be unable to obtain 
their goal of a majority, but that a coalition containing the party and other 
conservative and middle class parties was a possibility.  The paper reported that 
the Nazis continued to agitate against German Jews as a part of their plans for a 
new Germany: “Naturally, into this idea of German world mastery the Jew does 
not fit, so Nazi theory relegates him to a position of inferiority, and the Nazi 
program actually contemplates stopping Jewish immigration, the restoration of the 
Ghetto, the exemption of the Jews from military service, barring them as judges 
and educators, printing their writings only in Gothic type and other absurdities.”  
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The author of the story, journalist Frederick T. Birchall, however, did not believe 
that the Nazis would be able to implement such radical policies, whatever the 
outcome of the election.360  Birchall did not realize that such absurdities were an 
integral part of Hitler’s plans and that some of them would be imposed on 
German Jews when the Nazis took over.
The July Reichstag election produced a dramatic increase in Nazi 
representation, but left the party far from domination.  The Nazis won 230 seats 
out of 608, making them the largest party in the legislature.  While it appeared to 
be an impressive performance, the Nazis did not receive a majority in the 
parliament and were unlikely to form a coalition with enough partners to support 
a Nazi chancellorship.361  Apprehension in the American and British press 
decreased when the Nazis failed to garner a significantly higher percentage of 
votes than in the presidential election.  For while Hitler had received 36.8% of the 
vote in April, the party received only 37% in the July election.362  The press 
assumed the party was disappointed with the outcome, and that von Papen had to 
be encouraged.  Because a coalition was doubtful, his government would 
continue.  The Washington Post feared that discontented Nazi supporters might 
start a new Putsch, even though Hitler did not consider that an option.363  The 
New York Times concluded that German voters had rendered a clear message on 
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the topic of Hitler – namely that the movement had been stopped at 37% of the 
electorate and could expect little more.364  
The election brought the party to a crossroads.  Goebbels exemplified this, 
stating that faith in ever gaining a majority in the legislature was considered 
unlikely.  Hitler was unsure what his next move should be, but soon he decided to 
seek an arrangement with the figure who had engineered Brüning’s downfall, von 
Schleicher.  Hitler believed the election, though indecisive, enabled him to 
negotiate from a position of strength.365  Upon meeting von Schleicher on August 
5, Hitler demanded most of the important positions in a new and reconfigured 
cabinet.  He wanted the chancellorship for himself.  The party was also to have 
control over the Ministry of the Interior as well as the same ministry for the state 
of Prussia.  Von Schleicher was disinclined to make that kind of agreement, but 
negotiations continued for the first half of the month.366  The Western press 
expected a compromise placing Hitler in the office of chancellor or at least giving 
the Nazis a significant share of the national government.  By August 12, the press 
assumed that Hitler would get the go-ahead from von Hindenburg to form a new 
cabinet, creating a new and possibly dangerous situation in Europe.367  
When they met Hitler on the 13th, Von Papen and von Schleicher were 
unwilling to turn over control; instead they offered the Nazi leader solely the 
newly created post of vice-chancellor.  Hitler turned down the offer outright, and 
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the American and British press cheered the event as a republican victory over 
Nazism.368  Hitler considered this turn of events a defeat, and the German 
government was left floundering regarding the form it would take.  One option 
included doing away with the Reichstag altogether and creating a type of 
dictatorship through the office of the president.369  While the Nazis had been 
willing to tolerate the von Papen government as long as they believed the 
chancellor would help the party gain control, the refusal to grant Hitler’s wishes 
led to yet another political crisis.
The newly elected Reichstag assembled at the end of August.  Upon 
meeting, Nazi Hermann Goering was elected as the legislature’s president.370  The 
New York Times conceded this was in line with precedent, since the Nazis had the 
largest delegation.  The paper considered the move a submissive act to the 
regulations of the constitution.  It assumed that Hitler’s failure to gain power had 
tempered him even further: “This is obviously not the Fascist leader who was to 
take control of Germany’s destinies by the strength of his good right arm.  One 
does not demand the right to be accepted as a Napoleon or a Lenin or a Mussolini.  
One just goes ahead and is Napoleon, Lenin, Mussolini.  The Hitler movement is 
being tamed visibly before our eyes.”371  In fact, Hitler adhered to constitutional 
strictures to further his cause, not because he held them sacred, and when the 
opportunity came to oust von Papen, he jumped at the opportunity.
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At the September 12 meeting of the Reichstag, unexpectedly the 
communists proposed a vote of no-confidence in von Papen, which would force 
him to resign his post if carried.  Von Papen had obtained an order from the 
president giving him the ability to dissolve the legislature at will, but when he 
attempted to prevent the communist-proposed vote and disband the diet, Goering 
should have stopped the vote and allowed von Papen to speak.  Instead Goering 
ignored the chancellor.  The vote was against von Papen overwhelmingly, but the 
chancellor claimed that the dissolution decree took precedence over the vote.372  
Von Papen won the struggle, yet the vote illustrated clearly that he had almost no 
support from the various political parties.  He was forced to call new Reichstag 
elections, which were scheduled for November 6.  Hitler entered this new 
campaign energetically, attacking the government that had not allowed him to 
take over what he considered his destined position at the head of the German 
government.373
The Nazi leader made speeches all over the country in October, including 
once on the 2nd in which he exhorted thousands of Hitler Youth members to hold 
the nation in the highest esteem.  He told his audience that its generation would 
never accept a policy of fulfillment, or carrying out the provisions of the 
Versailles Treaty.374  Despite Hitler’s enthusiasm, it was well known that the 
Nazis were not doing well with voters.  Guido Enderis, a correspondent for the 
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New York Times, wrote that Hitler was waging a preventive campaign to stave off 
an anticipated defection of supporters.  Journalists assumed that the Nazis were 
going to lose a large number of their Reichstag seats.  The Washington Post
placed the expected losses at anywhere from 25 to 60.  The Times assumed that 
Hitler’s support, which it claimed was solely an expression of discontent, could 
not have been expected to last.375  Such predictions were accurate, and the 
election led to the first major setback for the party since it burst into political 
prominence in 1930.
When the election was held on November 6, the Nazis lost 10% of their 
support and 4.7% of their proportional representation.  Nevertheless the NSDAP 
remained the largest Reichstag party.  It was reported that the results came as no 
surprise to Hitler.376  The outcome had likewise been expected by Western 
journalists.  The only obvious conclusion that it yielded was that a political 
deadlock would continue.  Von Hindenburg was viewed as the only stable part of 
the entire German government.  American newspapers, especially the New York 
Times, declared the election the beginning of the end for the Nazis.  The Times 
argued that any prospect of Hitler controlling the country was finished.377  Time
magazine declared that the election had tamed Hitler, since his party had lost 
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almost 40 seats in the legislature.378  The American and British press did not 
dwell on the reasons behind the Nazi losses.  It assumed that von Papen and von 
Schleicher had attempted to implement a policy emphasizing several important 
aspects of the Nazis’ own platform, especially dealing with reparations and 
rearmament, so there was little reason for voters to support the party.  The result 
was seen as the beginning of the end of German radicalism.379
 There were several reasons behind the decrease in support for the Nazis 
that the Western press did not comprehend.  Many of the party’s local branches 
had begun to run out of money following several intense electoral efforts.  By 
November, it was difficult to obtain donations for propaganda from a populace 
grown tired of the political chaos.380  In addition, the party had shifted its
emphasis from the middle classes, believing that it had exhausted its support from 
that segment of the population.  Greater importance was placed on appealing to 
the working classes.  But this approach had a negative effect on voters fearful of 
the encroachment of Marxism.381   When the party lent its support to a transport 
strike in Berlin in the fall of 1932, it further alienated some of its middle class 
supporters.  Voters became disillusioned with Hitler as well when he refused to 
join the cabinet in August.  The apparent aimlessness of the party’s propaganda, 
which did not establish any firm program and promised instead only a glorious 
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future, began to drive away even NSDAP members.382  The Western press had 
described the party as a heterogeneous movement whose parts could not stay 
together for a long duration, and by the end of 1932 this appeared to be the case. 
The Nazis were going through a crisis of support, but the government was 
not doing much better in finding a way to administer the country effectively.  
After the November elections, von Papen was unable to find a majority in the 
Reichstag to support his chancellorship.  Von Schleicher began to undermine the 
chancellor, much as he had done earlier with Brüning.  He believed he could do a 
better job of creating a political consensus.383  On November 18, the Western 
press reported von Papen had resigned because of his inability to garner the 
legislative support necessary to continue the republican system in a normal 
fashion.384  
Hitler was expected to attempt to convince von Hindenburg to appoint him 
chancellor.  It was clear that no majority was possible, so the Nazi leader wanted 
the president to allow him to rule through presidential decree, suggesting his idea 
at a series of meetings on November 19 and 21.385  Von Hindenburg was against 
the proposal, demanding that Hitler find the necessary political support from the 
Reichstag before the president would give him the go-ahead to form a cabinet.  
After a series of interchanges between the Nazis and the president’s office, Hitler 
turned down the opportunity to form a cabinet, alleging too many constraints had 
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been placed upon him.386  Von Hindenburg was unwilling at that point to allow 
Hitler and the Nazis a large amount of power, assuming they would translate it 
into a dictatorship.387  The president was correct in his belief.  He hoped that some 
other option might prevent the creation of an authoritarian regime.
At the beginning of December, von Hindenburg decided to appoint von 
Schleicher chancellor, once again leaving Hitler out of the government.  The 
move was seen as the best option given the situation, and American and British 
journalists interpreted the president’s action as unwillingness to entrust the 
welfare of the country to radicals.388  Hitler let it be known that the Nazis would 
not support the government under any circumstances.389  Von Schleicher, who 
wanted to marginalize Hitler, hoped he would be able split the Nazi party by 
appealing to Gregor Strasser, the party leader who had been at odds with Hitler 
since the mid-1920s.  The possibility that von Schleicher would offer the vice-
chancellorship to Strasser was publicized, as was the prospect that a large 
segment of the party might pull away from Hitler should another Nazi join the 
government.  The overtures to Strasser created a crisis within the movement, but 
                                                
386 Guido Enderis, “Hitler Gets Chance to Combine Parties,” New York Times 20 November 
1932, 1; “German Cabinet Prospects; The President and Herr Hitler; Conditions of Hitler,” The 
Times 22 November 1932, 12c; “German Crisis; Herr Hitler and the President,” The Times 24 
November 1932, 12f; “Hitler Spurns Cabinet Offer as Too Limited,” Washington Post 22 
November 1932, 1.
387 Kershaw, Hitler, 394-395.
388 “Germany’s Cabinet Hiatus,” Washington Post 26 November 1932, 6; “General von 
Schleicher’s Turn,” The Times 3 December 1932, 11c; “Germany’s New Chancellor,” New York 
Times 3 December 1932, 16.
389 “Nazi Attitude,” The Times 5 December 1932, 12d; “Hitler Says Nazis Won’t Back Regime,” 
New York Times 3 December 1932, 7; “Christmas Chancellor,” Time January 12, 1933, 14.
155
Hitler pulled the party together and portrayed Strasser as a traitor.  His efforts 
were successful, and Strasser resigned from the party shortly thereafter.390  
The Western press took little notice of the party’s troubles.   It reported 
only that Strasser had gone on a leave of absence and that Hitler was assuming his 
duties.  Other German parties were apparently jubilant that a Nazi rupture was 
close, although Hitler had proven his control over the movement once again.391  
Following the November elections and the possibility of a split in the party, the 
Western press asserted justifiably that Nazism was falling apart.  The fact that 
there was still no agreement between the Reichstag and a cabinet appointed by the 
president, however, opened the door to Hitler’s takeover.
For much of January 1933, the U.S. and British press had little of interest 
to report on the NSDAP.  Now understanding that Strasser had the left the 
movement, it reported the outside chance that he would lead a split in the 
movement. The press believed also that the Nazis would tolerate the von 
Schleicher government out of fear of what new elections might mean for the 
movement.392  Early in the month there were reports that von Papen and Hitler 
were holding talks about overthrowing von Schleicher, though they denied this 
was the case.  Von Papen claimed he was trying to convince Hitler to support the 
chancellor.393  Despite von Papen’s statement, the two men came to an agreement 
that von Schleicher had to go.  Von Papen worked behind the scenes for most of 
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the month to secure the creation of a new government and the removal of von 
Schleicher.  Agreements were reached among various influential groups around 
the president that a Hitler chancellorship was the only workable solution to the 
government deadlock, as long as appropriate restraints on his authority were put 
in place.  Von Schleicher, who declared early in January that Hitler was no longer 
a threat, was faced with a vote of no confidence much as von Papen had when the 
last Reichstag met.  He requested that von Hindenburg give him the authority to 
dissolve the body and delay further elections.  When von Hindenburg was 
unwilling to do so, von Schleicher resigned on January 28.394  American and 
British journalists had no warning that any of this had taken place and that Hitler 
was about to become chancellor.
On January 27, the Times reported what it referred to as a sensational 
rumor.  Hitler had informed von Hindenburg that a presidential cabinet was no 
longer necessary for Nazi participation, though the position of chancellor still had 
to go to the Nazi leader.395  The insinuation that Hitler would be willing to join a 
more restrictive cabinet without unlimited presidential authority was made to von 
Hindenburg as von Schleicher’s situation deteriorated.  Reports explained that 
several powerful nationalist leaders, such as von Papen and Alfred Hugenberg, 
the leader of the German National People’s party, were seeking the chancellor’s 
downfall and replacement by Hitler.396  The information proved reliable once von 
Schleicher resigned.  The British and American press reported that von Schleicher 
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had asked von Hindenburg for his support against the Reichstag but was rebuffed.  
Upon von Hindenburg’s refusal, von Schleicher tendered his resignation, and the 
president accepted.397  Following von Schleicher’s resignation, Hitler went to the 
president to discuss the possibility of forming a new government.398  On January 
31, American and British newspapers announced that Hitler had been chosen by 
von Hindenburg the new chancellor of Germany.
The news that the Nazis held control of the government for the first time 
was greeted with apprehension by the Western press.  While expressing fears 
about potential Nazi radicalism, most assumed that Hitler would have little 
leeway given the makeup of his cabinet, which von Papen had handpicked.  Only 
two other Nazis were included.  Wilhelm Frick became the federal minister of the 
interior, while Hermann Goering assumed the title of minister without portfolio 
and gained control of the Prussian interior department. Von Papen received the 
post of vice-chancellor.  The New York Times declared that he had maneuvered 
Hitler into the cabinet, implying that von Papen would be the real figure 
exercising power.  American journalist Guido Enderis wrote: “The composition of 
the cabinet leaves Herr Hitler with no scope for gratification of any dictatorial 
ambition.”399  Indeed von Papen and Hugenberg, who became the minister of the 
economy, believed they now controlled Hitler.400  The Times assured its readers 
that von Hindenburg had not granted Hitler any special authority, yet noted that a 
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Nazi plan was being developed to grant the Nazi leader an enabling act through 
the Reichstag that would give him unlimited power for six months.401  Despite 
such information, most Western journalists felt confident that the Nazis had been 
harnessed by von Papen’s construction of the new cabinet.
In Great Britain the press was unsure what the new government would 
mean for the future.  Both the Manchester Guardian Weekly and The Times
assumed that the Nazis would suppress the socialists and communists since the 
national and Prussian police forces fell now under Nazi influence.  The Guardian 
called the election a triumph for Hugenberg because most of the cabinet was 
nationalist, which should give him a large amount of authority.  The Times noted 
that while most of the cabinet was nationalist, von Hindenburg had given in to 
Hitler in his demand for control of the police.  Both newspapers took a “wait-and-
see” attitude on the new government, though neither was optimistic.  The 
Guardian stated that with a government containing Hitler and Hugenberg 
anything was possible, while The Times noted that if Hitler found a Reichstag
majority difficult to obtain, he might do away with parliamentary government 
altogether.  The Times stated that the issue of rearmament would be watched 
closely in Great Britain and France, as the experiment of a Nazi government went 
forward.402  
Also, newspapers in the United States also believed for the most part that 
Hitler would have little room to implement his radical policies.  The Washington 
Post asserted that Hitler was surrounded by a cabinet of “strong men.”  The paper 
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admitted that his appointment as chancellor would keep tensions in Europe high, 
especially over the issue of territorial disputes, most importantly the Polish 
Corridor.  Nevertheless, the Post’s editors believed it was a good idea to allow 
Hitler the opportunity to govern since any lasting peace in Germany was not 
possible until the Nazis were given such a trial.403  The New York Times assumed 
also that the conservative cabinet could keep Hitler in check.  It listed other 
factors expected to oppose the Nazis should they attempt any radical policies.  
The paper argued that German labor movements were ready to strike in order to 
force Hitler out if need be.  The supposed stalwart of the republic, von 
Hindenburg, would also block Nazi extremism because he could remove Hitler at 
any time.  Therefore, the situation was not cause for “immediate alarm;” readers 
were told that Great Britain and France would follow the new government 
intently.  The paper’s editors closed their analysis of the situation with the hope 
that the German people themselves would be the most important barrier to the 
Third Reich: 
“But anxiety will not be relaxed nor vigilance abated so long as it is 
uncertain whether the new Chancellor of Germany is going to urge and 
seek to compel the German people to take a leap into the dark.  The step 
already taken is undeniably critical, and every subsequent one will be 
closely watched in the hope that the dominant German instinct for order, 
and the determination which Germans have repeatedly shown to stand by 
and defend and preserve their republic, may again triumph over every 
danger suddenly rising in their path.”404
For the Western press, 1932 had been a year of widespread political 
confusion in Germany that held serious consequences for the rest of the world.  
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Despite the major triumph of the Nazis in the July Reichstag election, the year 
was not a success for the movement.  It was rather a defeat for German political 
leaders who could find no way to bridge their ideological divides or suppress 
personal ambitions.  The inability to build a coalition resulted in von Hindenburg 
handing power to Hitler in January 1933.  American and British journalists thus 
witnessed the final victory of the Nazi party in assuming control of the German 
government, even though newspaper and magazine correspondents believed 
Hitler’s power would be limited.  Despite the brutality and harsh proclamations 
made by Hitler and his subordinates during the previous decade, the Western 
press hoped that his chancellorship would lead to stability and peace for Germany 
and Europe.  Western commentators believed that German democracy still 
functioned to some extent, and that the NSDAP would be unable to destroy it.  
German democracy had been dead for some time, though, and the Nazis wasted 
little time in imposing their control.
American and British writers did not proclaim that the Nazis were going to 
rebuild a German military machine and begin a series of wars, and the press had 
little reason to expect this.  Given the political instability in Germany, Hitler’s 
time in office was not expected to last long because the terms of his three 
predecessors had become progressively shorter.  The journalists had noted for the 
previous three years that the Nazis had little in the way of a real reformist 
program.  The writers had degraded Hitler’s leadership continually, stating that he 
had few of the capabilities possessed by Lenin and Mussolini.  Considering the 
odds against the party, the Western press had no reason to raise alarms.  What it 
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did not take into account, however, was Hitler’s ability to control and manipulate 
his own rapidly growing party, which the press admitted was composed of a wide 
variety of supporters.  The press never reported on the inner workings of the Nazi 
movement and how Hitler subordinated all threats to his position while expanding 
the party’s influence effectively in the 1920s and early 1930s.  That was a major 
oversight in its reporting and hence analysis.  Moreover, once in power, he and 
his closest supporters manipulated Germany’s long lasting economic and political 
crisis to create a dictatorship in a relatively short time.  Of this too, the Western 
press gave no inclination that it expected such an outcome following Hitler’s 




The February 8, 1933 edition of The Nation included an article describing 
how the new German cabinet would work.  Hitler was not considered the real 
head of the government; Franz von Papen, it was assumed, would exercise true 
authority.  The other leaders included in the cabinet were believed to have 
effective restraints on any excesses Hitler might attempt.  Just like the German 
leaders who maneuvered to form the Hitler-led government, The Nation expected 
that those around the Nazi leader would hem in his decision-making 
capabilities.405  Less than two months later, the situation had changed.  Hitler had 
created “…a Germany in which freedom and democracy dare not ever ask to 
live.”  The magazine reported widespread oppression and violence against Jews 
and communists, including some who had been placed in concentration camps. 
The Nazis had begun taking decisive measures to bar Jews from certain 
professions and the civil service.  Many were reported to be fleeing the country, 
and the imminent German physicist Albert Einstein declared that he would not 
return to Germany as long as the political situation remained so hostile.406  Many 
of the terrible policies that the Nazis had long stood for and which the Western 
press had reported emerged quickly in the nascent Third Reich.
Nevertheless, Deborah Lipstadt noted that following the party’s takeover 
in 1933, such early terrorism of the German Jewish community was rarely ever 
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the primary or sole focus of American press reports.407  The same had been true of 
most articles dealing with Nazi anti-Semitism printed from 1922 to 1933.  Though 
a handful of reporters recognized the intrinsic hatred of the Nazis towards the 
Jewish community, such views were exhibited infrequently.  When they did 
appear, it was generally not on the front page, where stories concerned with the 
political activities of the party were far more numerous.  In fact, only the New 
York Times consistently reported this aspect of NSDAP ideology over the course 
of the decade.  The paper was alone in relating several early Nazi threats of 
violence against the German Jewish community, but even it did not devote regular 
or prominent attention to what was the core of Hitler’s belief system before 1930.  
After the Nazi electoral victory that year, information on Nazi policy towards 
Jews was still uncommon.  The New York Times did make a point of reporting the 
fears of some within the American Jewish community of the dangers posed by 
such a violent party that now had a good deal of stature within the German 
political system.
The focus by the New York Times was one of the ways in which American 
coverage differed from the British press.  At times, American journalists were 
more interested in the ideological underpinnings of the National Socialists 
movement.  This was evident in the New York Times, but also in the magazine 
coverage of the The Nation and other American periodicals.  Also, the American 
press made a point to relate the various violent attacks or street fights carried out 
by Nazi storm troopers against their enemies as well as the overall aggressiveness 
of the movement.  The British press was concerned with the Nazis’ political 
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involvement and its effect on German affairs of state.  The Times in particular
focused on German politics, likely because of the impact it might have on the on 
the agreements on reparations created with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles.  
The Manchester Guardian Weekly echoed such sentiments, debating the role of 
reparations in the wake of the Nazis’ first major political victory in September 
1930.  For the most part, the American and British press reported many of the 
same events.  How such stories were presented, however, were influenced on 
occasion by the fact that Great Britain played a more active role in European 
politics, while the United States had a much more detached policy.
One aspect of the Nazi movement that the press from 1922 to 1933 made 
adequately clear to its audience was the inherent violence of the movement.   In 
November 1923, the Nazis displayed their violent methods in the Beer Hall 
Putsch, and such practices never ceased.  Even though Hitler claimed later that he 
would pursue only legal methods, the press was never fooled as the SA ran 
rampant through the country, helping push it into a virtual civil war.  By the early 
1930s, though, the press began to believe that the SA, and possibly the violence it 
represented, was unwanted by Hitler.  While Hitler started to experience problems 
controlling parts of his movement by 1933, he never discarded a belief in the 
virtue of conflict, aggression, and war.  Some of his subordinates, such as Gregor 
Strasser, expressed the necessity of war in the Nazi philosophy explicitly, and 
such reports made it clear that the Nazis would seek out a war to expand German 
territory.  No one pointed this out more clearly than American journalist Nicholas 
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Fairweather, who noted after a reading of Mein Kampf that Hitler dreamed of 
conquering lands to the east.  
Despite its perception of the movement’s ingrained violent and racist 
attitudes, the Western press did not appreciate the true threat a Nazi government 
presented.  Rather, it associated the National Socialist movement largely with 
chaos and instability.  Most journalists believed that when the Nazis came to 
power, they would fail to impose any systematic program and likely lead the 
country into a civil war and further suffering.  While Hitler’s organizational and 
oratorical skills were described as impressive, American and British journalists 
had little respect for what they perceived was his lack of real political experience.   
Journalists described him as a pale imitator of Mussolini or Lenin who would be 
unable to harness the German government to his radical ends.  
What the Western press failed to realize was that Hitler had been able to 
forge and maintain the Nazi party despite a diverse membership.  He and his 
closest advisors suppressed any internal threats and capitalized on every 
opportunity to increase his prominence in the movement.  Once in power, the 
Nazi leadership utilized a combination of force and opportunism to establish its 
effective control over Germany within a matter of months.  The Anglo-American 
press had described the party platform and its violent intentions adequately, but it 
did not pay sufficient attention to the inner party struggles and the party’s 
structure that were forced on Germany after January 1933.  The concept of 
obeying authority, of submitting absolutely to one’s superiors, was inculcated in 
German society, as was the almost religious reverence held by many Nazis for 
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Hitler.  In just a few years, Germany became a belligerent and dangerous nation 
that would attempt to fulfill the Nazis’ aggressive, territorial, and racist ambitions.  
Western journalists understood that Nazi policies were outlandish and barbaric, 
but they believed that such policies were impossible to implement within a 
republican framework.  American and British papers put too much faith in the 
very figures in the government who helped hand power to Hitler, officials who 
had no love of the democratic system itself.  
Overall, the Western press before 1933 presented an accurate picture of 
what the NSDAP stood for.  It characterized the movement at times as violent, 
racist, chauvinist, and bent on renewing a strong German state.  The Nazis were 
not seen as a singular threat, however, but as part of a larger problem in the 
German political situation, which included the specter of communism.  American 
and British journalists believed that most Germans wanted to repudiate the Treaty 
of Versailles; they understood and even sympathized with this, but hoped that 
Germans would choose a rational and moderate path of negotiation to do so.  In 
this they were wrong, and considering the Nazis’ outlandish demands and 
policies, most writers believed Hitler and his followers did not have the ability to 
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